Municipal debt/intergovernmental fiscal relations: a study of options and guidelines in the financing of local public goods and services by Rabinowitz, Alan
MUNICIPAL DEBT/INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS
A Study of Options and Guidelines in the
Financing of Local Public Goods and Services
by
Alan Rabinowitz
A.B., Yale College
(1948)
M.B.A., Harvard Graduate School of
Business Administration
(1950)
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of
Philosophy
at the
Massachusetts Institute of
Technology
June, 1969
Signature of Author
Department of Urban Studies and Planning, May 16, 1969
Certified by
Thesis Supervisor
Accepted by
Chai rman , Departmental Commi t tee
on Graduate Students
Rotch
loss. INST- TE. c4
'JUN 20 1969
L.IBR A RIES
   
Document Services 
 
 
Room 14-0551 
77 Massachusetts Avenue 
Cambridge, MA 02139 
Ph: 617.253.2800 
Email: docs@mit.edu 
http://libraries.mit.edu/docs
 
 
DISCLAIMER OF QUALITY 
 
Due to the condition of the original material, there are unavoidable 
flaws in this reproduction.  We have made every effort possible to 
provide you with the best copy available.  If you are dissatisfied with 
this product and find it unusable, please contact Document Services as 
soon as possible. 
 
Thank you. 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT
MUNICIPAL DEBT/INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS
A Study of Options and Guidelines in the
Financing of Local Public Goods and Services
Alan Rabinowitz
Submitted to the
Department of Urban Studies and Planning,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
on May 16, 1969,
in partial fulfillment
of the requirement for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Our subject is the role of municipal debt in the financing of
local public facilities in the United States. Our method is to
reconsider a classic statement of the purposes of municipal indebted-
ness in the light of history and of recent developments in the field
of intergovernmental fiscal relations in order to provide guidelines
for its use in the future.
The classic thesis asserts a municipality should finance only
"productive" capital investments, defined as those that generate
cash in the form of revenues from public enterprises and property
assessments. The antithesis is the sense of social responsibility
that impels expenditures beyond the fiscal capacity of local govern-
ments. We consider the "productivity' of actual expenditures and
the possibility of developing contemporary opportunities for
classically-productive municipal investment. Our study is in the
context of substantive changes during the 20th Century, including:
the income tax, the special district, the revenue bond, the federal
and State grant-in-aid systems, and the new willingness to compensate
for intra-metropolitan economic disparities and inter-jurisdictional
externalities.
One product of the analysis is an appreciation of the need for
a metric that differentiates the "productive" from the general-welfare
effect of the various purposes of municipal outlays and that can serve
as a standard in the distribution of both bloc and programmatic grants-
in-aid. Another product is an appreciation of the potential effective-
ness of new forms of special districts operating in the fields of
housing, health, education, transit, and other functions; if sub-
sidized by higher levels of government and equipped to furnish facili-
ties for occupancy and control by municipal agencies, their use would
change the demand for and the form of municipal indebtedness.
Our analysis shows that the forms of municipal indebtedness are
determined by political considerations to a substantial degree. A
major program of sharing federal revenues with the State-local sector
might eliminate some of the need for local indebtedness. Moreover,
municipal obligations might be bought by State or federal agencies
rather than by private investors, especially if bond interest becomes
subject to federal taxation and if the market for State-local securi-
ties continues to narrow. These factors, combined with the prospect
that facilities can be leased from new special districts, suggest
that municipal debt will diminish in significance. Until that time,
however, in the midst of the diversity of local government in America
and in recognition of the political compromises that result in sub-
optimal solutions, we conclude that the productivity principle
retains some power to generate constructive insights for those
concerned with the finances of an individual municipal general
government and with fiscal balance for the federal system.
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Title: Professor of Land Economics
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Chapter 1
TOWARD NEW POLICIES
A. Our approach to the subject
Our subject is the role that municipal debt should play in the
financing of local public facilities. Our objective is to provide
some needed and useful guidelines and perspectives for local officials
who are trying to make more efficient use of their community's
borrowing capacity and for those who are attempting to create a more
rational basis for intergovernmental fiscal relations.
What we do in this essay is to take a classic statement of the
purposes of municipal indebtedness and reconsider it in the light
of recent theories and trends in the multi-dimensional field of inter-
governmental relations. By this means, having used the original
statement as a working hypothesis to be validated and reinterpreted,
we arrive at a set of guidelines in Chapter 9.
The particular statement we investigate asserts that a muni-
cipality should finance only those capital investmenLs that promise
to be "productive," i.e., that would generate surplus revenues from
the operation of public service enterprises and/or that would stimulate
a flow of tax revenues to the municipality.
When we deal with this putative assertion in the context of real-
life intergovernmental relations, we find that its rigid logic of
(municipal) corporate finance must be tempered by a mature understanding
of the way in which the 80,000 diverse local governments implement
their citizens' individual perceptions of social responsibility,
political reality, and economic policy. Our national search for
equity has created the demand for high levels of public goods and
services well distributed among the population. Our national search
for efficiency has stimulated the formation of autonomous special-
district governments to administer and finance services that are
beyond the capability of individual municipal general governments.
Our national inclination for local self-government has inhibited the
establishment of direct operations by the federal and State govern-
ments but led to the creation of the grant-in-aid programs by which
these higher-level governments can simultaneously influence and help
finance local activities.
We begin our reconsideration of the productivity principle by
observing its development and application in the 19th Century, which
was also the period when national sentiments concerning the scope of
public enterprises and the relative merits of borrowing and taxation
were being turned into the legal foundation for municipal finance in
the several States (Chapter 2).
Continuing into the 20th Century, we see the old productivity
principle submerged as municipalities began to expand the range of
their activities in the public interest. At the same time, however,
the income and sales tax movements gave new fiscal muscle to the
federal and State governments, which undertook the construction of
many facilities contributing to the development of urban areas and
also supplemented municipal revenues with grants-in-aid. A second
important development was the emergence of the special district form
of government. Chapter 3 ends with an examination of the current
philosophies on fiscal balance, involving the reallocation of
revenues available to governments and the potential impact on the
municipal bond field from loss of tax exemption, the introduction of
economic stabilization and systems programming as factors in local
budgeteering, and the prospective sharing of federal revenues with
cities as well as States. The federal system, as we thus come to
see it, has found a variety of methods to compensate for the limita-
tions that the productivity principle imposes even on communities
that have the fiscal capacity to raise tax rates to cover increased
current and capital expenditures. We find, however, a definite need
for some means of measuring the strictly-productive and nonproductive
components that are mixed in each local investment. We also
discover in Chapter 4 that there are still many ways for municipali-
ties to obtain the use of facilities without recourse to the sale of
bonds and to acquire additional productive assets.
Next we turn to actual data for an indication of the extent to
which municipalities sell bonds for productive purposes. Chapter 5
includes a basic functional analysis of current and capital expendi-
tures by level of government, together with a case study of a
representative city (Worcester) in recent years. The study in
Chapter 6 of the types of bonds actually sold for productive and other
purposes returns the discussion to the function of indebtedness in
the system.
Our problem at this point is to define the normative elements
in the relation of municipal debt to the job of local governance.
The key to the analysis is the fact that each local political juris-
diction is required to have voter consensus to issue general obliga-
tion bonds and tends to resort to revenue bonds when a facility will
serve a population that is larger or smaller than the population
of the particular government. In short, voters do consider a bond
issue non-productive if the facility financed provides uncompensated
benefits for citizens of a political jurisdiction that is not co-
extensive with the issuer. Facilities that are productive in the
classic sense can be financed by either revenue or general
obligation bonds (Chapter 7).
We are then confronted with the task of providing a normative
basis for the whole system of municipal finance of which indebted-
ness is a part. The system we formulate is based upon the empirical
and theoretical findings of earlier chapters concerning the primary
functions of municipal governments; the tendencies for each level
of government to have predominent access to specified sources of
revenue; the need for a method of measuring the joint productive
and unproductive components of each type of municipal investment;
and the tendency for general obligation bonds to be associated
with certain kinds of productive projects. The system as we describe
it is optimal only in the sense that it seems to reflect reasonably
accurately both (a) the central tendencies of the existing structure
and (b) the form of fiscal balance advocated by such groups as the
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. In any case,
it provides a useful theory by which to evaluate the new types of
special district governments that are being established to finance
projects that would be non-productive for a municipal general
government (Chapter 8).
Guidelines for municipal governments and for the federal and
State dispensers of grants-in-aid are then presented in Chapter 9.
B. Context
The concept of "productivity" of local public investment stands
in contrast to, and as a limitation of, the more general concept of
local governments as purveyers of social welfare and other redistribu-
tive services to people. "Productivity" is not a 'term that can yet be
defined with precision, for, together with the fiscal benefits mentioned
earlier, it encompasses a range of intangible values for the citizens
footing the bill for the services provided. So long as fiscal imbalance
.characterizes the American federal system, however, we believe that the
concept will be useful in evaluating municipal expenditure patterns.
What fiscal imbalance means is that there is a gap between the
sources of funds and the governmental unit acking the expenditures.
The 20th Century has seen constructive changes in the composition of the
81,248 general, school, and rpcial-district gove Lents i the United
States as of 1967, in the programs of financial assistance offered by
the federal and State governments, and in the nature of the demand for
local public goods and services, but nothing has been done to free the
municipal general government from balancing its accounts in the same
manner as a bus'iness corporation (and with the same need for the productive
use of its fiscal resources). The reader is referred at this point to
Appendix I, our study of the formal relationship in any municipality
between intergovernmental revenues, property tax and other local revenues,
borrowings, and current and capital outlays.
We recognize that many public expenditures are "productive" for the
nation as a whole. The value of good health and a good education for the
the individual and hence for the nation are clearly in this category. The
question to be faced is the extent to which such social welfare
expenditures at the local level can be productively related to the
municipality's own economic and fiscal expectations. For economists
generally, "productivity" implies the creation of net benefits (however
defined) and is related to the doctrine that inves~tment is warranted in
any program up to the point at which the marginal utility of investment
in all alternative programs is equal.
However, we are dealing with local general governments whose juris-
dictions are not ordinarily coextensive with the domains of those who pay
for or benefit from the public services produced. We have, therefore,
Lurned to the more restrictive definit-ion of productivity for a local
public economy, covering only investments that generate cash profits from
public enterprises and/or a flow of tax revenues, as originally formulated
in the writings of Bastable and AdAs. In the text, we also exaine the
proposition that a fraction of each type of social welfare expenditure
falls within the definition of the productivity of local public invest-
ments, because that fraction provides public services that support a
given property valuation in a given community. The discriminating power
of this expanded "productivity" concept is particularly useful when, for
the usual mixture of political and economic reasons, that community can
no longer simply increase its tax rate to generate the revenues required.
In the last analysis, liberal-conservative politics is the stuff of
which municipal bond finance is made. We write in the context of change,
and there are a number of reasons to expect more fundamental alterations
in the structure of intergovernmental fiscal relations than mignt have
been likely before the intense pressure of urban growth in the post-World-
War II decades gave the subject its present high priority:
(a)
The cities can now claim to be full members of the federal system,
bearing independent responsibilities formerly subsumed to the States.
The growing status of the cities since the 1930's is a well-documented
reaction to the emergence of social and economic issues that the States
were unprepared to handle but which could be approached with federal
programs administered by city governments or metropolitan districts.2
(b)*
For the first time, reasonably adequate data about the operations
of an exceedingly complex system have become available and have been
analysed. 3
(c)
In contrast to earlier generations, our perceptions of ineffi-
ciencies of government in the metropolis, of inequalities in the
distribution of public goods and services, and of the divergent
politics of suburbs and central cities as people confront the issues
of race and poverty have all become razor sharp in recent years.
These perceptions impel the nation, for the sake of domestic tran-
quility and the general welfare, toward structural reforms of the
federal system and toward the introduction of a permanent sharing of
federal revenues with State and local government.
(d)
Change, or at least what Gardner calls continuous renewal of our
antiquated institutions, has become as necessary as it is desirable. 4
The drain on our resources, caused by the tremendous increase in demand
for public services as well as the wastes connected with the Viet Nam
was, have brought us to the verge of fiscal embolism. One sees new
stridency in taxpayer revolts (such as the 1968 fight in California
over the Watson Amendment), school systems that close in mid-term for
lack of funds, cutbacks in local welfare budgets, and, not least, new
bond issues of high quality withdrawn because no bids were forthcoming
from underwriters in the glutted market for tax-exempt State and local
securities.5
The basic policy questions as to the role of municipal debt to
which this dissertation is addressed have been treated only lightly,
if at all, in the mass of descriptive and analytic studies of fiscal
imbalance in the American federal system that have been published
since World War II. We think it important to explore them now, in the
hope of contributing some needed and useful perspectives to those
immersed in the day-to-day scramble to finance capital expenditures,
sell bond issues, balance local budgets, incorporate new programs,
and find new methods of raising and distributing revenue, all in
competition with other units of government.
Chapter 2
DEVELOPMENTAL STAGE
A. Critical episodes in the 19th Centuryl
APPENDIX B: Historical Foundations of the
Structure of Local Borrowing
for Public Goods
In the beginning, cities were small, municipal services were
limited with respect to both supply and demand, and the need for local
public capital was slight. The nation was eager to develop its
interior, and, in order to finance "internal improvements," the
federal government was instructed to sell public lands. Surplus
revenues therefrom were to be, and were, distributed to the States.
The idyllic character of the structure was shattered by events,
but certain principles represented by the original concept need to
be exhumed for present use. The range of public services at the level
of the city was indeed narrow, and it was proper to assume that local
citizens would be able to finance whatever improvements were voted by
the freeholders. There was little question but that certain public
goods that served the general or national interest (at that time
primarily represented by economic development projects such as canals
and turnpikes) should be financed by the federal government from its
delegated sources of revenue (primarily sales from the Public Domain).
The first situation to corrode this idyll was a triumph of
localism, the refusal on the part of States to permit the national
government to manage the "internal improvements" it could finance.
Thus came Monroe's veto of the Cumberland Road Bill and Jackson's
veto of the Maysville Road Bill.
Next came the drying up of federal sources of income as
revenues from the Public Domain petered out. The availability of
taxes on incomes at that point in the 1830's would have preserved
the structure of intergovernmental fiscal relations conceived by the
founders. When, after a few reckless years and under the protection
of the XIth Amendment, certain State governments defaulted on their
debt obligations, both the federal and State levels of government
were left without the ability to finance local public capital
investment projects.
The original structure of intergovernmental fiscal relations
was then turned upside down. The debacle of State credit truncated
the direct role of the States after all efforts to have the federal
government assume the burden, along the lines of the 1843 Congres-
sional Report on Relief of the States, had been in vain.2 Although
restrictions were placed by voters upon the States' freedom to
incur debt and levy taxes, the prohibitions did not appear to apply
to the local subdivisions their legislatures could create.
Internal improvements were still demanded across the land. It
was reasonable to be sanguine about America's economic prospects,
and immigration was providing large amounts of labor to develop both
the interior and the rapidly growing cities. Thus it happened that
municipal corporations, those political subdivisions of the States
that did not have the States' sovereign immunity from suits for the
payment of debt, became the fiscal tools of a new breed of economic
developers, private entrepreneurs who happily agreed to employ the
funds that municipal corporations could borrow.
Financing for railroad companies was added to a long list of
other industrial, commercial, and banking needs of the economy, and
the federal government was generous in its support of railroad
building, providing large tracts of land for the purpose. The
States were impelled to pass liberal laws for the incorporation of
unregulated development corporations as "it became the general cry
that public works should be carried on by private enterprise;"
moreover, "it was no difficult task" to obtain authority from State
legislatures to enable minor civil divisions to issue bonds in favor
of private corporations of many types, including banking establish-
ments.3
Hillhouse, in his masterful analysis of municipal bond. trends
and defaults between the 1840's and 1930's, points out that the
practices involving municipalities and private corporations referred
to above began before the retirement of the States from the field,
and it was only the process that was accelerated after the 1840's.4
Municipal debt went from $20 million in 1840 to $200 million in
1860, $328 million in 1870, and, in spite of the growing disillusion-
ment with the profitability of the financial and industrial ventures
for which municipal credit had been tapped, to $702 million in 1880,
in the middle of the last period of repudiation.5 The entrepreneurial
disappointments, combined with new taxes imposed to service the
debts, led to borrowing and taxing restrictions upon municipalities
during the 1865-1880 period, similar to those that had yoked the
State governments a generation earlier:
Prior to the panic year 1873 comparatively little
notice seems to have been taken of local debts....
The crisis of 1873 gave an opportunity for a full,
if somewhat hysterical discussion of the whole
question of municipal indebtedness and the serious
nature of the situation was exposed.6
The cities themselves continued to grow rapidly, and by the early
1890's municipal indebtedness had resumed its upward pace. Cities
entered the 20th Century with a full set of constitutional and
statutory restrictions, and some of the larger cities were already
severely pinched by these limitations on taxing and borrowing powers.
Unfortunately, a side effect of overturning the original fiscal
structure was to debase even further the concept of public service
in local government. In many localities, municipal officials were
hardly more than useful adjuncts to the private sector and to machine
politicians until the situation became so bad that the municipal
reform movement began to take hold in the 1880's.
The municipal reformers succeeded in improving municipal admini-
stration by introducing civil service, accounting controls, and
various mechanisms for elections. They succeeded in widening the
scope of services provided, especially in education and health
(including building regulations). They failed to provide new revenue
25
sources to match the new responsibilities, and they failed to keep
the new suburban communities within the fiscal orbit of the older
cities which were the object of their concern.
APPENDIX C: Note on the Municipal
and Intergovernmental
Reform Movements
B. Policy on private vs. public enterprise
Private enterprise under laissez-faire principles came into its
own with respect to social capital when the sovereign federal and
State governments abandoned the field in the decade or so before
the Civil War. At the same time, cities were growing rapidly, and
there remained the memory and continuing example of local governments
in both Europe and America that owned and operated necessary utilities,
that obtained revenues from the sale and rental of land and commer-
cial facilities and franchises, and that enjoyed surplus revenues
which could be devoted to general municipal purposes. The situation
is well described in the quotation from Mumford's The City in History:
"Neither a pure water supply, nor the collective
disposal of garbage, waste, and sewage, could be
left to the private conscience or attended to
only if they could be provided for at a profit.
"In smaller centers, private companies might be
left with the privilege of maintaining one or
more of these services, until some notorious out-
break of disease dictated public control; but in
the bigger cities socialization was the price of
safety; and so, despite the theoretic claims of
laissez-faire, the nineteenth century became, as
Beatrice and Sidney Webb correctly pointed out,
the century of municipal socialism. Each indivi-
dual improvement within the building demanded its
collectively owned and operated utility: water-
mains, water reservoirs, and aqueducts, pumping
stations: sewage mains, sewage reduction plants,
sewage farms. Only the public ownership of land
for town extension, town protection, or town
colonization was lacking. That step forward was
one of the significant contributions of Ebenezer
Howard's garden city." 8
Municipal socialism refers to the extension of function to include
the provision of utilities and welfare services (including education)
that were either not necessary for pre-19th Century cities or were
provided, if at all, within the private sector. Public education,
in fact, was added to municipal responsibilities at the end of the
19th Century. The first inventory of municipal public schools and
ownership of revenue-producing facilities was made about 1900.9
The best program for municipal socialism was provided by the
Fabians.1 0  They observed that the growth of cities in the 19th
Century created a greater demand for utility services and social
services than had been required in cities before the Industrial
Revolution. They held that cities should be able to provide such
services from revenues from the property values such growth sustained.
Municipally-owned utilities, therefore, should produce the necessary
surplus revenues for social services. They saw no reason to give
away such sources of revenue to the private sector.
In America, the typical community chose to offer the municipal
social services but gave away its right to derive revenue from
11
utility services. This set of choices was characteristically
American -- good-hearted in offering education but devoted to private
enterprise as the means of providing "public" utilities. The choice
made fiscal imbalance inevitable.
In the United States, municipal bonds have often been issued to
finance municipally-owned "public utilities" (as distinct from
public bonds whose proceeds were to be advanced to privately-owned
utility companies). Communities made their choices at the end of the
19th Century and the beginning of the 20th Century as to whether
their needs would be better served by public or private operations.
Over time, experience with municipally-owned utilities has eroded the
28
earlier concept that services should be provided "at cost", and recent
writings indicate a tendency to return to the even more ancient
concept of municipal ownership as a source of surplus revenues, much
to the distress of "conservatives" and often to the delight of local
12
taxpayers.
C. Policy on borrowing vs. taxation
Another basic conflict that runs through the financial history
of local government in America relates to the choice between taxation
(and pay-as-you-go finance) and borrowing. Taxation was not intended
when the federal and State governments set about to construct
"internal improvements" in the early 19th Century: the growth of the
economy was supposed to provide revenues by means of user charges and
sales of land to pay interest and retire debt. As the British press
observed when some States repudiated their debts in the 1840's, the
Americans were loath to tax themselves in order to service their
debt.1 3  The methods of taxation become established in the restrictive
laws of the later 19th Century and provided for combinations of
benefit taxation (either as user charges, special assessments, or
pay-as-you-go plans) and general taxation (with ad valorem property
taxes as a rough index of ability-to-pay).
The fear of governmental irresponsibility in issuing debt led
to innumerable restrictions on the freedom of States, and then muni-
cipalities, to sell bonds for public improvements. Current opinion
in intergovernmental relations seems to favor relaxation of refer-
endum requirements and other substantive revision, even abolition,
of arbitrary restrictions of this type, while preserving the
principle that borrowing to spread capital costs over the generations
that benefit should be limited in scope and amount. 1 4
The fear of taxation to service bond issues and to extend the
financial resources of (corrupt?) local officials led to complementary
restrictions on the power of local governments to tax the property
that represented their major source of revenue. Unfortunately, as
the economic historians of the late 19th Century recognized,
American cities had given away their birthright to the private
corporation, for, in general, cities did not obtain either revenues
from or control over the level of service provided by privately-
owned "public" utilities.
The search for alternatives to the property-tax/debt-limit
bind intensified in the 20th Century. Durand's V300 study for the
American Economic Association, "Taxation as a Partial Substitute
for Borrowing to Cover the Cost of Permanent Municipal Improvements,"
is an early example of economic thought on the subject.15 Local
governments have been moderately successful in finding alternative
tax sources, especially at the State level where non-property
taxation is more feasible, but property-secured general obligation
debt had commensurate growth through the expansionist periods of
the 1920's and the post-World War II era as the property tax bases
of local governments responded to new construction and inflation.1 6
The current pattern is illustrated by data in the 1962 Census
of Governments, as calculated by the Advisory Commission on Inter-
governmental Relations and as shown in Figure 3, where we have
plotted each State's tax effort index against its percentage of
total State-local revenues derived from property taxes.1 7
In general, the older States rely more heavily on property taxes.
Chamberlain remarks, in his 1913 critique, that the southern States,
notorious for repudiating debt, were also unwilling to tax themselves,
and the southern contingent still shows low levels of both tax
effort and property taxation.1 8 The tendency for slow-growing low-
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population States in the West to have fairly high tax effort indexes,
and for the higher-income industrial States to have somewhat lower
tax-effort records, can also be seen in the current pattern. Special
note should be made of the positions of California and New York,
where high levels of social programs for large urban populations have
brought them into the higher ranges of tax effort.
Chapter 3
MAJOR POLICY ISSUES IN THE 20TH CENTURY
A. Initial conditions and change in sources of revenue
1. Initial Conditions
The 20th Century is notable for two additions to the system of
intergovernmental fiscal relations of major significance to the
municipal bond field. These two factors are (1) the Constitutional
Amendment concerning the income tax and (2) the Supreme Court's
decision giving local government status to special districts which
do not have the power to tax.
In all other respects, we continue to operate under the frame-
work developed in the 19th Century. That framework, sharply limiting
municipal powers through State restrictions on taxing and borrowing,
is based upon Judge Dillon's 1868 ruling in City of Clinton v. Cedar
Rapids and Missouri Railroad Company, 24 Iowa 455, later upheld by
the Supreme Court.2 "Dillon's Law," as it has come to be known,
sets out unequivocally that a municipal corporation has no rights
except those permitted by State legislative acts and constitutions.
To change that framework, it is well recognized that pressure must be
brought upon State governments, a conclusion that has led to the
effort to force reappowtionment of their legislatures, and, in any
case, to obtain enactment of the kinds of enabling legislation,
administrative reorganizations, and subsidies outlined by such
organizations as the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations (ACIR).
The muckrakers and the municipal reformers worked diligently to
improve municipal administration at the turn of the Century (and
began the studies now carried on by ACIR). One result of their
concern was the collection and analysis of facts and figures about
cities that had never been available before. The National Re-
sources Planning Board discovered in the 1930's, when the federal
interest in urbanism and the problems of cities began to be
formalized, that the data were better in 1900 than they were imimedi-
ately prior to World War II. The story of the attempt to correct
this dearth of data is told in:
APPENDIX D: Development of
Data Sources.
At the turn of the Century, the original debate as to the most
socially useful form for the city to take in order to be both effi-
cient and accountable to the needs of people was tapering off.
Bryce had already noted how the development of suburbs allowed the
rich to escape the burden of inner city taxes and debt burdens.4
Such eminent writers as Ely (in The Coming City) were still advocat-
ing social control of public facilities and utilities as a means
of instituting reform and preventing the dismemberment of the
community through suburbanization.5
With few abatements in the century following the Civil War, the
centripetal growth of urban populations, the centrifugal movements
to the suburbs within urban areas, the general expansion in public
activities of both the welfare and revenue-producing types, and the
proliferation of special-function district-type governments con-
tinued. The first reasonably accurate enumeration of local govern-
ments in the United States was not available until the mid 1930's. 6
Older cities had largely made their choices by 1900, in
accordance with state laws, as to whether their public schools would
be a component of the municipal administration ("dependent" schools)
or subject to administrative control and finance by an independent
board or commission with the power of taxation. Since the 1920's,
there has been a consistent effort to merge and otherwise reduce the
number of independent school districts selling tax-supported bonds, while
several states have established school building authorities whose
bonds are secured solely by leases from tax-supported governments.
2. Change in sources of revenue
Between 1902 and 1913, the dollar volumes in State and local
finance doubled, whether measured in terms of revenues, expenditures,
capital outlays or debts outstanding; and the municipal component was
five times as great as the States' total.7 Federal programs contri-
buted $7 million in 1902 and $12 million in 1913, while property taxes
represented 70 percent of total State-local revenues.
Between 1913 and 1927, the volumes generally tripled, but the
States had become slightly more active, their expenditures being one-
third as great as their subdivisions' totals by 1927, a year when
the total federal contribution had risen to $116 million.
Figure 4 shows a steady growth of all sources of revenue to
cover the widening scope of local expenditures. Property taxes, 66
percent of total State and local revenues in 1927, represented not
quite 30 percent of the total $83 billion in Fiscal 1965-66. Revenue
from taxes on sales, gross receipts, individual and corporate in-
comes had risen through the years to represent 31 percent of the total
in fiscal 1965-66, slightly more than the share from property taxes.
The category, "all other revenues," including licenses and other
taxes and charges and miscellaneous revenues but not including
revenues of publicly owned utilities and liquor stores or. of insur-
ance-trust activities, has increased in amount to over $19 billion
but, as a share of total revenues, represented about the same
percentage in 1965-66 as in 1927, slightly less than a quarter.
Meanwhile, $116 million from the federal government in 1927 had
increased to a figure of $13 billion in 1965-66, representing not quite
16 percent of the total revenues received.8
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B. Circumventing restrictions with special districts and revenue bonds
The way in which both State and local governments established
special districts for the performance of one or more public or quasi-
public functions, operating over one or more political jurisdictions,
with and without the power to tax, and more or less responsive to the
direction of rational planners and to the electorate, is one of the
major topics in 20th Century local finance.9
We begin by noting that special districts have been financed
by both guaranteed (general obligation) and non-guaranteed (revenue
bond) types of debt obligations.
Revenue bonds are secured by a pledge of operating revenues,
tolls, charges, and sometimes by a given tax source, without the
general pledge of the taxing power. Long used, but sparingly, for
financing utilities, revenue bonds have come into prominence after
extended litigation in connection with the bonds issued by the
Triborough Bridge Authority (N.Y.C.) and the Port of New York
Authority. The Court ruled that authority-form governments without
the power to tax were entitled to issue bonds exempt from federal
income taxes if they were created for an authorized "public"
purpose.
The vast outlays required of State and local governments after
World War I spurred the use of revenue bond finance. Most of the
major turnpikes of the early 1950's were financed in this manner,
sometimes with contingent guarantees by State or other taxing govern-
ments to fortify the pledge of operating revenues.11 Revenue bonds
now represent about forty percent of all tax exempt financing.
The purposes for which revenue bonds are issued have come under
the careful scrutiny of the courts in many States. Some States have
established narrow definitions of public purpose even for general
obligation bonds; the litigation to permit revenue bond financing
has often served in such cases to expand the scope of all local
enterprises. In jurisdictions where greater discretion has been put
into the hands of local administrators, the courts have had to rule
on the reasonability and appropriateness of their decisions as to
purpose.
As the range of purposes for which G.O. and revenue bonds can
be sold has been enlarged, bond attorneys have had to develop new
forms of bond indentures, underwriters have had to develop new
markets for revenue bonds, and credit analysts have had to develop
more sophisticated forms of economic analysis than are usually
required to project a flow of tax revenues.
The growth of revenue bond finance is eloquent testimony to
the adaptive powers of local finance officers, but the process has
compounded the problem of budgeting and analysis and brought forth
new fears of defaulting under adverse economic conditions. In
addition, since a revenue bond finances a quasi-public improvement
that produces revenues by the sale of a service or commodity, it
represents a cross between theories of benefit and ability-to-pay
taxation and has raised many questions concerning pricing policies
and the distribution of benefits resulting from the project.
1o
The division of municipal activities iY G.O. and revenue-
supported operations also complicates analysis of the local economy
that is required to supply tax revenues for functions other than the
purposes served by the revenue-based facility: how does the credit
of a municipality change when it finances new waterworks, parking
garages, or industrial plants with revenue bonds instead of using
general obligations or relying upon private investors? 1 2
Moreover, the revenue bond technique is associated with the
development of the special district form of government, and the credit
analyst must make judgments on the extent to which the combination
improves the efficiency of local government by operating across
jurisdictional boundaries and accomplishing necessary public purposes
on an economic scale, or merely adds to the proliferation of govern-
ments. This problem is also the concern of the intergovernmental
reformers attempting to improve fiscal balance under federalism and
to make local governments, at one and the same time, more efficient
and equitable, with both greater managerial competence and responsive-
ness to the electorate or the legislature.
A final word needs to be said about the record of revenue bond
defaults to date. With the exception of a handful of relatively
small and poorly-planned irrigation or industrial development
districts, the record has been marred only by the difficulties en-
countered by two unfortunate toll highways: the West Virginia
Turnpike and the Chicago-Calumet Skyway, both built before the
adoption of the federal Interstate Highway Program and both the
subject of current negotiation between bondholders and various levels
of government.13
C. Current philosophies on fiscal balance
1. Allocation of revenue sources
The 20th Century can be characterized as the period when
conscious efforts began to be made to achieve fiscal balance for the
federal system as a whole, with full recognition that each unit of
government, at every level, is pursuing its own fiscal goals in its
own way, subject to the complex legal, political, and economic
constraints that limit its prerogatives. The fact that we still have
fiscal imbalance means that the proper balance between local
responsibilities and fiscal resources has not yet been struck.
There has been, however, a serious effort to think through the
administrative and economic effects of different taxes on the several
layers of government. This effort has included studies of tax
overlapping (where the same sort of tax is levied by different levels
of government) and of tax incidence.1 4
At the present time, with the major sources of tax revenue
fairly well apportioned throughout the system on a permanent basis, the
effort has turned to the possibility of finding a formaula for the
distribution of federal assistance to State and local government as
a means of obtaining simultaneously both equalization of tax burdens
and achievement of programmatic objectives.15
Underlying the current approaches to the problem of fiscal im-
balance are conclusions about the major events of the 20th Century
within the fiscal system. Three trends stand out, each one of which
has had an important consequence for the funding of capital expendi-
tures at the local level:1 6
(a) Income tax
Heavy federal use of the personal income tax, especially since
1940, has deterred its expanded use by the States and made the
national government dominant in the field, albeit with various
credits for the payment of local taxes that constitute a kind of
equalization.
(b) Other non-property taxes
As a consequence, State and local governments depend primarily
on consumer, business, and property taxes, although there does not
seem to be a dominant pattern in the way such taxes have been
apportioned between local and State governments. As a result of the
search for new sources of revenue over the past few decades, almost
every form of tax can now be found somewhere in the tax system of
each State. The ACIR currently advocates a standardization of the
allocation of sources across the board.
(c) Property tax
Property taxes, however, have come to be reserved for the use
of local rather than State governments. A number of suggestions are being
made concerning the method of assessment and the type of collector
(area-wide or municipal), but implementation of these reforms in the
administration of the property tax cannot be expected to change the
extent to which local governments still will rely upon it as the major
source of local tax revenue, in spite of the introduction of some non-
property taxes in the larger municipalities.
2. Constitutionality of taxing municipal bond interest
The Supreme Court has never ruled directly on the question of
whether the federal government has the right to tax the interest
paid by State and local governments on their bonds (although
Marbury v. Madison established the doctrine that the States cannot
17tax federal property). There is disagreement, as well, as to
whether Congress could determine the status of exemption from
federal taxation without a Constitutional Amendment, but the
Treasury has continued to attack the claimed immunity of state-local
bonds from federal taxation. A number of federal laws, bank regula-
tions, and interpretations of the tax code have tended to narrow the
range of purposes for which exemption will be granted (as in the case
of industrial revenue bonds over certain amounts) and the manner
by which institutional investors can claim the exemption (as in the
Atlas case). 1 8
Economists outside the Treasury tend to deflate the supposed
loss of federal revenues occasioned by tax exemption on State-local
securities, and the protagonists of the virtues of independent local
government consider the attack upon the exemption privilege as an
attack upon the institution of local government itself. However,
the truly critical issues, in the opinion of this writer, beyond
the continuance of tax exemption (which he favors in general as the
more politically feasible and appropriate solution), are: (a) the
extent to which both the federal and State governments will agree
to supply funds to political subdivisions of the States for the
accomplishment of a wide range of responsibilities given to these
local governments and (b) the administrative improvements to the
system of intergovernmental fiscal relations and budgetary controls
that will have to be developed concurrently as the framework for
such revenue sharing.
The XVIth (Income Tax) Amendment, adopted in 1913, was the
beginning of a process that has made state and local bonds attractive
primarily to investors with high levels of taxable income. The
market for state-local bonds considered exempt from federal income
taxes has been fortified in relation to the market for other securities
as (a) the income tax rates rose over the decades, (b) the federal
government just prior to World War II elected to declare interest on
its own securities fully taxable, and (c) the high investment quality
of the overwhelming portion of state-local general obligations was
enhanced by municipal reforms and by an admirable default record
during the critical years following the 1929 stock market crash.
The market for tax exempt bonds has become dangerously narrowed,
however, as (a) ever larger shares of investible savings have been
placed with institutions already fully or substantially exempt from
federal taxation, such as pension funds, life insurance companies,
and other financial intermediaries and (b) strong inflationary biases
in the economy encourage investment in equities rather than fixed-
interest bonds.
The forces constricting the market for tax exempt securities
have been dominant, forcing the interest rate on municipal securities
to rise relative to the prevailing interest rate on taxable bonds
of comparable quality, thus passing most of the financial benefits
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supposedly conferred by the lower interest rates on state-local
securities from the issuing governments to the small class of investors
constituting the market. 19
3. Programming federal grants-in-aid
(a) Scope
There are some 68 grant programs that sub-State local governments
can participate in directly, with some 311 other programs under which
the States can receive money from the federal government and pass on,
if they will, to local governments.20 The pace at which new programs
have been legislated has increased each decade since the 1920's, a
process that may begin to reverse itself as an effort is made to
consolidate the administration of programs at the federal level and
to eliminate the need for a few programs by activating some plan for
sharing federal revenues with the State-local sector.
The intention in a federal categorical grant-in-aid program (and
in a related State program) is to have the funds used for a specific
public good or service. To ensure the dedication of the receiving
local government to the mandated purpose, it is usual that there
be a matching contribution by the grantee. As the planned result,
the scope of local expenditures is influenced by the fiscal carrots
held out to the local governments, local expenditure options are
narrowed, and sometimes the amounts of local revenues required to
be raised are increased. 2 1
(b) Relation to the national economy
Keynes inveighed against "the principles of 'sound' finance"
which, in both England and the United States, found local governments
reducing indebtedness through sinking fund payments and postponing
new investment at times when national policies should be anti-
deflationary.2 2
This concept was developed further as the "perversity hypothesis"
by Hansen and Perloff.2 3 Their book was published as part of the
World War II debates about postwar full-employment policy. Their
thesis was that State and local government finances were perverse,
that is to say, they tended to feed the inflationary fires and to
increase the slides into deflation. Musgrave suggested that the
best course of action was for local governments to adopt relatively
stable spending programs, leaving the central government to compensate
for deficit financing.24 Rafuse's impressively thorough study of
the cyclical behavior of aggregate State-local total expenditures
and revenues (but with the expenditure totals consolidating the
current and capital accounts) suggests that such perversity is still
a serious problem. He writes:
Far more substantial federal policy measures
would be essential in the event of a serious depres-
sion. The threat to state and local revenues posed
by such a possibility, and the accompanying danger
that state and local governments would resort to
perverse rate increases and expenditure cuts, are
probably more serious today than in 1929. The
reason, of course, is that the income elasticity of
the state and local revenue system has been gradu-
ally increasing. The yield of the relatively in-
elastic property tax, for example, accounted for 63
percent of total revenue in 1929, 42.percent in 1946,
and only 38 percent in 1964.25
Except for the greater ability and willingness of the federal
government to take prompt pump-priming measures in the case of an
incipient deflation of major magnitude, the risk for an individual
local public borrower remains substantially the same as it was before
Keynes wrote, for the sources of revenue available to a municipal
borrower are not appreciably different; and the classic principles
of "sound" finance are still in full force and effect for the indivi-
dual municipal corporation that must balance its accounts annually.
However, the proposal of the National Commission on Urban Problems
(cited in section 4 below) includes use of a trust fund to enable
payouts to the State and local governments to be made regularly
without regard to the economic cycle.2 6
APPENDIX E: Local Debt in the National
Economy
(c) PPBS vs. bloc grants
Planning-programming-and-budgeting systems (PEBS), a modern form
of budgeting, again holds the promise of improving municipal admini-
stration by focussing attention on the purpose and effectiveness of
public expenditures for the fulfillment of social wants, especially
those financed hereafter under federal programs and applicable in
metropolitan areas. 2 7
As used by federal program administrators, PPBS studies are able
to reckon with such items as: the cost of "spill-over" effects; the
benefits to the nation expected from the increased productivity and
earning capacity of better-educated individuals; and the benefits of
greater efficiency (lower cost per unit of output) in delivery of
services. A federal program that produces greater benefits than
costs (properly measured and discounted over time) has at least some
intrinsic merit.
However, program budgeting by a municipality is subject to
several vitiating constraints, for the political jurisdiction of the
municipality is a fiscal island. An expenditure that benefits its
metropolis or that advances the national welfare may not produce net
benefits for the municipality in terms of either social or fiscal
returns. As Musgrave points out, the old doctrine of cash-flow
productivity for a city bond issue "encourages the cement-and-steel
concept of economic development," leading ofttimes to "elaborate
school structures, while no adequate funds for teachers can be
secured, since tax finance is required." 28
Although there are technical problems in relating program goals
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to standard municipal accounting schedules, a number of important
policies at the municipal level can be usefully investigated by
selective use of PPBS. In the future, PPBS may provide a means of
measuring both the "productivity" of local capital outlays and the
amount of subsidy required to induce the municipality to undertake
a level of investment it could not ordinarily consider under the
constraints of "sound finance."
4. Revenue-sharing with Cities as well as with States
The idea of revenue-sharing has been discussed since the early
19th Century when the federal government passed on surplus revenues
from the sale of the Public Domain, but the problem of instituting a
system for the mid-20th Century whereby cities would become full
partners with the States has required agreement on some formula that
would recognize:
(a) the desire for local determination of expenditure
policy;
(b) the desire for programmatic control by the grantor;
(c) the competing interests and varying capacities of
State governments and their political subdivisions.
The most sophisticated plan advanced so far is found in the report
of the National Commission on Urban Problems (The Douglas Report). It
is based upon the Heller-Pechman plan but provides, in addition, a
series of bloc grants to city and county governments.29 The authors
of the new plan realize that bloc grants might be less appealing
politically to the Congress than would a more restrictive set of ear-
marked funds, but they feel that even broad allocations for agreeable
major purposes such as education, public welfare, health, and sanita-
tion, "would hamper responsible policy-making at the State and local
levels unless and until" some even more complicated mechanism were
invented for assuring that the local governments involved would make
proper allocations of their own funds across the board.
APPENDIX F contains the full text of the recommendation made
by the National Commission on Urban Problems for revenue-sharing with
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cities, as the leading example of the kind of revenue-sharing program
that may finally be passed and which would become the major change of
this generation in the functioning of local government and in the
financing of local public construction.
Chapter 4
LOCAL GOVERNMENT VS. THE GENERAL WELFARE: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
A. The limitation of cities as partners in the federal system
"Dillon's Law" and the restrictions on the borrowing and taxing
powers of a municipal corporation make local governments poor partners
for the more affluent members of the federal-State-local confraternity.
It is ironic that cities in the 19th Century were the most financially
viable elements in the triad; it is sad that now they must subject
their public policies, especially in education, to the constraints of
local public finance. But that is the system we have created and will
have to live with until such time as a greater share of the national
wealth is devoted to improving the urban environment.
The problem is that municipalities are unable to provide for the
general welfare out of their own resources. A closer look at this
situation is a necessary preliminary to specifications concerning the
distribution of federal and State grants and concerning the allocation
of a local government's borrowing capacity.
The general welfare is an imprecise term, but the purposes of
local general governments are equally undefined. We are forced to
define the functions of local government by describing what they do.
Quite. clearly local governments are created to enhance the welfare
of their citizens, but they can do so only to the extent those
citizens or some other agency supply the necessary funds. A munici-
pality is not allowed to pledge its credit unless revenues are in
sight to balance the accounts; to that extent it operates in the
fashion of an individual or a private corporation rather than a
sovereign government.
These sentiments have not been as obvious as they seem, for
they have had to be formulated out of experience and they appear to
be often forgotten in modern writings on the subject of the urban
crisis.
The first adequate economic studies of local public finance in
America were written at the end of the 19th Century, after years of
municipal defaults, after the process of urbanization accelerated,
after the development of suburbs had begun, and after the range of
public services to be provided by a municipality had expanded to
include education, waterworks, sewers, and power utilities.
APPENDIX G: The Classic Theory of Local Public Finance
is an interpretation of the development and significance of a branch
of economic thought that is still valid.
It was apparent to these early writers that a municipal corpora-
tion could not redistribute wealth because the mobility of its popula-
tion provides the means for escape from the municipality's tax juris-
diction. The kind of redistributive benefits it can undertake are
necessarily only those that the community agrees to pay for. We find
that the prescriptions for public finance that are developed in
studi.es of the theory of government in a democratic society and
which deal with the problems of inter-regional and inter-group equity
are largely inapplicable at the municipal level.
APPENDIX H: Comments on Post-Keynesian Writing in
"Public Finance"
We have already seen how Keynes inveighed against the operations
of local government and its principles of "sound finance" with respect
to the economic stabilization problem. The best that can be done is
to use local government as a conduit in times of national economic
deflation. A proposal to limit local activities during inflationary
periods requires introduction of a control mechanism to ration credit
and current outlays in a manner that can hardly be reconciled with the
doctrine of local self-determination.
The difficulties faced by municipalities in providing a high
level of general welfare services to the citizens of the metropolis
(a situation also known as the metropolitan finance problem) are
well understood by the students of intergovernmental fiscal relations.
Their efforts to date, however, have largely been directed to studies
of individual programs (such as education or transportation) and to
studies of aggregations of municipalities.2 We have felt that it
was important to shed further light on the options available to a
given municipality in the metropolitan system. This we do by consider-
ing the comprehensive budgetary constraints on a municipal general
government which, each year, must strike a balance between its
different revenue sources, its expenditures for all functions on both
current and capital account, its borrowing capacity, and its expecta-
tions concerning its primary asset -- the property-tax base. Our
consideration of such comprehensive budgetary problems is found in:
APPENDIX I: An Approach to Economic
Analysis of Municipal
Debt Policies
The model developed in that study measures the effect of drift
in municipal affairs in situations where expenditures are forced for
political reasons to increase year by year but where the increases in
tax and non-tax revenues are limited. In such cases, intergovernmental
subsidies are essential, and borrowings can lead to disaster unless
sufficient current revenue is available to cover the accrued interest
and repayment of principal. The study is, therefore, concerned with
methods of relating increases in property tax revenue to the debt
burden and of estimating the amounts of intergovernmental revenues
required.
B. Revolutionary applications of the "productivity" concept
It is a radical notion that municipalities should return to the
fold, holding fast to the productivity rule as the path of salvation.
Recall that the productivity of local public capital investment
implied for the economists of the classic school, the creation of
3
revenue-producing facilities exclusively. Unless amply secured by
the property taxes of the voters, unprofitable public enterprises and
facilities primarily offering public services of the social welfare
type (distinguished from the property-serving type) were to be avoided
as '"unproductive" for the individual local general government.
The notion is critical for the distinctions we make in this
essay between the proper and unwise forms of municipal debt. The
notion must be evaluated, and we attempt to do so qualitatively in
this section by considering two dimensions of the question: the
methods available to cities to acquire productive assets, and methods
for financing nonproductive facilities.
1. Current methods of acquiring productive assets
The earlier chapters told how the primary productive investment
opportunities for cities were allowed to slip into private hands,
and there are evident ideological and fiscal problems in trying to
renegotiate the existing franchises and recapture control of the
"public" utilities now held in the private sector. Some feasible
options are available, nevertheless, for the local government
wishing to reinvigorate its sources of revenue:
(a)
Some utility franchises given at the turn of the Century for a
term of years are presently up for renewal, providing an opportunity
for obtaining compensation for the continued right to operate a
monopoly. There may even be opportunities to engage in competition
with the existing utilities by joining with other municipalities in
constructing an atomic generator, distribution system, etc.4
(b)
There may be further opportunities for profit-making economic
development projects, such as buildings on long leases to airlines,
shipping companies, freight forwarders, parking garages, and even
commercial and office tenants. The problem is to let such projects
benefit the municipality directly, rather than indirectly through
the use of an autonomous special district such as the Port of New
York Authority.5 The further problem is to avoid speculative
ventures such as stadiums and-concert hall, which fall into the
category of the general welfare and which are notoriously poor as
financial investments. 6
(c)
Urban redevelopment land provides perhaps the single greatest
opportunity for direct municipal benefit, but only if the benefits
are in the form of tangible profits, with the return on investment
to be discounted at the municipality's borrowing rate. This policy,
if not revolutionary, is at least heretical, for it appears to
favor the non-social central-business-district and industrial-park
type of redevelopment and to shunt aside the housing and other objec-
tives of the program. Such is not necessarily so, however, as we
go to some pains to show in the next section. More specifically on
the revenue end: if welfare-type reuses are prescribed for the
reclaimed land, the burden of subsidy could be borne by some higher
level of government than the municipality. With regard to payments
in lieu of taxes by local public housing authorities, for example,
the payments should be comparable to real estate taxes on, say,
upper-middle-income housing of the multiple dwelling variety, rather
than pegged at historically low levels.8 With regard to sales of
land at low prices and offers of tax abatements to limited-profit
or non-profit housing coiipanies, it should be the objective of
the municipality to acquire the land at the written-down price
that is possible with federal assistance, to then sell the land at
the highest possible price (or lease it at the highest -possible
rental), and to pass the burden of the subsidy to the higher levels
of government who sponsor the housing program. Such a policy is
comparable to the suggestion made by President Nixon that suburban
communities be fully compensated for the extra service costs and
loss of taxes involved in the building of housing for low-income
families in suburban communities.9 The principle should be extended
to municipal general governments across the board as they struggle
with the urban housing problems of the nation.
In addition, under the productivity rule, the repair and
maintenance of municipal assets should be looked upon as new invest-
ments, subject to the investment criteria sketched above. As
example, rehabilitation of the municipal plant, including street
and sewer repairs, must either (a) be paid for out of current
receipts, (b) be shown to be essential for generating a discounted
stream of future property taxes equal or greater than the investment,
or (c) be subsidized by the federal or State governments.
2. Methods for financing nonproductive projects
The most basic of all the issues raised in the four chapters
above is the systemwide lack of funds for the public facilities
that people demand for their urban communities. Successful revolu-
tionaries promise more bread, and the intergovernmental reformer
must promise more and better public goods and services (and, in
this case, not lower taxes, but equalized burdens); one cannot
expect a local government to proclaim calmly the termination of all
capital expenditures that are not guaranteed to make a profit for
the city.
One can, however, contemplate a situation in which no more
bonds need be sold by the municipal general government for such
facilities as schools, hospitals, highways, housing and subways.
This happy state of affairs could come about for a ccmbination of
possible reasons: passage of a reasonably adequate revenue-sharing
bill, creation of State-wide building authorities that construct
facilities for lease to local government agencies, and a development
of a metric for identifying the productive component of any given
public facility:
(a)
A revenue-sharing bill at the federal level and comparable
legislation within each State are strong probabilities now, rather
than remote possibilities. One of the prices to be paid for such a
bill might be abandonment of local government's claim for tax
exemption on municipal bond interest. 10 The major effect of taxation
on municipal bonds is expected to be higher interest costs (although
keeping tax exemption in a narrowing market also promises higher
rates). Revenue-sharing thus might simultaneously decrease the need
to sell bonds and increase the cost of doing so. As a result, bond
issues for truly productive projects might be even easier to sell
than at the present time.
(b)
We discuss a few of the State building authorities already in
existence in Chapter 8, for we consider this form of State enterprise
both logical and effective. One might even speculate that long-term
financing for such State authorities would be available from federal
sources, thus further lightening the pressure on the market for
local bonds.11
(c)
The metric for identifying the productive component of a given
local public facility is the most problematic but also one of the
most useful facets of our approach. It seems quite clear that
property values are a function of the amenities of the environment,
and these amenities include the usual range of good schools, trans-
pQrtation, and absence of pollution, etc. It seems equally clear
that the taxpaying public is prepared to pay for some, but not all,
of these amenities with the property tax dollars that continue to be
the basic prop of municipal finance. This concordance of equity
and desire provides some basis for the necessary metric, although a
good deal more research is necessary to arrive at a formula that
could be applied.
It is possible that the degree of productivity and the percentage
of a grant-in-aid requited as a matching contribution could be
formally related. At the moment, however, as the ACIR notes, the size
of a.matching contribution for a specific function may vary, depending
upon the legislative history of the program and the particular
federal department in charge.12 For instance, under existing programs,
ACIR finds that the federal contribution for water and sewer facili-
ties can be as low as 30 per cent and as high as 90 per cent.
The establishment of a standard metric scale, moreover, would
provide a means for setting rents on local facilities (such as
schools) leased from non-local building authorities. It would be
the means of defining the burden that a municipality, whether in the
suburbs or in the central cities, should bear for providing land
for low-rent housing.
Most important of all, with many major capital investments thus
funded by higher levels of government for tenancy by local agencies,
the larger part of municipal expenditures would be on current
account, including lease payments and non-capitalized capital investment
for maintenance and repair. Long-term borrowing by the municipal
general government would not be eliminated but would be reserved
for very special, i.e., very productive projects. The conclusion, to
which much of the essay is now to be addressed, is that the idea of
productivity does not necessarily imply a rejection of the need for
nonproductive facilities under the management control of the local
government.
Chapter 5
THE CITY'S ACTUAL SHARE OF FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY
A. The current pattern of expenditures by function
The gradual expansion of expenditures by the combination of State
and local governments is a well documented story. The subject of the
disparities between suburbs and central cities has also been thoroughly
explored.2 Relatively little progress, however, has been made in
heeding Mabel Walker's plea of some forty years ago for more accurate
measures of inter-city differences. 3
The expenditure data for 1966 prepared for the National Commission
on Urban Problems (and found in Table 1) provide a uniquely revealing
picture of sources of revenue by function by level of government.
The expenditure totals do not include local government revenues or
outlays on electric power, gas supply, transit systems or liquor
stores.
The Commission found that the federal government contributed
2.5 per cent of total local government expenditures, while the States
(to some extent passing on federal funds) contributed 29.2 per cent
of the local sector budget.
ESTIMATED REVENUE RELATIONSHIPS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
EXPENDITURES FOR VARIOUS FUNCTIONS: 1966
(2) (3) (4)
Percent contribution Percent of all local
of various sources expenditure, net of
to financing for int'gov't revenue
particular functions and user charge,for
State Local Local the United States.
and benefit- general
federal ed User resources
aid charges
Water supply.
Interest on general debt.
Fire protection.
General public buildings.
Gen. control & fin. admin.
Police protect'n & correct'n.
Parks and recreation.
Refuse coll'n & street cl'ng.
Sewerage.
Airports, terminals, parking
Health and hospitals.
Libraries.
Education.
Streets and highways.
Housing and urban renewal.
Public welfare.
All other
0.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.8
3.4
2.0
2.0
6.8
9.6
11.6
12.0
43.5
43.9
50.1
81.2
77.9
14.7
25.2
45.8
83.2
36.1
6.4-
6.7
42.3
22.1
98.0
98.0
98.0
97.2
96.6
83.2
72.7
47.4
7.2
52.3
88.0
50.1
49.4
7.6
18.8
1.8
Total 100.0
Source: Adapted from National Commission on Urban
Problems, "Building The American City," Table 3, p. 410
(1)
TABLE 1
(5)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
1-4.
15.
16.
2.0
5.9
4.5
2.2
6.4
9.0
3.0
2.1
2.7
0.2
5.3
1.3
43.5
7.0
0.4
2.3
In order to generate a typology of public goods and services for
which cities have fiscal responsibility, we have ranked the sixteen
reported functions of urban government in terms of the percentage of
total budget contributed, in the name of the general welfare, by
federal and State government (see Column 2, Table 1).
We find that no federal-State assistance was reported for water
supply. Federal-State support becomes of some importance for sewerage,
airport-terminals, parking, health and hospitals, and libraries. Such
support becomes very important (over 40 per cent) for education,
streets and highways, housing and urban renewal, and public welfare.
The typology of primary fiscal responsibilities of cities is
represented by nine categories (functions number 1-8 plus 12 in
the table):4
*Water supply
Interest on general debt
Fire protection
General public buildings
General control and administration
Police protection and correction
*Parks and recreation
*Refuse collection and street cleaning
Libraries
*User charges strongly represented in these
categories.
Altogether these functions represent 36.4 per cent of local
government general expenditures. Three of these functions are also
financed by local benefitted-user charges: water supply, refuse
collection, and parks-recreation.
User charges are particularly important for financing: sewerage,
airports-terminals-parking, health and hospitals, and housing and
urban renewal.
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-Column 5 indicates that only education absorbs a high percentage
of the local budget, with expenditures for the other necessary
functions well distributed. In the later chapters on policy, we
shall argue that local governments should be relieved of more of their
burden of these secondary expenditures by greater reliance on user
charges and on federal-State programmatic assistance.
B. Detail of a representative city's expenditure pattern
It is rare to find time-series data for a single city that
illustrates the process of accretion in local public expenditures over
the full span of 20th Century developments. Lack of such serial data
has limited urban fiscal analysis to either cross-sectional studies of
a given census or to temporal analysis of aggregated data for the State-
local sector. One must be grateful to Whitelaw who spent seven months
digging out the records for the City of Worcester, Massachusetts. 5
His data are used below to provide a unique case history of the
relationship between functions, current and capital outlays, and inter-
governmental receipts. Although Worcester was chosen as representative,
one must be aware that its expenditure pattern reflects the changing
national mix of social policies, combined with local depreciation
and general inflation, but it is a city that avoided the trauma of
rapid population expansion found in other urban areas around the
country, particularly in suburban communities. For whatever reasons,
Worcester's bond rating was dropped from AAA to AA in the early
1960's by Moody's.6
Whitelaw's objective was to see if he could explain the level of
Worcester's expenditures in terms of the need for maintenance and
repair of plant, together with many other factors. Our objective
here is to highlight the time periods during which specific functions
were the focus of attention, and we have reworked his data for that
purpose.
Figure 5 is familiar. It is a dutiful record of changing
expenditure patterns between 1915 and 1965, growing through the
- ro
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1920's, leveling off during the later 1930's and the War, and climbing
steadily in the post war years. The data for capital outlays,
revenues from property taxes and from intergovernmental sources
follow that general scenario. Approximately the same curves appear
when other cities, large and small, are the object of analysis.
The explanation of the curves is partly found in the record
of expenditures by function in Figure 6 and in the values of the
capital stock by function shown in Figure 7.
Figure 6 tells of the steady growth in expenditures for police
and fire protection and the stability of current expenditures for
streets, sewers and water supply over the half-century period. The
cost of education services also grows steadily, reflecting the pay
raises given to municipal employees after World War II rather than
expansion in the school system itself. Welfare payments became
significant after the Depression; health and hospital services take
on new importance after the War, and, finally, the streets begin
to need repair and upgrading beginning in the late 1950's.
Figure 7 is further explanation in terms of the value of the
capital stock, in constant 1958 dollars, by function. A moderate
increase in population and the number of school children required real
net investment in school plant during the 1920's; the capital stock
was allowed to age during the 1930's (in spite of federal assistance)
until the higher standards for educational plant after the War made
additional investment necessary. Capital invested in streets and
sewerage facilities depreciates at a slower rate, in both physical
and technological terms, than does school equipment, and thus a
Figure 6
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steady, if moderate, amount of capital outlay for those two functions
produces a net real increment period by period to the value of the
stock. The water supply system also was allowed to depreciate for
decades after its original installation prior to World War I, but
reconstruction after World War II became necessary, at higher real
cost.
Chapter 6
ACTUAL AND EXPECTED USES OF TAX-EXEMPT SECURITIES
A. Productivity of the indebtedness of American cities
1. At the turn of the Century
Clark's 1916 dissertation covers the purposes of the indebtedness
of all major American cities over the 32 year period 1880-1912.1 It
is a straightforward productivity analysis, based on the classic
definition of "productivity" as investment in revenue-producing quasi-
public projects. 2
Throughout the period, nonproductive debt was predominant in the
accounts of the cities in his enumeration, but productive debt
during that blush of municipal socialism increased relatively faster
than unproductive debt. Only the old canals and waterways category
slumped, and railroad financings were banned.
Clark notes that capital outlays for education rose faster in the
larger cities and in the northeast and West than in the South. It
was the age of the City Beautiful, and parks (in the category of
recreation) came into their own. The days of tolls for highways
and bridges that spanned the metropolis had not yet returned, and the
need for infrastructure was a sufficient measure of productivity for
the capital facility. So cities built bridges, highways and sewers
almost as fast as schools. The fastest growing sector (protection)
gave facilities to the newly-professionalized police and fire
departments.
Productivity continued to be broadly defined as the supply of
bonds responded to the pressure of urbanization and economic
expansion over the following half-century. The growth of State and
municipal debt between 1902 and 1957 is shown in Figure 8. Behind
the chart is the story of bonds offered in the 1920's (largely to
build facilities appropriate for the new automobile age), the
decline of long-term issues during the Depression and World War II,
and the post-war surge to accommodate a larger population, the air-
plane, the continuing expansion of the metropolises, and the shift of
activities to the suburbs.
Total State and Local Debt Outstanding,
Selected Years, 1902-1957
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2. Defaults and data
No comprehensive records were kept until the mid-1950's to tell
the more detailed story of how local governments put their bond-
issuing capacity to work. Since 1957, the Investment Bankers Associa-
tion of America has noted the details of each issue underwritten in
the general and regional bond markets, and it is these data that have
found their way infthe ACIR reports, Senate hearings, and economic
textbooks.3
Until the Depression, the volume of bonds issued was relatively
small, and the bulk of it was in the form of general obligations,
backed by the full faith and credit of the issuer. The few revenue
bonds outstanding were largely secured by utilities that participated
happily in the prosperity' of the 1920's. On the whole, the default
record of these and other bonds was good during the Depression:4
APPENDIX J: Footnote on the Default Record
The growth of revenue bonds, the establishment of special dis-
tricts not connected with municipalities, and the expansion of the
scope of public facilities, and the "metropolitan finance problem:"
these are the factors that make it necessary to reevaluate the pro-
ductivity of municipal general governments' borrowing. The new data
are invaluable for that research.
B. Intimations of productivity in bond usage, 1957-1965
During the 1957-1965 period, State and local governments in the
United States, taken together, spent $165 billion on education,
$80 billion on highways, $38 billion on public welfare, and $166 billion
for all other purposes.5 Bond issues, as reported in the IBA data in
Table 2, accounted for 15 per cent of the expenditures on education,
15 per cent of the expenditures on highways, 15 per cent of the
expenditures on public welfare, and 20 per cent of the residual;
altogether borrowed funds account for about one-sixth of expenditures
in all categories.6
Table 2 shows that 18 per cent of all the bond issues sold
during the 1957-65 period were sold by State governments, 35 per cent
by city governments, another 18 per cent by school districts and the
remaining 29 per cent by limited-function special districts.
Our perusal of the more detailed data on a State-by-State basis
shows that the amounts of bonds sold for school and general purposes
were especially high in the States with large urban populations. In
the South, industrial revenue bond issues visibly contributed to the
totals after 1960, while water and power issues in California and
Washington were important factors in the West. It appears that very
large and/or rapidly-growing States tended to sell proportionately
more than would be expected merely on the basis of population. States
with special programs, such as Washington for utility districts,
appear as extremes above average, while the probable explanation for
the opposite extreme is a low demand for public facilities, a combina-
tion of low fiscal capacity and modest aspirations for puiblic services.
TABLE 2BONDS SOLD BY TYPE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
BY PURPOSE: 1957-1965
(in billions of dollars)
(in percentages )
Type of issuer Education Transp'n Utilities Social Misc. Refund- TOTAL
$ Cons'v. Welfare ings
State
City
School Districts
Special Districts
TOTAL
State
City
School Districts
Special Districts
TOTAL
State
City
School Districts
Special Districts
$ 3.500 $ 3.400 $ .650 $ 1.000
4.000
13.600
3.500
$24.600
15%
3.700
5.200
$12.300
28%
30
8.800
5.900
$ 15.350
4%
57
2.150
3.300
$ 6.450
16%
33
$ 5.400 $ .300
7.800 1.050
- .350
2.900 1.650
$16.100 $3.350
34%
48
10%
31
- 10
14
100
25%
14
16
31
42
100
24%
13
23
16
39
100
5%
32
26
20
51
100
7 %
8
15
8
18
100
37%
28
13
21
$14.250
27.500
13.950
22.450
$78.150
18%
35
18
49 29
100 100
2% 100%
5 100
3 100
7
4
100
100
Source: IBA and census data.
Of all the bonds sold by cities, 32 per cent financed utilities
(which sometimes produce cash surpluses for municipal coffers) and
14 per cent financed school construction (a low productivity applica-
tion of municipal credit). City education bonds represented only
16 per cent of all education bonds.
School districts marketed over half of the bonds for education,
but, since most school districts levy local property taxes, the
effect on municipal fiscal capacity is minimized.
If the State totals were higher for education and social welfare
(an IBA category that includes low-rent housing as well as hospital)
facilities, the school and special district, and city, totals could
be commensurately lower.
For true productivity at the municipal level, the profit-making
quasi-public function served by special districts in the transporta-
tion and utility fields would shift over to the city column, while
unprofitable activities (such as mass transit companies in major
cities) would be financed with State credit (possibly in the form
of a guarantee of a special district's revenue bonds).7
In any case, States have been selling their general obligation
bonds in greater amounts than their revenue bonds; cities also issue
more general obligations than revenue bonds but both types have been
increasing 'in amount; school district general obligation bonds have
also been increasing, but use of revenue bonds by school districts is
negligible, although some special districts sell such bonds for
education purposes; the formidable increase in special district
revenue bonds has been discussed elsewhere in this essay, but it is
important to note the increasing use of special district general
obligation bonds.
The data published for the 1957-65 period do not show directly
the distribution of general obligation and revenue bonds by purpose,
but a comparison of Table 2 in the preceding section and the data
for Figure 9 above suggest the following:
(a)
Bonds for education purposes tend to be general obligations of
the issuer, except for a small but growing number of special district
revenue situations.
(b)
Bonds for transportation purposes tend to be revenue issues
when associated with income-producing improvements such as toll
highways and airports but, depending upon the nature of the facility
and the amount of federal or state aid available, are otherwise
general obligations of the responsible government.
(c)
Bonds for social welfare purposes, even more than in the trans-
portation field, are related to federal and State programs and are
often allowed to be revenue bonds secured by rental payments (such
as dormitory charges) and by contingent guarantees by State or
federal agencies.
(d)
The types of bonds sold to finance utilities tend to reflect
the profitability of the public enterprise, as seen in Table 3. The
finances of city-owned utilities (Table 3), including water supply
Bonds Sold by Type of Local Government
and Type of Bond, Trendlines, 1957-65
Source: IBA
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FINANCES OF CITY-OWNED UTILITIES, BY TYPE: 1964-65
WATER
SUPPLY
SYSTEMS
ELECTRIC
POWER
SYSTEMS
TRANSIT
SYSTEMS
GAS
SUPPLY
SYSTEMS
(millions of dollars)
Revenues
Current operating expenses
Gross margins
Margin as % of revenues
Interest paid
"Times earned" (Margin + Int)
Year's capital outlay
as % of debt outstanding
Non-guaranteed debt
as % of debt outstanding
Revenues as % of debt outstanding
$3,760
2,356
1,404
37%
$354
3.8x
12.5%
55%
35%
$1,651
871
780
47%
$207
3.3x
11.6%
54%
26%
$1,441
840
601
42%
$453
489
-36
-8%
$76 $65
7.9x -
15.8%
99%
61%
5.6%
6%
23%
Source: calculated from Table 4, p. 270,
Municipal Year Book 1967
TOTAL
$215
157
58
27%
6
9. 7x
21. %
83%
150%
TABLE 3
systems, electric power systems, transit systems, and gas supply
systems, are importantly determined by market forces. The demand
prices for electricity and gas exceed those for water supply and
the benighted urban transit systems, with effects that can be
anticipated in the reports: revenue is a smaller percentage of
debt outstanding for transit compared to electric or gas utilities;
these two profitable forms of enterprise (electric and gas) can
issue non-guaranteed debt or pure revenue bonds where only a small
percentage of transit debt can be issued in that form.
C. The expected role of debt to 1975
1. The Joint Economic Committee estimates
The demand for social capital of the sort typically supplied by
the issuance of local public securities has already been estimated for
the next decade in amounts quite possibly in excess of the market's
capacity to furnish (see Table 4). In broad categories, as estimated
by the Joint Economic Committee, the needs for public facilities add
up to about $500 billion, of which amount one-third would be furnished
by private or community organizations and two-thirds furnished by State
and local governments, with approximately half of the local govern-
ment sector's share of capital outlays to be represented by bond
finance:8
APPENDIX K; Extent of Borrowing
for Local Public
Construction
While the nation is generally committed to this inventory of
needs (which are largely but not exclusively concerned with metropoli-
tan areas), there are numerous factors that might affect the total
volume of construction and the reliance on bond financing. Among
these are (a) the possibility that revenue-sharing programs will
obviate part of the need to borrow; (b) the possibility that many
of the projects will be rendered unnecessary or fundamentally altered
by technological change; and (c) the probability that many of the
projects will be voted down by citizens or indefinitely deferred by
anxious budget makers.
The most significant omission from the list is an estimate of
the need for housing and urban renewal expenditures, representing
ESTIMATED CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS, 1966-1975,
FOR STATE AND LOCAL PUBLIC FACILITIES, BY
MAJOR CATEGORIES AND SOURCE OF FUNDS.
TABLE 4
Group of facilities Total State- Private Percentage
for local Sector Distribution
Nation sector Public Private
ColsCol Col
1+2 2 3
Billions of dollars % % %
Transportation
Education
Water & Sewer
$151.7 $141.1 $ 10.6 93% 43%
82.2
76.2
Recreational & Cult. 53.1
Health
Electric & gas
43.5
84.9
62.0
56.5
35.0
13.1
12.8
6%
20.2 75 19 12
19.7 74 17 11
18.0 66 11 11
30.4 30 4 18
72.1 15 4 42
Other Public Bldgs. 7.5 7.3 0.2 97 2
TOTAL $499.1 $327.8 $171.3 66% 100%
source: UA. r I', -ccri s -s Tol-e
LOaJ/~6~ 12,I, /1j'eels w'tL 4 l
t/,( 7
0
100%
activities often financed by the sale of local public bonds but heavily
dependent upon federal grants-in-aid, the political philosophies and
disposable incomes of local populations, and other factors making it
difficult to calculate the amount of public funds required. Less
controversy appears to surround the social capital to be invested in
the facilities enumerated in the table.
Certain generalizations are in order as one observes the role
of non-public agencies in Table 4. Except with respect to electric
and gas utilities (and other public buildings), when the amount
involved is very large, the public's share is also relatively high.
Moreover, as the prospect for surplus revenues increases, as would be
the case for such health facilities as nursing homes and the
electric-gas industries, the share of the estimated investment
consigned to the non-governmental sector tends to increase. When
rates for service can be set to generate profits (based on tradition-
ally low-priced franchises for use of public rights-of-way), private
capital is attracted for the bulk of the prospective outlay.
2. Trouble in the market for tax-exempts
Regardless of the need for capital outlays, one of the major
problems for the future of intergovernmental fiscal balance is that
the State-local sector's freedom to plan bond financings is
limited by the willingness of the nation's investors to hold the
volume.of State and local securities offered.9
Only a small part of the investing public considers it advan-
tageous to hold fixed-income tax-exempt securities: taxable institu-
tions such as casualty insurance companies (in contrast to tax-
sheltered life companies, savings banks, and pension funds), wealthy
individuals and their surrogate trust companies, and commercial banks.
During the post-war period the volume of new tax-exempt issues
soared; the yields also rose to attract investors; the holdings of
outstanding bonds declined in market value, causing further dis-
affection among investors; and rather special opportunities were
available to commercial banks, who became the market's major
investors after 1961. In the 1966-75 decade, according to studies
by the Joint Economic Committee, the volume of State-local bonds
outstanding may double from $100 to $200 billion, but rather ex-
cessive reliance is placed upon the commercial bank investors who
are expected to absorb two-thirds of the new offerings. For a
number of technical reasons, State and municipal securities without
tax exemption would be less attractive to investors than comparable
corporate securities, so that the possible removal of tax exemption
would only aggravate an already tenuous balance between supply and
demand. There are a number of troublesome disputes within the
industry over and above the running battles concerning the tax-exempt
status of industrial revenue bonds and the Constitutional status of
tax exemption itself; these concern the rating system and the conflicts
between commercial and investment bankers.
In summary, the municipal fiscal administrator must recognize
the scarcity of investors for State-local securities for the foresee-
able future. With free access to the market at any time by any local
government, capital rationing necessarily takes the form of voluntary
withdrawal from the market by prospective local government borrowers.
A combination of higher local taxes and service charges, together
with revenue-sharing and subsidies from the federal government, will
be required to provide the funds estimated as required for State
and local public facilities in the coming decade in the not unlikely
event that commercial bank investment will falter. The only alterna-
tive is diminution of the indicated supply of new issues by local
forbearance from the market. There is some evidence and much
opinion that the smaller issuers and the big-city issuers would be
the ones most affected by capital rationing as imposed by the un-
trammeled operation of market forces.
The capital market underwriters and investors determine the
form of bonds issued indirectly, by preferring issues with certain
characteristics of security, purpose, term, and call provisions, and
by establishing the corresponding interest rate or yield structure.
The highly differentiated issuing government is free to accept or
reject bids for the bonds but is ordinarily constrained by State
laws that may prohibit the establishment of terms acceptable to the
buyer.
We know in recent years that scores of issues have been withdrawn
from bid because issuers were preyented from accepting interest rates
above the maximum specified in State law. We cannot know, however,
of all the bond issues that were stillborn,,sometimes because of the
market and sometimes because a municipality's credit had been used
inappropriately and, hence, the marginal interest rate anticipated
for the next financing was either politically, legally, or economically
unacceptable. The true cost of capital for a corporation may be
inferred from the price-earnings ratio of its common stock in associa-
tion with the yields of its corporate bonds; the cost of capital for
a municipality at the limits of its bonding capacity is manifestly
higher than the yields of its outstanding bonds but by an unascer-
tainable amount.
The nature of the market constraint is thus real but intangible.
The situation in the market for tax exempt bonds promises to become
worse during the present decade, as we interpret the evidence. The
Joint Economic Committee studies also indicate: (a) that a federal
guarantee would stifle the market for tax exempts even further,
and (b) that removal of tax exemption would raise interest costs
for State-local securities generally, and particularly for the
marginal issuers.1 O Every market signal, therefore, suggests again
the need for optimizing the productive use of municipal credit along
the lines outlined in this essay, until such time as supplemental
capital funds are available in quantity from the federal and State
governments.
Chapter 7
INFLUENCE OF POLITICS ON TRE FORM OF DEBT
A. The politics of local control
The reader knows that no concise constitutional document exists
for the governance of local areas. From the day the States reserved
the power to govern themselves and omitted any mention of the rights
and obligations of lower levels of local government vis-a-vis the States,
the struggle to define the proper functions of government and to
allocate responsibilities and fiscal resources among the various
levels has proceeded without abatement. One merely observes, in
the midst of diverse experience, a consistent distaste for over-
centralization at either the State or federal level and a willingness
to risk the Balkanization of government in urban areas. When dis-
cussing the variable politics of local control as it affects the
shape that revenue-sharing might take, even the pundits of the
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations are forced to
resort to such a general term as the "iliberal view."
The "merits" and "shortcomings" of local control have long been
debated by scholars around the world. The controversy is manifest
currently in the debate about the method and speed of desegregating
schools and in the search for a viable form of citizen participation
in the Model Cities programs. The most profound example is in the
proposal that the federal government agree to share its revenues with
cities and State governments through bloc grants rather than cen-
trally-administered programs of federal assistance. The politics of
the nation will determine the outcome of revenue-sharing; the process
by which voter support is obtained for specific bond issues is a
microcosm of that struggle.
ACIR produced a staff analysis of six alternative ways of dis-
tributing a federal surplus shortly before the National Commission on
Urban Affairs proposed a seventh, the first to deal specifically with
the possibility of direct sharing with cities. Five of the plans
feature little or no federal involvement in State and local expendi-
ture decisions; the sixth plan, an expansion of the present type of
conditional grant-in-aid programs to finance specific functions, in-
volves "considerable" intervention by the federal program administra-
tors.
APPENDIX L: ACIR Staff Analysis of Six
Revenue-Sharing Plans
"Liberals," says the ACIR, favor the conditional grant approach
and could also be expected to support aggressive use of. the "direct
federal expenditure approach" so long as the purposes were for
clearly defined social welfare categories. Liberal and conservative
positions can also be identified with respect to the effect of the
plans on the incidence of taxation within and among the several
States and with respect to the effectiveness of the plans in helping
State and local governments provide services and balance budgets.
There is a real lack of evidence to support affirmations about
which programs are truly best administered at the local level, and the
admissibility of opposing views feeds the political flames. Is it
really better to have teachers hired and fired by a local community,
or would the system work as well if the teachers were salaried em-
ployees of the State government, and the local school board could
exercise its discretion in selecting candidates from the pool. Is
it really necessary to have each community design and build its own
school buildings, or could the State implement the system of mass
production of education facilities advocated by a California archi-
tect?3 Is it really necessary for each community to market its own
issues of tax-exempt bonds, or should each State establish a
central marketing facility?4 Each of the proposals for State action
takes some measure of local autonomy away, and hence the ultimate
judgments are political rather than economic.
The lesson in Chapter 5 is that education is the only category
of local public expenditure that absorbs a major share of the urban
government budget. The next largest single item is for police pro-
tection. From this situation it follows that a showing by an urban
economist that scale economies are possible say, in refuse collection
(2.1 per cent of the urban budget), may not produce significant
enough savings to convince the voters to forego their ancient preroga-
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tives. The refuse collection system might be better managed at the
regional level, but politics may require such a degree of local options
as to scheduling that the estimated economies evaporate.
By the same token, we find widespread understanding of the
diseconomies and spilloyer effects of uncoordinated transit and
transportation systems combined with a firm resistance to the
intrusion into local jurisdictions by area-wide planning and
expenditure control authorities, with examples too numerous to
mention. The lesson is that a contribution of municipal tax revenue
to the support of an area-wide function suggests at least representa-
tion for the community whose money is being used and even a strong
influence on area-wide management policy.
The political requirement for representation in the spending
of one's own property taxes is purposefully obscured under these
conditions: (a) when property taxes are assessed and collected by
a county or other intermediate jurisdiction, or (b) when a non-
elective governing board of a metropolitan-wide special district
(such as those controlled by the State legislature in Massachusetts,
including the Metropolitan District Commission or its Massachusetts
Bay Transit Authority, both of which serve the Boston area) have the
power to levy assessments on local communities. 6
The politics of representation is displaced when a local
activity is subsidized in whole or in major part by transfer of funds
from State or federal government; the displacement is to.the Legisla-
tive and executive branches of those governments, as revenues are
raised by non-property taxes and as expenditure policy takes either
the form of categorical programs for specific activities or disburse-
ment of bloc grant*.
The collective wisdom of our society, based on experience, is
that a categorical grant conditional upon a matching local contribution
produces better results than an unrestricted grant for a specified
purpose. 7 What the National Commission on Urban Problems proposes is
a little of both conditional and unrestricted grants to be distributed
to both the State and the municipal governments. The intended result
is to put both levels of government in a better bargaining position
without excessive specification of how public services should be
managed within the State. It is the kind of political compromise that
America likes when the subject matter is local government and the
urban environment.
Perhaps there can never be a clear determination of the best
method of managing a.public service. Waterworks and electric power
installations are capable of providing satisfaction in both private
and public hands. There is a motion on the floor for a labor inten-
sive activity, the postal system, to revert to private management,
and some feeling that another form of labor intensive activity,
health services, be nationalized. Political judgments are partly
based on technological and economic criteria, but the desire for
local management of public services is surely one of the stronger
forces determining the shape of the federal system and the nature of
municipal debt.
B. Consensus required for general obligation bonds
Proposition 1. A general obligation bond is evidence that a
consensus exists concerning the public purpose
for which it was issued
The matching of the "public purpose" of a capital outlay with the
type and level of government has been an evolutionary process in
American history, but, in every case where a general obligation bond
has been issued, there has been a political consensus behind it, how-
ever temporary or undemocratic may have been the creation of such
consensus at various periods. Many of the State laws on borrowing
require an "extraordinary" (over 50 per cent) majority of voters to
approve a bond issue.
In the early days of the Republic there was consensus that neither
the States nor their political subdivisions should incur debt for
local governmental facilities, which were ordinarily financed at that
time by sales of local assets or contributions (and loans) by those
to be benefitted. Only with the retreat of both the federal and
State governments from the field and the exhaustion of local assets
did the third tier of government under the federal system enter the
borrowing market. The local electorates, in the hectic pre-Civil War
decades, were willing to support "productive" income-growth projects
(such as railroad building) which would benefit both themselves and
their heirs. The frauds perpetrated by the Carpetbagger and machine
politicians of the post-Civil War period represent an aberration
in the democratic process. The development of the notion that
local governments should not lend their credit to private enterprisers
ended the temporary consensus that obtained in the pre-Civil War
period and produced the general, if misguided, opinion that the proper
use of general obligation bonds is for the construction of non-
productive income-distribution projects such as schools (over and
above the property-tax based set of local improvements). Taxpayer
revolts that take the form of campaigns to defeat proposed bond
issues under the more democratic and well-managed forms of municipal
government in the 20th Century show how difficult it is in any
community to gain the consensus required under State laws to issue a
general obligation bond. The widespread rejection at the polls of
proposals for metropolitan-wide government or authorities with general
taxing powers indicates that there is little concurrence between
suburban and center city populations concerning the extent of the
responsibilities of local government. In the optimizing system
outlined in Figure 10, communities are only expected to sell bonds
for productive property-improving functions and other very local
amenities, regardless of the extent of approval within the
community of grander social objectives that are fiscally unproductive
and which should be the fiscal responsibility of higher-level
governments.
C. Productivity required for other bond types
Proposition 2. Limited obligation, special assessment, and
-revenue bonds are evidence that the public
facility being financed offers benefits
primarily to classes or groups with the
willingness and ability to pay therefor.
Proposition 3. When quasi-market prices can L. se on the
services being financed, the type of bond
offered (general obligation or revenue) d u
upon the prospects for "profitable" -eeration.
Proposition 4. Some form of subsidy from a higher level of
government is required before a local govern-
ment will construct a facility offering social
welfare services.
These three propositions will be considered together. The rela-
tion of special assessment bonds to the local property improvement
spectrum is a simple proposition, but the content of the propositions
becomes more complex as we shift into the area of overlapping private
and public opportunities.
It was the localized liberal-conservative split that determined
whether or not a specific community built its own utilities or enfran-
chised a willing privately-owned corporation to build and operate the
local waterworks, electric or gas utility, or rapid transit line.
Such facilities, when publicly owned, have been financed by both
general obligation and revenue bonds.
Table 3 indicates that non-guaranteed (revenue) bonds are over-
whelmingly the source of long-term funds for electric utilities owned
by municipalities and represent about half the financing of those gas
and waterworks that are publicly owned; what cannot be discerned from
those data is the extent to which such non-guaranteed debt finances
the less profitable utilities compared to those that are nore profitable.
In any case, it is the opinion of this writer that general obligation
debt is to be preferred for profitable utilities in the fiscal strategy
of municipal general governments, providing more flexibility, possibly
lower overall interest costs on the general obligations issued for all
purposes by the municipality, and the promise of surplus revenues for
10-general municipal purposes.
The strands of the argument are brought together more vividly
when the case of the unprofitable utility is considered, with rapid
transit lines the most pervasive form of an unprofitable public enter-
prise with quasi-market prices. When transit first was built, a
case could be made for use of either general obligation bond financ-
ing or revenue bond financing by the municipality as it played its
role in developing its real property tax base. That day has passed,
for it now appears that improvements to rapid transit systems tend
to benefit suburban commuters rather more than either central city
residents or the central city tax base, although the point is
debatable. (Note 34).
In any case, so long as transit is provided by cities at a loss,
with cities unable to maintain a market for transit services at
prices that cover costs, and equally unable to institute some system
of full-social-cost accounting into the combined road-transit network
that serves the metropolis, the municipality encumbered with a rapid
transit system is providing at its own expense an income-distributive
social-welfare set of public services. Our logic of local fiscal
balance suggests, in this case, that some form of subsidy is
required and that general obligations should no longer be sold by the
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municipality for its support; however, since the operation is un-
profitable for the central city municipality, access to the market
for revenue bonds is effectively closed without extensive guarantees
that hypothecate the general credit of the municipality. Only to
the extent that a municipality concludes that maintenance of the rapid
transit system contributes to the stability of its property tax
base can general obligation bonds be condoned by either logic or
practice. It is thus that New York City assumed transit debt as its
general obligation and has sold new debt in the form of subsidized
and guaranteed transit authority obligations. And it is thus that
the citizens of Los Angeles rejected a proposed general obligation
bond issue to construct a transit system for which there was no
consensus regarding the ability of such a facility to augment the
property tax base. 1 2
Chapter 8
A NORMATIVE VIEW OF MUNICIPAL DEBT POLICY
A. Basis for the normalization of municipal debt policy
In this chapter, the many aspects of intergovernmental fiscal
relations relating to municipal securities that have been discussed
in the preceding pages are brought together to provide (1) a con-
sistent perspective on the allocation of fiscal resources and
operating responsibilities among local governments and (2) a basis
for judging the utility of certain new forms of special district
governments.
The consistent perspective of which we speak is our interpreta-
tion of the interaction between the following fundamental character-
istics of American local government: (1) the tendency for each
level of government to have predominant access to specified sources
of revenue; (2) the tendency for municipal governments to bear full
fiscal responsibility for certain "primary" functions and for other
governments to participate in the financing of all other functions;
(3) the mixing of "productive" and "nonproductive"' components in most
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local government investments; (4) the suitability of revenue bond
financing for activities that are productive for a larger jurisdiction
than the municipality; and (5) the establishment of special district
forms of government to provide more optimal (e.g. efficient and
consensual) services for such larger jurisdictions.
The mix of functions, agencies, and techniques can be expected
to vary from one place to another and yet produce equally satisfactory
results. Each municipality, as a fiscal island under existing systems
of local government, is entitled (within limits) to select and pay
for its own high or low level of local public goods and services out
of the tax resources designated for its use. Subsidies from higher
levels of government and the use of area-wide special governments are
then utilized to broaden and improve services, to equalize fiscal
burdens, to minimize interjurisdictional imbalances in costs and
benefits, and to raise minimal standards in specific low-capacity
commun i ties.
In Figure 10, we attempt to portray one mix of functions,
agencies, and resource allocations that would be satisfactory for
a municipal general government. It is a system that reflects the
central tendencies and theories of American local government, and,
to that extent, can be said to represent a normative basis for
appraising the types of debt securities and types of governmental
operations employed in a given locality. 2 In setting out this
normative system, we have attempted to recognize (1) the political
requirement for local self-government, (2) the fiscal requirement
for enlarging opportunities for "productive" municipal investment and
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FIGURE 10
Relationship of Revenue Sources,
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for subsidizing the nonproductive component of the public services
municipal governments offer, and (3) the possibility of obtaining
greater efficiency and equity by use of subsidized special district
governments.
The State-local sector in Figure 10 is shown to have available
five forms of revenue (in addition to prospective transfers from the
federal government): (1) net proceeds of the sale of assets or
services for which there is a market price (such as electricity or
liquor); (2) net revenues from services with approximations to market
prices as a form of benefit taxation but with some component of social
welfare, such as tolls on essential bridges; (3) non-property taxes
of many kinds, including sales taxes, business franchise and corporate
taxes, etc.; (4) ad valorem taxes on real and personal property; and
(5) charges in the form of assessments for special benefits to
property owners.
Four types of "public" agencies are available to assume
responsibility for providing "public" goods and services: States;
regional or metropolitan-wide organizations; municipal general
governments; and private for profit and community non-profit organi-
zations. 3 The boxes with solid lines indicate where fiscal responsi-
bility should rest in order to enhance the productivity of municipal
general governments; the boxes with dotted lines indicate where
fiscal responsibility typically rests at the present time.
These five revenue sources are to be matched with the three
main functions to be performed in the public sector:
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TYPE (A)
TYPE (B)
TYPE (C)
Quasi-public functions offering."public" goods
and services which can command market prices as
an approximation of benefits conferred;
"Public" or general welfare functions such as
schooling, transportation, low-rent housing,
health and welfare services, all of which must be
supported by taxation over and above service
charges, if any; and
Local services to property-owners, including local
streets, police and fire protection, sewers, etc.,
equivalent to the "primary" functions identified
in Table 1, Chapter 5.
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B. Implications of a normalized system
Local property taxes and special assessments would be used
primarily for the support of Type C local "primary" functions. Note
that local property taxes are also used to support Type B functions,
but it would be our hope that the metric for distinguishing between
the productive and general welfare components of the expenditures
for schools and other functions in Type B would serve to lighten the
fiscal pressure on the municipal general governments.
Non-property taxes (including income taxes, business and excise
taxes, etc.) would be devoted primarily to Type B public or general
welfare functions but could also be used to subsidize Type A quasi-
public functions. Note that fiscal responsibility for Type B
functions is transferred from the municipal column to either the
State/regional/metropolitan column or to the non-profit organizations
in such fields as housing, general hospitals, and education.
Revenues from tolls and market prices would support Type A
special-function activities, including utilities and toll roads.
The State, with its access to non-property revenues would assume
fiscal responsibility for unprofitable activities, such as urban
rapid transit and anti-pollution facilities. Private corporations
with profitable "public" utilities and profit-making toll roads
should be required to pay fair compensation to the municipalities
for the right to do business as a monopoly.
To the extent that capital outlays required bond financing,
municipal general governments will be encouraged to issue only
general obligations, even for revenue-producing projects; the
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objective here is to improve their ability to attract bids at reason-
able interest rates from the capital market, and the shift of fiscal
responsibility for nonproductive functions from these municipal
governments to other governmental agencies would presumably increase
the general governments' ability to obtain consensus in the form of
bond approvals for the bonds that they would still wish to sell.
"Revenue bonds, on the other hand, would be reserved for non-
general governments and used primarily for the support of Type A and
B functions. These revenue bonds could be subsidized further and
guaranteed, where necessary, by State and federal agencies. The
profit-making quasi-public Type A activities and the local property
tax revenues would, ideally, be shunted away from Type A and B
functions and placed at the disposal of municipal general governments.
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C. Designating roles for new forms of debt-issuing special governments
1. A new typology of special districts
The theory of fiscal balance developed in the preceding section
assumes that no fundamental changes are forthcoming in the basic alloca-
tion of revenue sources among governments (with most income taxes to
the federal government, property taxes to local government, etc.) and,
further, that bloc and programmatic grants to local governments
continue to be inadequate.
There thus remains the possibility of financing "Type B" current
and capital expenditures (covering social welfare functions) through
some instrumentality other than the lowest level of municipal general
government. However, municipal general governments still will be
expected to share in the fiscal burden of welfare-type projects, in
accordance with the measurement of productivity described in Chapter 4
and as discussed in the last Chapter in the context of proposals
for bloc and programmatic grants-in-aid. (And, of course, nothing
prevents a community with unused fiscal capacity from raising its
tax rates to supply funds for the level of public services its
citizens will vote for.)
The two forms of governmental unit that have been proposed as
candidates are special districts (without taxing powers) and county-
wide (or metropolitan) general governments (with taxing powers). In
some areas of the country, the county can serve effectively, but
most public administrators no longer expect that multi-county or
metropolitan-wide general governments can be made acceptable to the
4
electorates. Our attention therefore is directed to special-function
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governments and to the particular roles that new forms can play
in lifting the burden of social welfare functions off the shoulders
of property-tax payers.
The rapid growth of special districts in the post-war period has
been viewed as a danger to representative government, as a threat to
local autonomy, as a new element of complexity in intergovernmental
relations, and as the solution to many problems of efficiency, equity
(both in terms of income distribution and compensation for interjuris-
dictional externalities), metropolitan coordination, and fiscal
limitations. We view the special district here as a means of obtain-
ing facilities for social welfare activities at the local level in
order to transfer the financing burden from municipal general govern-
ments. At the optimum, this new form of special-function govern-
ments will issue only revenue bonds secured by leases from municipali-
ties and by guarantees of State governments, reserving general
obligations for municipalities. In some cases, it might be possible
for municipalities to acquire profitable quasi-public ventures now
in the hands of special districts and to slough off unprofitable
operations (such as mass transit) for incorporation into such new
special districts.
Our typology of new and useful forms of special districts is
illustrated in Figure 11 with respect to three functional areas:
education, transportation, and housing-community development. The
principles represented there apply across the range of social
welfare functions. In Figure 11, the new forms of special districts
are heavily outlined. The white arrows indicate the proper flow of
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subsidy from one level of government to a new special district (with
a continuation of the white arrow indicating that the subsidy is
passed on. A circled "NS" (signifying no-subsidy) suggests the
present existence of financial support from municipal governments
that should be eliminated when the Type B welfare functions are
properly refinanced. A dotted line indicates the possibility of
subsidy at some future time.
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2. Education facilities
Capital facilities for education at the primary and secondary
school level have ordinarily been constructed by municipalities and
school districts (coterminous or regional), all with taxing power.
The logic of our argument is that funds for school and public higher
education facilities should come from federal or State sources, or,
if such facilities are built by local property tax revenues, the
taxes should be imposed by a regional or metropolitan entity.
Schools were built by federal funds in the days of the Works Progress
Administration, and there is still inherent justification for
federal subsidies and grants.
A Statewide school building and college dormitory authority is
shown in Figure 11. Several States, such as Georgia and Pennsylvania,
undertake the bond financing required for local area school facili-
ties, ordinarily leasing the facility to the community whose fiscal
liability is then a current rather than a capital expenditure.5
Comparable financings for independent and parochial schools are a
possible extension of this approach; dormitories and other facilities
for persons rather than for instruction are currently available
under federal and State mortgage assistance and bond purchase
programs. At the optimum, education facilities would be paid for
by federal-State and private sources, not by municipal general
governments. Maintenance and operation of the facilities would be
by agreement, presumably vesting responsibility in local hands.
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3. Transportation facilities
Capital facilities for transportation media serving the metro-
polis are more difficult to handle, for the unprofitable mass transit
ventures should be financed by the public at large (particularly by
operators of private automobiles), while intra-city revenue-producing
ventures (if any) would be happy additions to the municipal fisc.
We show in Figure 11 a subsidized mass transit authority, and
potentially self-financing authorities for other transportation
facilities. Valid arguments, dating from the 19th Century, support
a contemporary federal and State role in the financing of "internal
improvements" as presently defined in the field of both inter-city
and intra-metropolitan transportation. A start has been made, not
only in terms of federal subsidies, but also in terms of State
agencies selling bonds, similar to equipment trust certificates,
with the proceeds purchasing rolling stock for lease to municipal
systems (as in New York), but the process should go much further
6
than is usually contemplated. Maintenance and operation of the
facility would most likely be vested in the transportation authority,
with some representatives of the municipality on the governing board.
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4. Housing
Subsidized housing and urban renewal generally are quantitatively
and qualitatively of fundamental concern in the process of rationaliz-
ing the fiscal structure of American federalism. The concern of the
State is people and it should be prepared to subsidize housing as
necessary. The concern of the municipal corporation is, for
unfortunate technical reasons, primarily its own fiscal equilibrium;
the municipality wants to have its slums removed and its supply of
good housing augmented by private builders. It needs property taxes
or payments in lieu thereof to justify its contributions to those
7programs.
The local fiscal situation is endangered by tax abatements
and hidden subsidies to housing that is not in a full tax-paying
status; such worthwhile activities should be subsidized (including
payments, in lieu of taxes, if necessary) by State or federal
sources rather than by the municipality. The capital costs of low-
rent public housing projects are largely covered by municipal bonds
guaranteed (to all intents and purposes) by the federal government;
the principle can be extended to other housing types, but most
housing is now subsidized indirectly. The real risk is that
municipal general governments will be offering important and
continuing subsidies to private builders of moderate-rental
housing under a variety of federal and State programs without
receiving fair compensation in the form of property taxes for their
contributions to social welfare. Figure 11 shows subsidies in
lieu of taxes coming to municipalities as such compensation.
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5. Development corporations
Housing and community development can also be handled by a
State-wide development corporation, such as the New York State Urban
Development Corporation. The concept is fiscally sound. Its
operations can be financed by any combination of public and private
sources, and it is empowered to issue "public" (i.e., exempt from
federal or State taxes) bonds that are not general obligations of
8
either the State or any of its subdivisions. Housing subsidies and
urban redevelopment can both be financed through a State urban
development corporation and make an attractive package for municipal
officials concerned with their fiscal situation, if payments are made
in lieu of taxes and if the operation of the urban development
corporation is in tandem with the planning efforts of the locality.
These conditions are not easy to satisfy, however, as the initial
conversations between the mayor of New York City and the director
of the New York State Development Corporation show.
6. Community corporations
Intra-city neighborhood-scale corporations can be set up under
Model Cities or other legislation to be conduits for Type B social
welfare functions, as well as to give the residents a sense of self-
directed achievement.9 From the perspective of fiscal balance rather
than operational or ideological positions, these sub-municipal
agencies can be neutral as private real estate ventures if included
in the program of subsidy is a payment to the municipality for
property services rendered. As shown in Figure 11, they are subject
to the same conditions as noted for statewide development corporations.
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7. New communities
New communities come, or will come, in many sizes and configura-
tions (and are not seen in Figure 11).10 If set up as new general
governments, the rules of "sound" finance and non-social-welfare
budgeting will apply to them as to the older cities. If set up as
unincorporated sections of counties (viz., Reston, Virginia), the
new community is not conceptually different from any other large-scale
real estate development, and the literature concerning the true cost
of municipal facilities supplied to the development will be
applicable. Appropriately-scaled property taxes will have to be
remitted to the nearest local general government to maintain the
latter's fiscal balance.
Two important forms of new communities that have recourse to
municipal bond financing are of special interest. The first is the
community with independent status as a municipal corporation but run
by a developer corporation that sells bonds to finance the construc-
tion of infrastructure for future growth: Clearwater, Texas, and
Foster City, California, are examples.12 The second type is the
community whose developer can sell bonds that will be purchased or
guaranteed by the federal government under current legislation.1 3
Chapter 9
SYNTHESIS AND GUIDELINES
A. Synthesis
We have been evaluating the context for municipal debt policy in
terms of a 19th Century thesis of continuing but limited validity,
the productivity principle for local public investment, with its
specification that the expectation of cash receipts sooner or later is
the primary criterion justifying debt. The antithesis is the 20th
Century mandate for local governments to provide and manage a much
wider range of public goods and services. That mandate, however,
requires expenditures that are (a) beyond the fiscal capacities of
municipal general governments and (b) only partly "productive" in
the classic sense.
The synthesis is the system by which intergovernmental fiscal
resources are provided to the local governments charged with the
responsibility for providing public goods and services. That the
present synthesis is inadequate is attested by many reports on
fiscal imbalance in the American federal system. The synthesis that
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will be developed for the latter decades of the 20th Century will
be the context for municipal bond financings in the future. In our
opinion, the method by which capital facilities are to be acquired
by local governments deserves more attention than it ordinarily
receives in proposals for new forms of synthesis.
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B. Economic and fiscal guidelines
We have seen that municipal debt policy is an integral part of
a complex economic and fiscal structure of intergovernmental relations.
That structure rests on a foundation of political philosophy, and we
have come to expect a large quantum of diversity and inefficiency as
the price we pay for our heritage of local self-government. Our
syntheses, past and present, evolve as resolutions of differences
between local and more central governments, between liberals and
conservatives, between those with a capacity to pay and those receiving
benefits, and between demagogues and saints.
The productivity principle itself was transmuted during the 20th
Century into a national consensus to provide resources for the many
social welfare activities that generate greater national and indivi-
dual productivity, more equitable distribution of benefits, and
savings in real costs. Our view that the social welfare function
is only partly productive for the individual municipal general
government has led directly to the suggestion that a metric that
clearly distinguishes, program by program, between local and general
components of productivity would be useful-as a basis for calculating
grants-in-aid.
We have also felt it is useful to begin laying the foundation
for a more optimal allocation of fiscal and debt resources in the
federal system, given the mixed bag of functions to be performed by
local government, with each function itself a mixture of local and
general productivity.
A truly optimum system would satisfy the rule that an extra
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expenditure for a given public good should return equivalent benefits
for those supplying the revenues. The well-known findings that
small local fiscal jurisdictions generate interjurisdictional externali-
ties and that economic disparities are found in all metropolises show
that the present system is far from optimal.
1
To discharge their responsibility for general-welfare productivity
and to compensate for the fiscal constraints on local governments,
the federal and State governments have found many ways to pass fiscal
resources down to the local level where operating responsibility is
to be located. Under the prospective new synthesis, bloc grants from
the federal to the State and local governments, and from the State
governments to local governments, will ameliorate the pressure on
communities with low fiscal capacity and may even raise the aspiration
level of segments of the population within those communities. Pro-
grainmatic grants-in-aid, backed with minimum standards and mandatory
matching contributions, would help in the effort to deliver public
goods and services to regions and populations hitherto unable or
unwilling to provide them out of their own resources.
In this future, a wealthy community may be even less constrained
by archaic restrictions on borrowing and taxing its own citizens to
provide the level of public services they demand, but, hopefully, such
wealthy communities will also be forced to pay for the benefits they
receive from expenditures made by nearby communities and to contri-
bute their proportion of extra revenues for the general upgrading of
the urban environment.
There are a variety of methods by which local public construction
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can be financed and managed by -- or in behalf of -- local units of
government, but some of them are currently dependent upon the operation
of the municipal bond market, whose function must be redefined in the
midst of fundamental structural changes resulting from the operation
of the tax laws and the growth of the local public sector as the
whole economy expands.
The substantial probability is that the market will be able to
absorb a relatively smaller volume of new State-local securities and
will have to impose a relatively higher rate of interest than at
present. The chance is probably slim that there will be involuntary
rationing of local government credit, for this violates the principles
of local self-determination, but the market constraint suggests the
need for exceptional care in the application of bonding capacity by
the individual local governments. Before further comment on rational,
efficient, or optimal guidelines for municipal bonds, however, a
word is in order on the amenability of intergovernmental fiscal
relations, including the debt function, to systems analysis.
The concept of suboptimality is implicit in the notion of
synthesis. The logicians of the space age (accustomed to simple
goals such as "more bang for a buck" with no limits on the budget)
have been looking for optimizing solutions in the management of local
investment (broadly defined) through use of the systems analysis or
PPBS techniques, but they have found that analysis of even a single
function (such as health care, or bus scheduling, or municipal debt
finance) breaks down when confronted with such incommensurate values
as the maintenance of individual liberty and the desire for order
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and efficiency. As one analyst wrote:
In the application of operational research we
are on the safest ground when the analysis is
limited to problems in the small, that is, the
choice of alternative projects or ways to solve
a specific problem such as designing a subway sys-
tem in the context of a given environment or
provision of hospital care in a specific area.
This is called sub-optimizing since higher level
problems can be reasonably ignored. But with the
extension of programming systems to a wide variety
of government programs all at the same time, there
is a need to consider total expenditure levels in
an urban area and also to consider the trade-offs
among major programs such as health, education,
transportation, and housing. It will simply not do
to assume that the design of major programs in any
one area is unaffected by what is done in other
areas. For any given urban area the total re-
sources available for all programs are not only
limited but changes in any one of them vitally
and immediately affect the others. 2
Thus the economic and fiscal guidelines for local governments
will continue to be suboptimizing solutions, but we still feel that
constructive results can emerge through more explicit consideration
of the tradeoffs between borrowings, taxes, intergovernmental
revenues, and expenditures on capital and current account in the
context of "total expenditure levels," along the lines exemplified
in our Appendix E.
To be sure, there are many tradeoffs of a different sort to be
made between major programs in allocating the capital and operating
budget, but the game of suboptimizing at the level of the municipal
general government really begins, in our opinion, when the level of
local services demanded cannot be financed by further local tax
increases or borrowings. At that point, local choices are further
distorted by the selection of programs that maximize grants-in-aid
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and minimize local matching contributions and operating costs and
by creation of special governments able to operate beyond the local
restrictions on borrowing and taxation.
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C. Suboptimizing with special districts
Many of the attempts to create viable special-purpose govern-
ments have provided admirable sub-optimal solutions to the problem
of bringing efficiency, fiscal equalization, and compensation for
interjurisdictional externalities to the metropolis.
The success of a special-district approach to suboptimality
cannot please everyone, and each experiment in the art of making
special districts has critics with different sets of values and
objectives. For instance, some argue that the Metropolitan District
Commission (which controls parkland, expressways, and trunk sewers
for the Boston area) should be freed from control by the State
legislature, should have larger State subsidies, should employ a
different formula to assess municipalities within its jurisdiction,
and should expand its functions.
Similarly, critics argue that the Port of New York Authority
should be run by elected officials, should undertake unprofitable
ventures such as mass transit, should reduce tolls on bridges
already paid for, and should not build office buildings in competition
with the private market, but even these critics admit that the Port
of New York Authority has been a successful pioneer in the creation
of a mix of productive public projects of varying degrees of profit-
ability.
We have suggested that municipalities attempt to obtain greater
fiscal benefits directly from the productive activities of special
districts operating within their jurisdiction, to the extent that
such benefits are attributable to the agglomeration effect of the
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local economic base and can be measured in terms of taxes or
franchise payments on utilities and other profitable enterprises of
a public nature. Let iJ be noted that there are those who disagree
strenuously with the notion that "public" utilities in private
ownership should have to pay municipal taxes, for they see this as a
regressive tax that raises the cost of the service. What they
forget is the dire financial plight of the municipal corporation.
However, the amount of taxes or increased charges on utilities that
are foregone can serve as the basis for specific bloc grants to be
made by metropolitan-wide or higher levels of government as part of
the effort to equalize fiscal burdens in the metropolis and in the
intergovernmental fiscal system as a whole.
We have also suggested roles for subsidized special districts
in the financing of "non-productive" facilities. This policy is
unquestioned for activities with large "spillover" effects such as
pollution control, where a State agency disburses its own (and
federal) funds and the municipality coordinates efforts within its
own jurisdiction. The policy has been applied to such other public
facilities as education and housing in many States and could be
adopted generally. As this is written, Mayor Lindsay in New York
has proposed this solution for the City's hospitals, a development
that should be observed as a model for other functions and other
communities.3
The building authorities discussed in Chapter 8 were all State-
The
wide in jurisdiction. /technique of the subsidized special
district is also highly appropriate at the metropolitan level (and
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occasionally at the municipal level, e.g. the case of New York City
above). Such a metropolitan special district would satisfy the
requirement for spreading the costs and benefits of the function over
the relevant population, in effect minimizing inherent interjuris-
dictional externalities. Operational control could remain
decentralized, although higher standards of coordination and service
would be expected. Financing might even be intra-metropolitan in
scope, based upon differential charges for services to communities
in proportion to their varying fiscal capacities and tax efforts;
if revenue bond financing was required, the bonds might be contin-
gently guaranteed by the participating communities; subsidies from
the federal and State governments would always be welcome.
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D. Further reflections on municipal debt/intergovernmental fiscal
relations
The notion of productivity is only part of the theory of
municipal borrowing. Municipal borrowing is only part of the larger
topic of State-local indebtedness, which increased from $24 billion
outstanding in 1950 to over $110 billion outstanding at the end of
1968. State-local indebtedness, however, is only one of many
choices for the financing of local public goods and services; of
far greater significance, as the ultimate source of debt service,
are the level and incidence of taxes in the American federal system.
Even at this level, however, the financing of the public sector,
for a nation as well-to-do as the United States,- is subordinate
to the less trivial matter of how the nation chooses to allocate
its human and natural resources in pursuit of higher goals.
The systematic look at the municipal debt function, rather
than being the tail that wags the dog, is, as it has turned out,
a way of developing perspective on the choices available to us for
an improved set of intergovernmental fiscal relations.
The Joint Economic Committee, taking the view that the basic
system of federal, State and local responsibilities and resources
would not be changed in essence in this decade, estimated that
the volume of State-local bonds outstanding would amount to
$200 billion by 1975. As noted, we have serious doubts about the
ability of the market to digest this increment at interest rates
sufficiently attractive to local governments, and our doubts have
led ineluctably to the speculation that bonds will no longer need
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to be sold at all or will be sold by non-municipal governments.
Suggestions have been made, for instance, that the States
should be the only local governments to issue debt. The proceeds
would be distributed to minor civil divisions according to the
system mandated by the legislature, after it resolved the issue
of local self-government within the State for the next era. That
States have the power to change the rules of local government is
unquestioned, although in many instances changes in the individual
State's constitution might be necessary.
The federal government is also in a position to change the
method by which municipalities obtain capital funds by issuing debt
securities. Under a number of different programs administered by
federal departments (including HUD, HEW, Agriculture, and Interior),
bonds for public improvements can be underwritten at submarket
rates of interest.4 The amounts to date are relatively small,
compared to the volume of State-local bonds issued through the
capital markets (including public housing bonds), but the principle
of federal underwriting is conceptually as important as that of
federal grants-in-aid, especially if the demand for State and local
bonds evaporates with loss of tax exemption and inability of
communities to issue bonds at yields the market will accept. The
federal government would be invaluable as an underwriter, in such
circumstances, for special district bonds of the type to be issued
by the New York Urban Development Corporation. Federal pre-
eminence in the field of municipal borrowing is made possible
through Congressional action and by manipulation of the tax code
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and the banking regulations; its activities as underwriter could be
neatly related to the economic stabilization policy of the nation
and to the system of grants-in-aid to be established for sharing of
federal revenues with the State and local government sector.
Such speculations focus attention on the extent to which
decentralization and disintegration of the concept of the local
general government are to proceed in the next few decades. In short,
the question is whether the city itself as an organic whole has a
future, not whether it can sell municipal bonds approved by the voter.
We can imagine a system of local government within a State that is
composed of community corporations to institutionalize neighborhood
matters and a whole complex of single- or multi-functional special
districts, each one optimizing some public function: one district
for health services, another for education, one for fire and police
protection, another for transportation by all media, another for
land development and sewers, etc., all coordinated by a kind of
metropolitan-scale or regional planning-programming-and-budget-
systems (computerized) control center, which in turn coordinates
operations with related centers and with higher government.
Perhaps the critical question is whether citizens would feel
satisfied to have their instinct for local self-government discharged
by direct participation in the community corporation and by
exercising their franchise in regional and State-wide electioneering.
Perhaps the primary schools and the local police and fire station
could be subject to veto or even managed at the community level, as
a further inducement to allow government in the urban area to be
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rationalized. In any event, one cannot be so sure that the city as
a corporate entity with general responsibility for public goods
and services will survive the next generation; its demise would
have evident effects on the nature and purpose of local government
finance and debt.
In the more likely event that the existing structure of State
and local government will not be so drastically overhauled, however,
municipal general governments will still have the right to borrow
within the limits imposed by State constitutional and statutory
restrictions. We have suggested that there are a number of
opportunities for municipal governments to expand the productivity
of their investments in classic terms. There is the possibility
that issuing general obligations instead of revenue bonds may lower
interest costs and permit access to surplus revenues from quasi-
public enterprises. The most constructive approach, however, may
well be the development of methods by which the facilities desired
locally can be financed by some other governmental entity and
leased to the municipality for its exclusive, uninterfered with, use.
Given the diversity of American local government, we can anticipate
that most of the concepts advanced in this essay will be implemented
in part in one area of the country or another but that no one
jurisdiction will trade all of its 19th Century recipes for local
government for a 20th Century diet of PPBS pills.
APPENDIX A
SOME DEFINITIONS
1.
Public goods and services is used in this study to refer to the
diverse inventory of activities financed by State and local governments,
sometimes with the assistance of the federal government. In theory,
such activities are offered on a non-exclusive basis, that is to say,
the public as a whole will share equally in the benefits created; in
practice many public goods are distributed on a more restricted basis.
Quasi-public goods are those activities (such as electric utility
services) which can only be provided if a monopoly position is created
for a public or private corporation.
2.
Local borrowing or "local public debt" refers to long-term
securities issued by States and their political subdivisions. Short-
term bank credit, tax anticipation notes, and other financial instru-
ments, are scrutinized only tangentially. General obligation bonds
are secured by the full faith and credit of the issuer.
In ordinary usage, "local public debt" or related terms such as
"municipal bonds" and "local government" are applied collectively to
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the "State-local sector." When it is necessary to differentiate between
the State government and other forms of local government, appropriate
wording to that effect is found in the text.
3.
Public finance deals with the fiscal and monetary policies of
sovereign governments, i.e , only those that have the power to create
money as well as to wage war, levy taxes, and even promote the general
welfare. Studies of goal-formation and decision-making in a democracy,
of the distribution of benefits and the incidence of taxation, and
of policies for full employment and economic stabilization, are all
components of public finance. In matters of public finance, however,
the fiscal problems of the State-local sector are generally of
interest only to the extent they illustrate the complexities of
decision-making at the national level in a federalist system. Monetary
policy involving the creation of money by incurring deficits or
funding indebtedness is central to the study of public finance at the
national level but plays no role in local government affairs.
4.
Municipal finance is the term most often used when the focus of
attention shifts to the fiscal problems of local government: States
and their subdivisions. Without the power to monetize its deficits,
each unit of local government must balance its revenues from taxa-
tion, public enterprises, and sale of assets, with its expenditures,
which include payment of interest and repayment of principal when there
has been recourse to debt financing. In the language of municipal
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finance, therefore, the proceeds of new issues of local public securi-
ties are not revenues in the true sense. In general, the study of
debt transactions of local government has been of minor interest in
the past to writers on local fiscal capacity and expenditure policy.
APPENDIX B
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A. Institutional requirements: capital markets and independent
local governments
The structure of local borrowing for public goods is, for any
time or place, a unique derivative of political ideologies, social
values, and economic developments. The experience of America, with
its manifest desires for decentralized decision-making in both the
public and private sectors, is an illuminating story, important
domestically because so few contemporary documents in the growing
library of intergovernmental fiscal relations contain an understand-
able history of the development of the institutions we now seek to
modify, and of potential importance for the developing nations
grappling with the structural problems of delivering public goods
and services by means of local governments in a federal system.
The basic conditions for municipal bond finance are a society
that provides for the institution of independent local government
and a minimum number of lenders willing to exchange their cash for
deferred claims on the public credit. 1 Within each local government
will arise the basic conflict between economic expansionists who
are optimists (and even opportunists) and economic conservatives,
a group that includes present creditors, tax-payers, and those
prospective seekers of credit who are fearful of the impact of
the expansionists on general capital markets in which both public
and private interests compete.
With rare exceptions, no such phenomenon as State or local
funded debt could exist until western civilization was free of
imperialism and feudalism. Such conditions appear in Europe around
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the 16th Century, providing something of a model for the governance of
the colonizing settlements by the English in North America. In short
the experience of local government in America is roughly coterminous
with the development of modern forms of government in Europe where
cities were part of a landscape cluttered with the archeology of
feudalism, evanescent mercantile towns, and engrossed ecclesiastic
lands.
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B. Ancient roots of the independent city
Until very recent times, the city with some modicum of
independence was found only in the western world; the Orient as a
land of emperors and of latter-day colonies established by European
joint-stock companies, does not figure in our literature. In
municipal histories, the cities of ancient Egypt, Assyria and Babylonia
merit a few lines, but the story really begins with the city-states of
Greece. As Fairlie points out, a firm distinction must be made
between a municipality and a city-state; the city-state has the
attributes of nation-state as well as local government, and the
functions of the government of Athens were as comprehensive as
modern municipalities, included education, utilities, and public
charities, and were suitably financed by revenues from many different
sources. 2 There is a record of defaulted debts by members of the
confraternity of Greek city-states. 3
The history of cities under the Roman Republic, the Early
Empire, and the Later Empire occupy a more prominent place in a
history of municipal finance, for from Roman law are derived not
only the word municipal but many of the forms of administration that
characterized the later governments of Europe. What began as a far-
flung set of city-states in the days of the Republic eventually came
under the watchful eye of imperial agents to be used as instruments
of imperial policy in the later days of the Early Empire, and finally
turned over to the bishops of the early Church as the empire dis-
assembled. During the centuries that followed, some of the older
cities of the Roman Empire, hitherto unfortified, were ringed with
Document Services
Room 14-0551
77 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02139
Ph: 617.253.2800
Email: docs@mit.edu
http://libraries.mit.edu/docs
DISCLAIMER
MISSING PAGE(S)
138
139
walls against the German invaders who tended to be-non-urban until,
with the rise of feudalism, administration and commerce came once
again to focus upon the fortified centers.4
Urban life developed in various ways after activity quickened
in the 10th and llth centuries. In almost every country, there were
continuing struggles between secular and ecclesiastic powers and
between city guilds and higher authority.5 Fairlie writes that "none
of the French communes reached the political independence of the
Italian and German free cities," and, as the French communes came
under the direct control of the royal power in the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries,
Charters were surrendered to the king, constitutions
reformed from Paris, and municipal debts extinguished
by taxes levied by royal officers.
Throughout Continental Europe, the free cities were brought under
the military protection, and sometimes administrative superintendence,
of dukes- and kings, but the cities of the Dutch Republic became
markedly more prominent in their national affairs than did cities in
Germany, Italy, France and Spain.7 This process continued through
the 18th Century, thus diminishing the direct influence that a more
democratic system of local government on the Continent might have
had upon the colonists in America. The later experiences of
European municipal administrations, however, interested the social
reformers and city planners of the 19th and 20th centuries with
respect to social programs rather than the relationship of city
to nation. By contrast, the link between England and America has
always been closer.
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C. English roots of America's cities
What America took from England was not only the Common Law but
the concept of local government as a corporate matter, based largely
upon the borough system (except in New England where the town meeting
itself was endowed by its creators with corporate powers). The
history of the English boroughs is the history of the English city
between the early Middle Ages and the middle of the 19th Century,
even though the boroughs were not at all democratic and depended upon
Parliament, largely composed of representatives from the boroughs,
for approval of financial transactions. By the end of the 17th
Century, some of the larger cities obtained separate charters from
Parliament that gave them more control over their affairs than the
boroughs enjoyed, but it was not until the Municipal Corporations Act
of 1835, following hard behind the belated Reform Act of 1832, that
the modern forms of local government in England began to emerge.9
By the time of the American Revolution, the pattern of local
government was well settled in each of the States, and many of the
basic differences have continued to this day, not only in the names
and powers given to various subordinate levels but in the relative
significance of municipal and intermediate levels of government within
the several States. Independence was the occasion for the confirma-
tion of the status of a number of cities, but also, and of greater
importance, of clarification of the relationships between the States
and the federal government."
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D. Municipal finance in colonial times
Like their counterparts in Europe, the cities of the colonial
period were financed by grants from the legislatures, various kinds
of excises and charges, and an occasional levy on some form of
capital (usually in the form of a special assessment), but one of
the most important sources was the sale of municipal assets and
the lease of municipally-owned property.
Unfunded borrowing was not unknown, as scholars combing the
dusty records of individual cities have reported. The earliest
example cited by Shattuck is found in New Amsterdam in 1652 when
the authorities borrowed money from burghers to erect fortifica-
tions; in the records of Philadelphia he found mention of advances
from citizens to pay for repairs to wharves, bridges and streets
in 1706 and for building market stalls in 1720, with stall rents
to be used for paying interest on the notes.12 In comparison,
the earliest funded debt reported for the colonial governments
themselves was in 1690, when the Massachusetts Bay Colony issued
non-interest-bearing "bills of credit" to pay soldiers returning
plunderless from an expedition against Quebec.1 3  Public property
rights were far more important in these early days. Economic life
and the city were one and the same in the late Middle Ages, for
the owner of the city, whether guild, noble, or bishop, derived
revenue from every activity taking place therein or passing through
the gates and, moreover, held much of the land within and without
the walls. The colonial governments in America also began their
existences as owners of the land and as sole proprietors in the
economy.
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E. Expanding municipal powers after 1789
The English cities, until the second quarter of the 19th Century,
did not play any important role in local government, but the nascent
American municipal corporations, with community needs that demanded
governmental recognition, promptly assumed the new functions as a
matter. of course and obtained the powers now usually assumed for
cities in the United States. These may be briefly summarized as:
1. The powers incident to all corporations.
2. The power to levy taxes and borrow money.
3. The power to appropriate and spend money.
4. The power to perform certain public services.
5. The power to enact and enforce local police ordinances. 1 4
The functions deemed proper for the new kind of municipality
developing in the United States continued to expand in the early
years of the Republic, but, to finance them, steady streams of
revisions had to be made in the relationships between State legis-
latures and municipal councils. As Fairlie describes the situation:
These additional activities necessarily meant
a larger amount of municipal taxation than had ex-
isted in the early part of the century; and the
necessity for a regular system of municipal taxa-
tion was recognized in most cases by a general
grant of the taxing power for any of the enumer-
ated powers of the municipal government, in place
of the former system of special authorizations for
definite amounts for specified purposes. The
general grant was often limited to a certain per-
centage of the assessed valuation of the city;
but this limitation was sufficiently flexible to
allow for an increase of taxation with the
development of the cities, though resort still had
to be made to the legislature for further authority
whenever a city wished to o beyond the powers
enumerated in the charter. 5
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F. Disinheriting America's municipalities
The economic potential of the governments that emerged in the
United States, however, has been allowed to drift from public into
private hands over the centuries. Until the early part of the
19th Century the municipalities in the United States were able to
build improvements by selling off the land they held, but they were
never able to capitalize upon the licenses they gave for the
construction of waterworks and later types of utilities, for the
right to erect wharves and warehouses, or for the right to do
business within the city.
As a result, American cities were increasingly forced to rely
upon their taxing powers, having exhausted their potential for what
is known as municipal trading, an important aspect of local finance
in some areas of Europe where the swing to full reliance on private
enterprise had been moderated. More than one writer agrees with
Goodnow in questioning both the wisdom and necessity of the process
by which cities in America (and often in England and the Continent)
wasted "what might have been a new city patrimony of immense value,"
as he explained that,
There was, as it turned out, in the streets
of cities a new kind of property whose income, if
recognized as being at the disposal of the city,
would have been sufficient, particularly in the
large cities, to pay a large part if not all of
the really local expenses of the city government.
In the United States, however, the courts very
generally refused to recognize the cities as
possessing any property rights in the streets,
and the legislatures of the states very commonly
wasted this property by improvident grants of it,
sometimes in perpetuity, to private persons and
companies. These grants were in many instances
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unaccompanied by conditions by the enforcement
of which cities could either derive pecuniary
profit for themselves as corporations or in-
direct advantage for their inhabitants through
improvement in service.16
New York City is a case in point, for it was able to finance its
improvements by the sale of land and rentals from municipal facilities
until about 1812, when it first sold bonds, as one of a handful of
larger cities that were a generation in advance of the era of city
bonds. 1 7
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G. Reliance on sale of the Public Domain
The history of public debt between Independence and 1845 is
of critical importance for understanding the American system of
local government and private enterprise. The temper of the times
was against public borrowing, in line with the viewpoints of Hume,
Adam Smith, and, later, Ricardo and Mill.1 8
The new federal government had assumed the debts of the States
attributed to the Revolution in the amount of $72 million and set
about to liquidate it by selling off the Public Domain. By 1835,
in spite of the Louisiana Purchase and the War of 1812, the Federal
Government was completely free of debt, to its own citizens as well
as to the foreign countries that had lent funds for the conduct of
the war for independence and who had threatened to intervene in
American affairs when the debts fell into default during the days
of the Articles of Confederation.19
A word is in order about the Public Domain, for again we find
governments hoping to finance their improvements and debts by
selling off their assets. With the creation of a national government,
the westerly borders of the States were defined, and the areas not in
the States proper became the "original public domain." The federal
government's intent was to alienate these lands in such a way as to
promote settlement and to provide federal revenue from a non-tax
source. Although these concepts neatly fitted the political and
economic theories of the time, the process of realizing cash from
these vast domains was extremely difficult, and events never per-
mitted the implementation of a rational or efficient policy by which
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revenues would continue to be available for implementation of
governmental programs at either the federal or State level. 20
A few large tracts were sold for cash, but then it became
necessary to sell land on credit terms, following the outlines of a
report by Hamilton in 1796. At that time and until 1820, settlers
could purchase a quarter section (160 acres) at a price of $1.25 an
acre, but the procedure had the unfortunate effect of absorbing in
the early years of repayment all of the settler's cash resources that
he needed for the purchase of productive equipment and supplies. Thus
in 1820, the federal government agreed to accept as payment bank notes
issued by local banks that held mortgages on the land purchased from
the Public Domain. Jackson's action in issuing the Specie Circular of
1835, which made the bank notes no longer acceptable in the exchange,
was one of the major factors precipitating the Panic of 1837-39,
itself a critical factor in the collapse of State finances and the
ensuing shift from State borrowing to municipal and private borrowing.
In any case, by 1835 the federal debt had been extinguished, and from
1841 on settlers could acquire a share of the Public Domain by pre-
emption, by homesteading, and, as reward for military service, by
receiving bounty. Large amounts of the Public Domain were given to
the States directly and under the Morrill Act of 1&86 for the
encouragement of education, a process that has been called wasteful
because it also encouraged the development of barren lands. Not
quite a century later, the federal government was called upon to
rescue the livelihoods of farmers working the dustbowl or grazing
livestock on rocky uplands.
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H. Affirming State sovereignty: the XIth Amendment
The struggle that led to adoption of the XIth Amendment and to
its aftermath was a more fundamental issue in the early years of the
United States, ultimately more influential in shaping the course
and structure of the nation than the disposition of the Public
Domain. The Amendment, adopted in 1795, reads quite simply:
The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
In 1792 a citizen of South Carolina brought suit against the
22
State of Georgia for the recovery of a debt. When the case,
Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 Dallas 419, came to the Supreme Court, the pre-
Marshallian justices affirmed that a State could indeed be sued by an
individual. Georgia immediately passed a law prohibiting, on pain
of death, any attempt on the part of U.S. marshals to collect the
judgment on the debt, and a storm of protest swept across the new
nation. Adams' reading of contemporary documents suggests that the
Constitution would not have been adopted had the doctrine of
Chisolm v. Georgia been anticipated, although the language of the
original Constitution is clear on this point. The XIth Amendment
was quickly passed and ratified, establishing a truly sovereign
character for States, and Adams considered it anomalous that States,
otherwise limited to the exercise of local functions and never
called upon to borrow money except for industrial purposes or
local defense, should be granted the protecting robe of complete
sovereignty the moment they assumed the role of debtor. -The
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immediate effect of the Amendment was to render the States immune
for all practical purposes from suits on their debts, and thus a
vast set of borrowing opportunities opened before them. Thereafter
the holder of a bond issued by a State had to rely wholly upon the
faith of the State's legislature for interest and repayment on his
note. The States thus became as free as the federal government
itself in their financial undertakings, immune from attack by
foreign as well as domestic bondholders, in sharp contrast to the
vulnerability of the municipal corporations to civil suits on their
contracts.
The actual amount of public borrowing in the first thirty years
of the. Republic was small, however, for the federal government was
intent upon paying off the debts it had assumed from the Revolution,
the Louisiana Purchase, and the War of 1812, the State governments
were busy establishing their sovereign powers under the aegis of the
XIth Amendment, and only the larger cities, as reported by Shattuck,
were occasionally found issuing bonded indebtedness, all of which
was backed by the full faith and credit of the municipality:
Philadelphia in 1799, New York City in 1812, Baltimore in 1817,
and Boston in 1822.23
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I. Avoiding national programming
How to develop the nation? There was general agreement, articu-
lated by President Washington and an article of faith thereafter,
that political ties between the seaboard and the interior could only
be strengthened by the building of adequate communications, from
which would come commercial ties as well. The argument raged during
the early 19th Century as to whether Congress had the power to
administer the roads it might build through the States, although
there was little doubt it had the power to advance funds for their
construction. Reports Adams,
A national board of internal improvements was
established; national surveys were carried on; and,
had not certain questions that imperiled the general
safety forced themselves upon public attention, we,
should now have been able to write the experience of
national improvements actually undertaken.2 4
However, opposition to federal preeminence gathered force as
the national government acquired formidable centralizing powers by
its purchase of the Louisiana territory and by its conduct of the War
of 1812.25 Monroe vetoed the Cumberland-Road bill in 1822 because of
the uncertainty regarding the power of the federal government to
manage the road, and, when Jackson, intent upon decentralizing
authority, vetoed the Maysville-Road bill in 1830, the legislatures
of the States were provided with the mandate to proceed with the
internal improvements so long desired.
Financial muscle for the purpose was provided for State-run
enterprise by a series of programs that would now be called revenue
sharing between the federal and State governments and bloc grants
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from the federal government to the states. Such funds represented
the distribution of surplus revenues from the sales of the Public
Domain, now that the federal debt originally incurred by the States
had been expunged, plus prior distribution of a percentage of the
sale proceeds themselves. Moreover, the times were expansionary and
inflationary; enthusiasm for the success of projects soared when all
could see the magnificent flow of revenues into the coffers of the
Erie Canal built by the State of New York. The Erie Canal then
served as a model and as a competitive threat to local economies
caught without equal access to the interior. No one yet invoked the
patron saint of laissez faire to impede the rush of public bodies
into the game of economic development.
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J. Relying on State bond issues
Figure 12 clearly illustrates this history of the early years.
The federal debt vanishes; State debt begins to increase between
1825 and 1835 and then climbs sharply until it levels off in the
1840's, at which point the debt of cities (not including county
debt) begins its career. We shall not need to be as concerned with
the shape of federal debt hereafter, but it is no more than just to
bid farewell to the subject by quoting an eminent 19th Century
historian:
Ever since emptying its plethoric purse into
the greedy State treasuries, the government had
not received enough to pay its annual expenses.
Every year it sank a little deeper into the mire
of debt. 2 6
The States began to use their credit for constructing railroads,
canals, and other internal improvements and for buying stock in banks
loaning funds for such purposes. State debt jumped year by year;
$13 million outstanding in 1825; $26 million in 1830; $66 million in
1835; up to $107 million by 1838; and $231 million in 1843.27 It is
not entirely clear who purchased the bulk of these securities, but
substantial amounts were held by foreign investment bankers who
made their views about repudiation well known when the bubble burst.2 8
While space does not permit close examination of the particular
projects so financed in the several States, the graph of railroad
mileage in operation in Figure 12 shows how that sector of the
economy was growing at a rate that tends to match the growth in
State and local financings; the story of the defaults in State bonds
is adequate treatment of the situations where growth of population
Growth of Governmental Debt FIGURE 12
by Level of Government, 1790-1920
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and.the local economy did not generate sufficient revenues to provide
debt service. The nation's total population is also shown for
reference.
The pattern of default and repudiation that ensued led ultimately
to radical changes in the structure of local government and has been
a factor in the development of the revenue-debt problems that have
plagued local governments in more recent decades. As seen by
Chamberlain, these early troubles fall into definable periods, all
with the same underlying source:
The ultimate cause of state repudiation then,
is a low standard of business ethics. 2 9
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K. The collapse of State credit by 1843
Chamberlain, in his review of events defines three major periods
of stress: the first repudiation period dating from 1837 to 1845;
the repudiations and defaults connected with financing the Civil War;
and the second repudiation period dating from 1870 to 1884. In all
three situations, he finds the southern States having the worst
record, the Western and mid-Atlantic States with better records, and
the New England States, generally more conservative and with less
need for internal improvements, with the most enviable record.
In the first period, Massachusetts was the only New England
State to issue bonds. Delaware and two new States, Wisconsin and Iowa,
joined the other New England States in having no bonds of record.
Ohio issued large amounts in the earlier years and, with New Jersey,
imposed limits on the amounts that could be outstanding. New York,
emerging as the Empire State, managed its considerable debt in good
style, but both Pennsylvania and Maryland incurred temporary defaults
in 1842. As the list moves west and south, the blemishes become more
serious. Indiana defaulted in 1840, Illinois in 1841, but honored
their debts. Alabama defaulted and had to resort to taxation, an
unusual step for the period. Michigan, whose ebullient beginnings
in 1837 are chronicled by Adams and others, repudiated part of the
debts carried in her name, acknowledging only those funds actually
received by the State itself from the sale of bonds. Florida and,
in an outrageous fashion, Mississippi, deliberately repudiated their
debts.
The many financial histories of the United States are full of
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domestic and foreign comments in reaction to the various strategems
of repudiation which garnish the record. The library includes an
open letter from a New York gentleman who was livid at Daniel Webster's
support of a bill that would allow the federal government to stand
responsible for the State debts, for the gentleman saw in the XIth
Amendment a clear disparagement of any foreign attempt to secure
redress and a clear mandate for States to abandon obligations as
they chose; his sentiments were uttered officially on behalf of the
people of Mississippi in much more colorful language by their
governor.3 0 When Baring Brothers was approached by the federal
government to discuss the terms of a loan that would enable the
federal government to assume some $200 million of the debt in 1843,
that redoubtable banking house would not dis-cuss the matter. Adams
quotes a British writer:
America is not the country it is cracked up
to be; too many speculators and gamblers -- in-
deed, to be plain, I look upon it, from Maine to
Florida, as one vast swindling shop. 31
And Sydney Smith,
Sad is the spectacle to see you rejected by
every State in Europe as a nation with whom no
contract can be made because none will be kept;
unstable in the very foundations of social life,
deficient in the elements of good faith, men who
prefer any load of infamy, however great, to any
pressure of taxation, however light. 3 2
In the following sections, we turn to the impact of this situation
upon the municipalities waiting in the wings and to the related topics
of the restrictions and other guidelines developed to head off
defaults. The Civil War defaults were relatively minor, often result-
ing from attempts to repudiate or change the terms of bonds fraud-
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ulently issued by carpetbaggers, and otherwise resulting from
temporary inabilities to pay acknowledged debts in the aftermath of
war. 3 3 Chamberlain notes, with invidious remarks about the character
of southerners generally, that only Southern States were involved in
the repudiations of the second period, 1870-84: Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana,
Arkansas, Tennessee, and in part, West Virginia. The victory of the
States in the early 19th Century now had a hollow ring, for with
restrictions imposed by the people upon their power to borrow, their
potential as stewards of their own economies was passed into other
hands.
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APPENDIX C
NOTE ON THE MUNICIPAL AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL
REFORM MOVEMENTS
Theories of local finance were without value -- and restrictions
on taxation and debt were essential -- so long as Carpetbaggers and
the later machine politicians held sway in the cities. Reform came
at the turn of the century. (See especially: A Municipal Program:
Report of a Committee of the National Municipal League. Macmillan,
New York, 1900.) Several important organizations founded at that
time became the source of much of the material published regarding
municipal administration, local finance, city planning, and capital
budgeting: the National Municipal League, the International City
Managers Association, the Municipal Finance Officers Association,
and the American Economic Association. In their stable of writers,
who were sound researchers of available data and opinion and worthy
purveyors of classical doctrine were, notably, Carl Chatters,
A. M. Hillhouse, A. F. MacDonald, and Paul Studensky, part of a group
from whom comes not only our present knowledge of municipal practice
during the 1920's and, especially, the turbulent 1930's, but also
much of the early research supporting recommendations for the more
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complex reforms advanced in the larger field of intergovernmental
relations. To an extraordinary degree, contemporary proposals
reiterate their sentiments.
Reference is made here to the stream of reports that have
analyzed State-local fiscal problems in terms of the distribution of
powers and obligations in the federal system. The post-Keynesian
concepts of efficiency and equity have added new chapters to the
basic concerns for the improvement of the system. A major study
of intergovernmental fiscal relations was undertaken in the early
1940's, reviewed in the 1955 Kestnbaum report, and continued under
the aegis of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.
These documents are listed in our bibliography.
The more theoretic aspects of public purpose and public wants
were not developed until the Keynesian period. During the days
of the municipal reformers a substantial literature developed in
support of Henry George's single-tax movement, but more relevant
to our concern have been the writings in support of municipal
socialism, providing public ownership of "productive" assets.
Examples are found in the writings of Ely, Wilcox and others also
included in the bibliography.
APPENDIX D
DEVELOPMENT OF DATA SOURCES
For data about the 19th Century, almost all writers have relied
upon the tables in Adams, Public Debts, among them being Studenski,
Hanson & Perloff, and the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations. The Research Committee on Urbanism reported in 1936 to
the (U.S.) National Resources Committee as follows:
The period of the [first] World War marked the end of some four
decades of detailed official statistical reporting of comprehensive
scope relating to the many phases of urban America. As early as
1880, the Bureau of the Census published a two-volume work entitled
Social Statistics of Cities, which covered 1758 pages and presented
running descriptions and some detailed statistics of the topography,
history, transportation, manufactures
facilities, and governmental services
tion class of 10,000 and over. The I
and presented, in summarized statisti
material in more comparable form for
10,000 and over. In 1898, financial
collected for the first time. These
the present day. From that date also
statistics continued annually until I
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idea of official general statistics were given up in favor of
publication of occasional special monographs and series.
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- Strangely enough, the original survey of 1880 was partly
repeated in 1909, not as an official American projects but as a
British Board of Trade study covering the economic life of twenty-
eight of the larger industrial cities of the United States, published
by His Majesty's Stationery Office and then republished in 1911 as a
United States Senate Document (Number 22).
This retrogression of the general statistics of cities is apparent
from Table I I I which reflects the range and content of these statistics.
In a general way the sequence in titles is symbolic of the narrowing
scope of the official statistics on various items gathered with parti-
cular reference to cities. Beginning in 1880 and 1890 with the broad
title Social Statistics of Cities, and employing intermittently the
titles of Statistics of Cities and General Statistics of Cities, the
title finally shifted to the narrower term Financial Statistics of
Cities. Appearing as decennial publications in 1830 and 1890, the
general statistics were published annually from 1898 to 1909, dis-
appearing then except for a short revival in 1915 and 1916. The
Financial Statistics of Cities appeared annually from 1909 to the
present time skipping however, the years 1914 and 1920. Further,the
number of cities covered in these reports has on the whole diminished.
In 1890 345 cities were included; the highest figure was reached in
1903 when 544 cities were included, while in 1934 only 94 cities were
covered. The population range of the cities enumerated has also
narrowed. Beginning with cities of 10,000 in 1880 and 1890 and going
as low as 8,000 in 1903, these reports were restricted to cities of
30,000 and over in all other years until 1932, when they'were limited
still further to cities of 100,000 and over. The range of subject-
matter covered by these general statistics also has been noticeably
contracted. (From Interim Report, July 1936, p. 17-18.)
Comprehensive data on State and local finances began to be
available after Congress in 1898 instructed the Commissioner of Labor
to make annual reports on major cities. Aggregate data by State was
published for 1902, 1913, 1922, 1927, biennially after 1932, and
annually after 1952.
The first acceptable counts of the number of governments (i.e.,
potential sellers of bond issues) came only in the late 1930's in
the work of Anderson and various federal agencies. The first
detailed Census of Governments was conducted during 1941 but published
only in part because of the war. A limited survey was made in 1947,
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with full Censuses being taken in 1957, 1962, and 1967. Many of the
well-known cross-sectional analyses of cities were performed on
1957 data. The 1962 Census was considerably more detailed than the
earlier ones and was published in parts over the following years.
Only the preliminary totals have been published from the Census of
1967, but no detailed reports are available at this writing. See
U.S. Bureau of the Census. Historical Statistics of the United States:
Colonial Times to 1957. Supt. of Documents., GPO, Washington, D.C.,
1960. An excellent discussion of sources of data, including biblio-
graphy, is found in the introductory notes to Chapter Y, Government
Employment and Finances, pp. 694-708.
APPENDIX E
LOCAL DEBT IN THE NATIONAL ECONOMY
A. Debt to GNP
In its report on State constitutional restrictions on the
issuance of local government debt, the Advisory Commission on Inter-
governmental Relations investigated the ratio of both local debt
and interest expenditures to gross national product at various points
of time after the Civil War to 1960.1 Their measure was an amount
of debt and debt service per $1,000 of GNP. With respect to debt,
they found that local government debt per $1,000 of GNP was $77 in
1870, $90 in 1902, increased steadily through the years to $140 in
1929, jumped to a high of $280 in 1932 as a stable volume of local
debt became a larger ratio to a depressed GNP, fell to a low of $58
in 1948 as debt was paid off and GNP recovered through the end of the
1930's and the war years, and climbed steadily thereafter to the
point in 1960 where the table ended, at which time the figure was $102.
(A comparable figure for the end of 1967 is approximately $142.)
With respect to the Advisory Commission's calculations regarding
debt service, including interest and repayments, their data showed
a high of over $26 per $1,000 of GNP in 1932, and a 1960 level of
not quite $8, the variation stemming from the same relative movements
of GNP and volume of debt noted above.
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Given a precipitous decline in the level of GNP, any fixed finan-
cial obligation becomes onerous and will be deferred if possible as
available resources are devoted to more essential purposes, and thus
the records of the Depression years are replete with instances of de-
faulting on municipal obligations. Given a rising level of GNP in
real terms, however, the size of local government expenditures and
debts becomes an index to the allocation of national resources
between the public and private sectors.
To illustrate the latter point, Figure 13 has been prepared.
The horizontal axis shows GNP in real (1958) dollars, while the
vertical axis gives two sets of State and local data for (A) total
purchases of goods and services in each year and (B) locally-owned
public construction expenditures financed both by federal grants-
in-aid and by local resources.2 On such a correlation graph, a 450
line indicates that the two sets of data being charted are perfectly
correlated, so that an annual change in one set is matched with a
corresponding change in the other set of data.
The resulting graph of total purchases of goods and services
by State and local governments against GNP shows clearly how declines
in GNP during the 1930's were hardly matched by a decrease in State
and local expenditures until the end of the decade when the process
became reversed, with GNP rising and the State and local sector
lagging behind in real terms. The graph also demonstrates that the
1950's were years of gathering momentum for the State and local
sector in relation to GNP, with the 1960's a time when the two
series moved together. The growing share of GNP devoted to State
j ~FIGURE~ 13
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT OF THE UNITED STATES
COMPARED TO (A) STATE/LOCAL PURCHASES OF
GOODS AND SERVICES AND (B) STATE/LOCALLY-
OWNED PUBLIC CONSTRUCTION, BY YEAR 1929-
1967, IN CONSTANT (1958) DOLLARS.
70- Source: Economic Report of the President,
1968, Tables B-2, B-40.
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and local activities is evident in 1967 and 1968.
While the general shape of the graph relating State and local
public construction to GNP is similar to the graph relating their
purchases of goods and services to GNP, the indication is that the
construction activities of State and local agencies are increasing
at a slower rate than are their non-construction activities, in
itself a not surprising finding in light of the post-war emphasis on
higher pay for echelons of local government employees, including
teachers, combined with the general expansion of local services.
With regard to the comparability of the A and B data, note that
federal support funds are included in both the purchases and
construction series but that the construction data (B-graph) were
converted into 1958 dollars by use of the implicit price deflator
for non-residential construction in gross private domestic invest-
ment, an index that has risen slightly slower than the deflator for
State and local purchases generally, with the effect that the size
of the construction budgets as shown may be slightly overstated, a
bias that merely strengthens the finding about relative rates of
change, however.
Whether the share of the total national economy devoted to the
affairs of State and local government is too big or too small is a
subjective matter reflecting the observer's own social and political
proclivities and perception of needs in the welfare state, except
in so far as the amount, distribution, and timing of State and
local financial transactions are considered factors to be manipulated
or controlled in pursuit of goals represented by programs for
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economic growth, economic stabilization, and full employment.
B. Local and other debt
Municipal bonds compete in the nation's credit markets, and one
can gain a sense of the importance of this form of indebtedness for
the economy as a whole by inspection of Figure 14.
The federal debt surged during the Second World War after its
gradual rise during the Depression, with the postwar years showing
a renewal of the upward tendency. The increase in debt outstanding,
however, is most notable in the private sector, comprised of vast
amounts of corporate securities, non-farm mortgages, and commercial
finance company and consumer credit. The farming community's
indebtedness and the debt issued by State and local governments
pale in comparison, although the amount of State and local debt stood
at an all-time high of $110.1 billion at the end of 1967, represent-
ing 8% of the national total.
The crucial aspect of this distribution of debt, however, is
not to be found in comparisons of the percentage rates of increase
by category over the past three decades, nor in the absolute amounts
of the increase, but in an understanding of how the change in the
nature of savings institutions under the impact of the nation's tax
system has operated to limit the number of investors interested in
acquiring municipal bonds at yields State and local governments are
willing to pay.
The problem with respect to the demand for municipal bonds, in
brief, is that more and more of the savings of the American people
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are going.into tax-sheltered financial intermediaries such as pension
trust funds, life insurance policies, and various types of savings
institutions, none of which derive benefits from the tax exempt
interest feature of municipal bonds. In addition, funds that in
previous years had looked upon securities issued by State and local
governments with favor, either as a question of loyalty or as a
matter of investor prudence, have been induced to decrease their
holdings of municipal bonds in favor of higher yielding corporate
bonds and inflation-hedging common stocks; the investment record of
State and local pension trust funds and life insurance companies
is a case in point. This squeeze on the demand for municipal tax
exempt bonds has been analyzed elsewhere, but it remains the salient
characteristic of municipal bonds in the context of national sources
of credit, a factor that will also be relevant in discussions below
concerning the role that municipal bonds can be expected to play
under varying investment climates to the extent that those climates
are determined by national fiscal and monetary conditions.
NOTES TO APPENDIX E:
1. ACIR, State Const. and Stat. Restrictions on Local Government
Debt, p. 18.
2. Data from Economic Report of the President.
APP::DIX F
in the Congress which contemplate a different
approach, involving distribution of funds on
a less conditional and narrowly-targeted basis.
While Federal "revenue-sharing" had some-
times previously been proposed, the recent up-
surge of congressional and popular interest can
be traced to a proposal which was developed in
1964 by a fiscal study group that included Prof.
Walter W. Heller of the University of Minne-
sotta and Joseph A. Pechman, Director of
Economic Studies of the Brookings Institution,
and which is therefore often referred to as the
"Heller-Pechman Plan." 1
The revenue-sharing plan that was outlined
for consideration in 1964 was specifically of-
fered as an addition to, rather than a substitute
for, existing Federal programs for categorical
grants-in-aid. Some of the principle objectives
of a Federal revenue-sharing system have re-
cently been explained by Drs. Heller and Pech-
man as follows:
Revenue sharing is intended to allocate to the States
and local governments, on a permanent basis, a portion
of the very productive and highly growth elastic re-
ceipts of the Federal Government. The bulk of Fed-
eral revenues is derived from income taxes, which
rise at a faster rate than income as income grows. By
contrast, State-local revenues barely keep pace with
income. State-local needs have outstripped the po-
tentialities of their revenue system at constant tax
rates, with the result that tax rates have been pushed
steadily upward throughout the postwar period and
many new taxes have been added. Since State-local
taxes are on balance regressive, the higher State-local
taxes impose necessarily harsh burdens on low-income
recipients. In addition, essential public services are
not adequately supported in many, if not most, com-
munities because they do not have, the means to fi-
nance them * * *.
Categorical and general-purpose grants have very
different functions and these cannot be satisfied if
the Federal system were limited to one or the
other * * *.
Categorical grants are needed because the benefits
of many public services "spill over" from the com-
munity in which they are performed to other communi-
ties. Expenditures for such services would be too low
if financed entirely by State-local sources, because
each State or community would tend to pay only for
the benefits likely to accrue to Its own citizens * * *.
General-purpose or bloc grants are justified on sub-
stantially different grounds. In the first place, all
States do not have equal capacity to pay for local
services. Even though the poorer States make a larger
relative revenue effort, they are unable to match the
1 A congressional committee has recently issued several
publications about this and other possible types of Federal
action that might help meet the pressing fiscal problems of
State and local governments. See Revcnue Sharing and It8
Alternatives: What Future for Finnal Federalism? Hearings(July 31 and August 1, 2, 3, 1067) ; and Vol. I, Lessons of
.xperience; Vol. II, Range of Alternatives for Fiscal Fed-
eralism; and Vol. III, Federal, State, Local Fiscal Projections.
Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy of the Joint Economic Com-
mittee, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
revenue-raising ability of the richest States. Second,
Federal use of the best tax sources leaves a sub-
stantial gap between State-local need and State-local
fiscal capacity. Moreover, no State can push its rates
much higher than the rates in neighboring States for
fear of placing its citizens and business enterprises at
a disadvantage.'
At the time the "Heller-Pechman Plan" was
first publicized, its advocates urged that the
shared revenue should go only to the State gov-
ernments. They conceded that problems of
public services and financing are most critically
evident at the local level, and especially in
major urban areas. However, they pointed out
that: in general, the State governments have
been responsive to rising public service needs,
as evidenced by their tax-raising efforts and
in many instances by extensive grant-in-aid
programs; the proposed additional revenue
would enable the States to increase their aid to
local governments; and the great variation in
State-local patterns of govenment and fiscal
relations seemed to preclude any workable and
equitable arrangement for direct Federal-local
sharing.
These views, however, were not shared by
some spokesmen for local government, who
strongly urged provisions to protect the in-
terest of major urban areas in the States' use
of the prospective additional funds. Accord-
ingly, the authors of the plan have since modi-
fied their original stand and "in the light of
urgent local needs and the observed tendency
of State capitals to shortchange their major
central cities * * * have been perstaded that
an explicit 'pass through' rule may be desirable
to recognize the legitimate claims of local gov-
ernment." 3 They still recognize, however, that
any effort in this direction must take account
of the great diversity, from State to State, in
existing patterns of State-local fiscal relations.
We believe there is urgent need for early ac-
tion to establish a system of Federal revenue-
sharing which would incorporate major fea-
tures of the "Heller-Pcchman Plan" but which
would also provide for a share of the allocated
funds to go directly to major cities and urban
county governments. Accordingly, we make the
following recommendation:
Recommendation No. 1-A Federal revenue-
sharing system
The Commission recorimends that Con-
gress adopt a system for regular revenue
sharing with State governments and major
2 Walter W. Heller and Joseph Pehman, Questions and
Answers on Revenue-Sharing, Washington : The Brookings
Institution, 1967 (Reprinted from the hearings cited in foot-
note 1 above).
8 Ibid.
cities and urban counties. The revenue-shar-
ing system should be on a simple formula
basis that (1) reserves to a Federal trust
fund a sum for annual allocation consisting
of a legally authorized percentage of the
total net taxable income reported under the
Federal individual income tax; (2) provides
an allocation to each State area basecP pri-
l;arily upon population, but with an adjust-
ment for relative total State-local tax effort
and additional crediting for State revenue
from taxation of individual income; and (3)
provides for a portion of the allocation for
idividual State areas to be paid directly to
raajor municipalities and urban county gov-
ernments on a basis determined by their re-
spective shares of ali State and local tax
revenue in the particular State. The system
should leave a high degree of discretion with
tie recipient governments as to their applica-
tion of the distributed funds.
Primary features
Before discussing our proposal in detail, we
will review its major aspects, noting whether
and in what respect it may differ from the
Ifeller-Pechman version.
The purpose is basically the same-to tap the
highly productive Federal income tax so that
State and local governments might regularly
receive a defined portion of taxable personal
income.
The mechanism, under our proposal as under
the original plan, would be a trust fund. This
fund would regularly receive for allocation a
total sum determined by statutory provisions,
rather than being contingent upon annual da-
tailed appropriation action with all its uncer-
tainties and potential delays.
The State-by-State allocation we recommend,
as in the case of the earlier proposal, would be
primarily in terms of population. However, we
specifically urge that adjustments be made for
the level and form of State and local tax effort.
The use of funds would, for recipient govern-
ments, have few strings attached under our pro-
posa l as unl(letr tle pa piinxe'I otly developed.
The rc/piut gornacnh mtler I lte originial
plan, as noted earlier, would have been the
State governments only. Our proposal explicitly
ofTers a formula by which a portion of the
shared revenue would be allocated directly to
major cities ad major urban counties.
Allocationmethods
Oir recommendation would inv-olve two
major steps in apportioning the total u avail-
ale nim(n- lmtrtioular indvidual zoverrn :
50 State areas; 4 and (2) apportioninig each
State area total among major cities and urban
counties and the State government itself.
We are suggesting that the State area alloca-
tion take account of fiscal effort, as measured by
the relation of all State and local tax revenue to
personal income in the various States, and with
extra weighting for revenue from State indivi-
ual income taxes. Each State area's proportion
of the Nation's total population would be ad-
justed by this index to determine its share of all
the funds available.
Following are illustrative calculations (based
upon 1966 data) for two neighboring States that
differ considerably in relative fiscal effort, as
thus measured:
Illinols Wisconsin
(1) Percent of U.S. population--- --------------- 5. 528 2.135(2) Index of fiscal effort:(a) All State-local taxes per personal in-
come, relative to U.S. average.... . 853 1. 185(b) Same, adjusted to give double weight
to State income tax revenue....._. .785 1.373(3) Proposed State-area allocation as percent of
U.S. total (2b times 1)------------------- 4.321 2.920
Our proposal that extra weight be given to
revenue from State individual income taxes is
intended to encourage further use of this type
of tax, which is not yet used at all by a third
of the States and is only very modestly employed
in a considerable number of others.
The second step in the apportionment proc-
ess--determining the individual-government
parts of each State-area allocation-is more
fully explained below under "Selective Direct
Local Sharing."
Minimum constraints
We are urging that the allocations be inade
with a minimum of constraints upon the func-
tiona.l application of the funds by the recipient
governments. Fundamentally, this recommenda-
tion takes account of the basic purpose of the
proposed revenue-sharing system, which should
provide not olly a nieasur of inctrtasod fiscal
capacity but, 1lso 0 e freed(Om*II of ',Action for the
aided governments; i.e., with more opportunity
than is generally possible through conditional
grant arrangements for them to set priorities in
accordance with their own respective conditions.
This no-strings approach, we realize, may
seem less appealing politically to the Congress
"State area" is the tern used to include all governments
within the boundaries of a state--ieliding the state govern-
mo'nt, County governments, mnimlcipal goveranents, and so
forth. "Stat' govorniment" refers of (ourse solely to the
superir level of g .vernmuent within the state.
1i n wouMt a iore retrmve eaniiarlmgi- o
funds. Perhaps only minor harm would result-
in view of the prevailing makeup of State-local
expenditure-if the allocations were to be made
available for only some few major purposes,
such as education, public welfare, health, and
sanitation. But even such summary specification
would hamper responsible policymaking at the
State and local levels unless and until-as might
well be expected-adjustments had been made in
the way that "own revenue" sources were ap-
-olied to various needs. In other words, a second
argument for the lack of detailed functional con-
straints is that, at least over time, they would
tend to become illusory: complicating, but in-
effective.
It may be noted that, while no-strings aid
would be a new development for the Federal
Government, there are many precedents for this
kind of intergovernmental relationship, not only
in other countries but also at the State-local level
in the United States. All but a few State gov-
ernments distribute some funds for "general
local government support" (as classified in Cen-
sus Bureau reports), and the total of such State
distributions in fiscal 1967 was $1.4 billion. In a
few States, such unrestricted aid makes up a
considerable fraction of all State-local pay-
ments.
Selective direct local sharing
The local government feature of our proposal
is of crucial importance. In urging direct form-
ula-based payments to "major cities and urban
counties" we have in mind municipalities of
50,000 or more and those county governments
above the same minimum size in which at least
half the population is "urban." As of 1960, there
were 310 such municipal governments, with 63.4
million inhabitants, and 407 such major urban
county governments, with 103.1 million inhabi-
tants. The net total 1960 population of the pro-
spectively aided major units (without double
counting for the majority of major munici-
palities that 'are within major urban counties)
was 121.7 million, or two-thirds of the Nation's
total population.
On the other hand, this selective approach
would avoid the in(lesirnble features of a system
that envisaged direct Federal-local sharing to
local governments generally. Any such sweeping
ef'ort should be avoided on at least two grounds:
the tremendous administrative complexities in-
volved (with some 80,000 local units to be con-
side red) , and the prospect that no-strings Fed-
eral aid would tend to suistain and eiitrench
many local governments that are far too small
to ronr vinblp unit Undclr fh En0et0(l
Lu-stage wUAisutive luilnua, the uLd aimnca-
tion among State areas would be determined on
a uniform basis, but the intrastate shares to be
paid directly to major local urban governmernts
and to the State government itself would take
account of the particular State's prevailing pat-
tern of functional, responsibilities and financ-
ing, as reflected by tax revenue proportions.
With such an approach, it would be obviously
desirable to avoid the possibility of drastically
different treatment for individual governments
just below and just above the size standard for
eligibility; for example, one municipality of
49,900 and another of 50,100. This could be han-
dled by graduating allowances for units of
50,000 to 100,000 according to the percentage by
which their population exceeds the 50,000 level.
On such a basis, the plan would be most fully
helpful to municipalities and urban counties of
100,000-plus, and would provide discounted al-
locations for those with a population of 50,000
to 100,000.
The actual proportions of all funds going di-
rectly to States, as against major local units,
would of course depend upon the weight applied
to the "own tax revenue" portion of the intra-
state formula. We have tested one such formula,
under which the fraction of the total allocation
to any State area that would go directly to eligi-
ble local governments would be as follows:
(a) For each municipality or urban
county of 100,000-plus population, 2 times
the percentage relation of the goernment's
own tax revenue to the total of State arid
local taxes in the particular State; and
(b) For each municipality or urban
county of 50,000 to 99,999, the product of
(a) times the percentage by which the gov-
ernment's population exceeds 50,000.
With such a formula, judging by recent Cen-
sus Bureau data, direct allocations to major
municipalities would make up about 22 percent
of the nationwide total, direct allocations to
county governments would represent 13 percent,
and the other 65 percent would go to the State
governments. These proportions would natu-
rally range considerably from State to State,
depending upon their relative degree of urbani-
zation and their governmental patterns and
State-local tax arrangements. Some direct local
allocations would be made in all the States ex-
cept Alaska and Vermont (which lack any po-
tentially eligible local units). At the other ex-
treine, the local portion would be more than 50
percent of the State-local total in three States
(New York, Maryland. and Tenies(.e) and be-
nia, llawan, Massachusetts, Ne
Virginia.) 1
In most of the Nation, obvious
of all the federally shared reven
to the State governments unde
However, a considerable part of
resources thus available to the S
used by them-directly or indi
creased grants to local gover
grants already make up more th
all State general expenditure.)
to say, it is reasonable to expect
urban governments for which
revenue sharing is proposed wou
pate in such increased State fis
Implication3 for urban governm
This suggested plan for s
Federal-local revenue sharing
"loaded" to favor general-purpo
that are sufficiently large in pop
some prospect of viability a
Earlier in this report we have
need for greater use of such rel.
Detailed data by states are as follow
directly-aided cities and counties in pare
Percent of t
State
govern-
ment
Alabima---------------------- 75.3
Alaska----------------------- 100.0
Arizona----------------------- 72.2
Arkansas---------------------- 95.0
California---------------------- 56.5
Colorado---------------------- 72.9
Connecticut-------------------- 70.8
Delaware---------------------- 79.9
District of Columbia
Florida------------------------ 67.2
Georgia----------------------- 76.6
Hawaii------------------------ 51.9
Idaho ------------------------- 96.2
Illinois------------------------ 71.5
Indiana----------------------- 78.5
Iowa------------------------- 85.4
Kansas------------------------ 81.6
Kentucky---------------------- 83.9
Louisiana---------------------- 79.4
Maine------------------------ 94.0
Maryland---------------------- 38.9
Massachusetts------------------ 54.8
Michigan---------------------- 70.8
Minnesota--------------------- 75.7
Mississippi--------------------- 84.0
Missouri-----------------------69.8
Montana----------------------- 97.2
Nebraska---------------------- 79.3
Nevada----------------------- 77.8
New Hampshire-----------------86.9
New Jersey-------------------- 55.0
New Mexico-------------------- 86,5
New York---------------------- 22.4
Noith Carolina------------------ 78.1
North Dakota------------------- 98.6
Ohio------------------------- 68.9
Oklahoma---------------------- 85.4
Oregon----------------------- 79.6
Pennsylvania------------------- 71.7
Rhode Island------------------- 67.2
South Carolina------------------ 92.9
Soutn Dakota------------------- 95.8
Tennessee--------------------- 47.0
Texas------------------------ 71.5
Utah------------------------- 81.8
Vermont----------------------100.0
Viri-W ima - - - -- - - - - ---- 54.2
Washington ..................... 0.1West Virginia . . . . ..-------- 93.6
V, - ---- --- 73.4
nw Jersey, and hitilvo locag
ing, and scatteration of responsibility found in
ly, a major part so many metropolitan areas. A revenue-sharing
ues would flow plan of this nature should help to encourage
r this formula. State and local action in that direction, especial-
the additional ly if the provisions for eligibility are designed
;tates would be to recognize changes in governmental structure:
rectly-f'r in- for example, population minimums should per-
nments. (Such mit allowance for the effect of recent annexa-
an one-third of tions and mergers, and creditable local tax
And, needless revenue should be allowed for all of any group
that the major of units that might have recently merged.
direct Federal Given such provisions, the system would offer
ld also partici- some specific financial incentive toward desir-
cal aid. able enlargement and functional consolidation
~nt t r-cture of local government in urban areas. Many cir-ent strueture t
electivecumstances can be identified where eligibilityeletie irct for direct participation in the revenue-shaf-lring
is deliberately system could be achieved or enlarged by munici-
se grovernmentss o govrn et pal annexation action, municipal consolidatGions,)ulation to gi city-county integration, intercounly cogilv-
s urban units. tions, or the -bsorption by populous cities or
emphasized the counties of various "overlying" special districts
atively compre- which now exercise independent taxing power.
The systemn would also provide some incentive
s (with numbers of for increased use of the county as an instrument
nthesis): for local school-taxing purposes, as w have
otal State-area allocation previously urged.
Major
Major urban The Federal Government has a clear
cities counties mate interest in more rational and workable
12.5 (6) 12.2 (12) patterns of urban government structure, in
15.1( 1 2 view of the great difficulties which existing con-
2. 5 (3) 2. 5 (4) -15. (1)27. (5) ditions create for effective interg-overnmental15.8 (41) 27.7 (25)e_
16.2 (3) 10.9 (7) relationships. On the other hand, the proposed
29.2 (8)-
12.1 (1) 8.0 (1) revenue sharing plan would not be directly
100.0 (1) --
12.1 (10) 20.7 (15) coercive toward structural change nor-in view
9.6 (6) 13.8 (8) of its rather limited scale in relation to urban
48.1 (1)- - -
....... _-- 3 8 (2 government financing-so generous as to pro-
20.7 (15) 7.8 (21) 'de an overwhelming incentive. This seems
10.5 (9) 11.0 (18)
6.6 (7) 8. 0 (9) consistent with the view that iimarr
6. 9 (3) 11. 5 (6)yrep n i9.5 ( biity for dealing with problems of urban gov-
14. 3 (5) 6. 3 (9)14.3 (5) 16 (9) erment structure must continue to rest with4. 4 (1) 1. 6 (5)
27. 8 (1) 33. (4) States aid local communities.
41.9 (19) 3.3 (9)
17.5 (17) 11.7 (15) Some observers might question our proposal
10.7 (4) 13.6 (6)r10.7 (4) 1.3 (6 that direct sharinar of Federal revenue should11.7 (1) 4.3 (73 v
23. 3 (6) 6. 9 (8) extend to large urban counties as well as to ma-
.4 (2) 2.4 (1)
13.6 (2) 7. 1 (2) Jo municipalities. They may argue that coun-
2.8 (2) 19.4 (2)
10.5 (1) 2.6 (3) ties in some parts of the country evidence low
23.3 (14) 21.7 (16) standards of competence. However, eligibility
11. 4 (1) 2. 1 (6)67.0 (15) 10.6 (20) for major urban counties seems clearly desir-
7.0 (7) 14.9 (10)
. -- 1.4 (1) able main because of ue varations
19.6 (18) 11.5 (28) that exist in the split of functional and
8.0 (3) 6.6 (6)
9.3 (2) 11. 1 (5) financing responsibilities between cities and
19.6 (14) 8.7 4) th role32.8 (4) -- couties county's a
2.4 (3) 4.7 (5)
1.2 (1) 3.0 (2) ement) ranges from zero in certain cases up26.1 (4 26.9 (6)
18.7 (21) 9.8 (27)
8.8 (2) 9.4 (4) ment in some other major urban areas. On the
28.2 (8) 17.6 (5) other hand, there is one rather widespread fea-
9. 5 (3) 10.4 (11)
3.1 (3) 3.3 (4) ture of county government that does demand at-02.8 (7) 16.0 (s) tan C t r l thres. svstnu. shs rin-
APPENDIX G
THE CLASSIC THEORY OF LOCAL PUBLIC FINANCE
Local public debt theory did not have to be formulated until
sub-national governments became active sellers of debt securities and
the originally clear distinctions between public (or national) debt
and private debt (all other forms thereof) became obscured in the
process of economic growth and the rise of constitutional government.
The classical approach to local public debt theory only took
shape toward the end of the 19th Century, following almost a
hundred years of innovative experience with the unique federal
structure of the United States and with the financial problems of the
rapidly-growing cities in England and the Continent. We refer to the
writings of Ely on local taxation, Bolles on the financial history
of the United States, and H. C. Adams and C. F. Bastable on public
finance. Ely in 1888 wrote of the paucity of literature in America
on the subject of local taxation and finance, observed the emergence
of well-researched treatises on political economy in Germany and
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and other European countries, but praised a book which remains the
foundation even for contemporary scholars such as James M. Buchanan:
America has at last a work on one of the aspects of
modern finance which can compare favorably with the
[European] treatises mentioned above. I refer to the
thoughtful and well-written work by Professor Henry C. Adams
of the University of Michigan, entitled "Public Debts."
Part III deals with state and local public debts, and it is
needless to say that a treatment of debts is an essential
part of any complete work on finance. The book is histori-
cal, descriptive, Tritical, and suggestive, and is in every
respect admirable.
As a foundation for our reappraisal of policy regarding State-
local debt in contemporary conditions, we have distilled the Adams and
Bastable treatises into seven major points. Their arguments are
rooted in the work of Adam Smith, the Physiocrats, and economic thought
as it developed through the 19th Century. They were among the first
scholars to analyse the emerging role of the State and municipal sector
in the United States, observing how institutions of local government
first developed in Europe were modified by American law and custom
and how events impelled municipal governments to undertake capital-
investment programs that had been the responsibility of sovereigns
in earlier times.
1.
Public indebtedness, far more prevalent in the.19th Century
than before, is a product of the development of responsible
constitutional governments (less able to levy taxes and corvees
at will) and of money market institutions serving a growing class
of private investors. 2
177
2.
A loan by itself is not a consumer of resources, merely a
transfer of private wealth to a public body. The deflationary effects
of postponed private consumption anticipated by Montesquieu, Hume,
Adam Smith and Hamilton were shown to have been canceled out by the
stimulating effect of public investment, while a Ricardo-Chalmers-Mill
claim that wage earners were especially affected by public indebtedness
was held fallacious. 3
3.
The ''spirit of socialism'' abroad in the land exerts a profound
impact, extending the functions of government from the protective to
the developmental area and expanding the demand for capital funds whose
burden is to be allocated over time over the relevant population.4
4.
Based upon analysis of (a) the social principles underlying
different forms of taxation (i.e., apportionment in accordance with
the theory of cost, the benefit theory, or the contributory theory)
and (b) the administrative aspects of tax collection for different types
of taxes (i.e., income and excise taxes versus real property taxes), a
federal system has a special need to distribute sources of revenue
appropriate to the functions to be performed by that level of government.
Adams goes so far as to suggest:
.... since the payments are the greatest where the
social relations are the most intense -- that is to say,
in the cities -- .... there would seem to be some pro-
priety in opening up to the cities as a peculiar source
of revenue that fund of values which the growth and the
life of the cities have caused to be created. Refer-
- 5ence is here made to all forms of muni-cipal monopolies."'
5.
Unlike the sovereian national and State governments, a municipal
corporation can be sued on its debt, and thus its projects tend to be
of a more considered and even productive nature. Although some of its
tax and debt policies have similar social effects as those of a
national government, its revenue potential and its organization are
more akin to those of a private corporation than to a national govern-
ment.
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6.
A local government, however, functions both as an agent of the
state and as a representative of its resident citizens; therefore,
some public projects (such as schools) might properly be financed by
loans from the state; projects more directly for the benefit of
tenants and/or property owners (such as sewers) might be financed by
bond sales to private parties.6
7.
There should be no need for refunding local bond issues to take
advantage of lower interest rates, since local bonds should not be sold
in periods of crisis (such as war) nor be of such long maturity that
pronounced changes in business activity would create either opportuni-
ties for profitable refunding or high risks of default. 7
Adams and Bastable understood but did not emphasize the two con-
siderations that have characterized later investigations: the extent
to which suburbanites can avoid municipal taxes but still enjoy the
services of central cities; and the extent to which State-local finances
and urban economic growth are affected by business cycles and the
programs for full employment and economic stabilization that emerged
in later theory and practice. It was clear to them, however, that the
growth of urban America and the enlargement of the inventory of social
wants to include education, waterworks, sanitary sewers, and trans-
portation facilities would make municipal indebtedness inevitable,
for no system of pay-as-you-go local taxation could provide the con-
struction funds required, and no steady flow of either revenues or
loans was forthcoming to cities from either federal or State sources.
The most urgent improvement called for in the works cited thus far
was for a higher quality of municipal management, based on citizen
awareness of the fiscal dangers of overoptimism, fraud, and corruption.
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The dangers of local mismanagement might thus be avoided, but no easy
cure was anticipated for the paucity of municipal revenue sources
in the federal system, although the States were gradually becoming
aware of the new uses to which their credit might be put.
NOTES TO APPENDIX G:
1. Ely, p. 98. See Buchanan, Public Debt in a
Society, p. 67.
2. Bastable, p. 550; Adams, Public Debts, p. 7
3. Bastable, Book V, Chapter V, p. 575 ff.
4. Adams, Public Debts, p. 17 ff; Bastable, p.
5. Adams, The Science of Finance, Chapters 11
Chapter VI, p. 492.
6. Adams, Public Debts, p. 361; Bastable, p. 6
7. Adams, Public Debts, p. 307 ff.
Democratic
ff.
48 ff.
and 1I1; quotation
31.
APPENDIX H
COMMENTS ON POST-KEYNESIAN WRITINGS
ON "PUBLIC FINANCE"
The new political economy
With Keynes came a renewed demand to provide full employment
through national economic growth and to eliminate the "arbitrary and
inequitable distribution of its wealth and income."
Following Keynes, the concepts of welfare economics were sub-
jected to far more rigorous analysis than before as economists merged
the ancient concerns for economic growth and equity in taxation with
(a) more explicit treatments of decision-making in a democracy and
(b) a higher aspiration level for public wants. Consideration of the
literature of this new school of political economists is beyond the
scope of this essay, but its central ideas are of great importance
and relevance, representing development of what Edwin Seligman called
a "social theory of fiscal science." Such theory is the foundation
of definitions of the public purposes to be served by public expendi-
tures in a democracy characterized by increasingly complex intra-
metropolitan and inter-group relationships. (See, especially, works
by Buchanan and Rothenberg.)
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A determination as to when a "want" common to the members of a
group is properly a "public" want is one of the major concerns of
such social theory, for such a determination defines the nature of
"public goods" and the amount of such public goods demanded by
members of the body politic. The writings of the liberal economists
suggest that America still has far to go in satisfying "public
wants" for education, housing, an unpolluted and gracious environment,
and so forth.
The definition of "public" involves the question of how the
individual's preferences are respected by the body politic and the
problem of achieving a Pareto optimality in a public program.
"Pure" theories of local public economics
The "pure" theories attempt to define "public" goods, distinguigh
various types of such goods, and provide a rational basis for distri-
buting resources to and within the "public" sector.
Samuelson's 1954 essay set out to provide firmer foundations for
the spreading activities of government in the post-Keynesian days.
His concepts have been continuously expanded, criticized, and
adapted by Musgrave, Margolis, Tiebout, Williams, and others.
A pure public good is one that, if offered, will be available
to all members of society, that cannot be withheld from.any person,
and that can be enjoyed fully by each person even though the number
of persons benefitted increases. Pure air for breathing is a prime
example of such a public good. Pure public goods have a zero
marginal cost, which dictates a zero price and eliminates the possi-
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bility of private investment to obtain it. Since everyone benefits
equally, the costs of providing the public good can be apportioned
by a per capita tax.
Unfortunately, most of the non-regulatory activities of
government are providing benefits from which some members of society
can indeed be excluded. Benefits may only accrue to one locality
or one class of persons, and in many instances, there is no clear
advantage to public over private operation. If a public agency makes
the investment, it is confronted with the ancient problems of who
may use the facility and how to finance it: whether by benefit
charges, ability-to-pay taxes or fees, or general taxes. In all
cases, borrowing is a way of spreading the burden of cost over the
generations that will benefit from lumpy capital investments.
Particular attention is given in the literature to the purposes
of public expenditures by communities in the same metropolis who are
in the position of spending for the benefit of non-residents or being
affected by the externalities of investments (or lack thereof) in the
other communities.
The work of these "pure" theorists is of interest to all those
concerned with the propriety, the efficiency, and the redistributive
effects of governmental expenditures, including the operation of
enterprises for which market prices can be employed. Such "pure"
theory, however, has not been addressed to the particular problem of
an individual local government in a metropolis with limited access to
funds for capital investment as distinguished from total expenditures,
and thus the body of this literature is tangential to the subject of
local public debt policy. Moreover, one recent writer (Williams)
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points out that such "pure" theories have dealt only cursorily to
date with the problem of localized goods that can be either public or
private, while another analyst (Pidot) remarks that the "pure"
theories, being static, are irrelevant or misleading for local
officials involved with the heuristics of local administration.
APPENDIX I
ECONOMIC MODELS OF MUNICIPAL
FISCAL RELATIONSHIPS
A. Models of the local finance problem
The models developed in this appendix approach a set of problems
not yet tackled in the literature. The objective is to test the
validity of some of the principles of "sound" finance and to explore
the relationships that are felt to exist between different revenue
sources, expenditures on current and capital account, bonds issued
to finance capital expenditures, valuations of property for tax
purposes, interest rates, and State restrictions. The models are
simple, but the conclusions they suggest are building blocks for
rational policies for municipal corporations.
Scores of economists have analyzed fiscal (and associated socio-
economic) data by means of multiple regression programs to discover
the revenue and expenditure patterns of urban communities. What
these empiric researchers have provided is a description of how
suburban communities differ from central city populations. The
theory implied in such research is that a given set of characteristics
determine a municipality's fiscal allocations: IF one knows the
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initial state variables concerning income, ethnic voting habits, age
of sewers, etc., THEN one can predict for any community the size of
its expenditures on schools, sewers, housing, etc. The inadequacy
of this work for our purposes stems from its sector by sector account-
ing, its lack of discrimination of current from capital items, its
cross-sectional analysis over metropolitan areas which make intercity
comparisons misleading, and its lack of intuition as to how such
local governments will meet the demand for high levels of service.
Whitelaw made a substantive contribution by being one of the few
analysts to treat time series data in depth over an extended period
for a single municipality, but his model, while rich in independent
variables, still fails to consider the municipal budget as a whole.2
He too looks for the ultimate model of the municipal budgetary
function that incorporates what he called "an explicit simultaneous
system of revenues and expenditures" and which he deferred examining
because he found the constitutional and statutory constraints on
borrowing "far too complex to place in a precise functional form."
Yet, intuitively if necessary, local fiscal officers act as though
such a budgeting system existed; it remains for the empiric researchers
to describe such a local government function.
Far more relevant as an empirically-based finding to.guide local
officials is the evidence Margolis reported that shows that single-
function districts have higher financing costs than general govern-
ments (and that independent school districts have higher financing
costs than school systems operated as departments of general govern-
ments), providing strong arguments for use of general obligation bonds
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issued by general governments wherever possible and for securing
subsidies for social welfare facilities along the lines of the
arguments presented in this dissertation.3
Studies of municipal debt management are also rare. Shattuck
investigated the relationship of debt to property valuations over
economic cycles in his critique of State restrictions.4 Studenski
recommended an ever-normal budgeting policy, with variations from
the mean to be financed by the federal government.5 The conventional
views and standard practices are well covered in manuals for local
finance officers.6
What is lacking, and what we attempt to provide, is a study of
contemporary options available to a municipal general government,
subject to the traditional constraints but caught up in the whirl
of metropolitan politics in an era with a rising demand for public
goods and services. The kind of comprehensive budgetary model
required would take as inputs a PPBS report on a single function,
a list of approved items for the capital budget (suitably ranked as
to potential productivity), and all the other facts and figures
about the fiscal position of the municipality, including secular
trends with respect to its tax base. The required output is a
balanced budget over the period, based upon judgments concerning
the borrowing capacity of the municipality and the availability of
intergovernmental grants-in-aid.
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B. The equation for local fiscal equilibrium
The fundamental rule in municipal finance is that, over the short
run as well as over time, total revenues must be equal or greater than
total expenditures.
For the model developed below, the equilibrium sought is in
terms of the present values of the flows of revenues and expenditures
over a 20-year period, discounted at a 5 per cent rate. While one
might argue for a five- or a 20-year moving average instead of the
present value approach, the 20-year period is something of a benchmark
in municipal bond reports, while the discount factor provides a
familiar method of comparing financial flows over time. We assume
that borrowing and lending rates are equal.
The revenue side of the local fiscal equation reports receipts
from the following sources:
P = taxes on real property
Q = other tax and non-tax revenues
G = intergovernmental revenues toward current expenditures
Gc = intergovernmental grants toward capital outlays
B = total borrowings
Expenditure items in the model are allocated to the following
accounts:
X = total current expenditures, excluding debt service and
capital outlays
D = debt service on outstanding borrowings
C = construction outlays financed by intergovernmental
grants
Cm = construction outlays financed by the municipality alone
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The basic equilibrium can be expressed in the following form:
(1) P + Q + G + G + B =X + D + C + C
x c g m
with each term being the present value of a 20-year stream discounted
at 5 per cent. (The present value of one dollar a year for 20 years
is $12.50, a factor employed in the model below.) Several identities
may also be expressed with reference to the basic terms of the
equation.
Property taxes are found by multiplying property valuation by a
tax rate. For the model we assume true value (V) and an effective tax
rate (rt) as equivalent to actual assessed values and local tax rates.
Thus, in each year's accounts,
(2) P = tV
Total borrowings are the sum of annual amounts of new debt sold
in a year less amounts repaid, placed in sinking funds or otherwise
escrowed against the day of maturity. In the model, total borrowings
are subject to a limit prescribed by the State as a percentage (r )
of true valuation. Thus, in each year's accounts,
(3) B r5 V
Debt service is the sum of interest payments and sinking fund
requirements in each year for each bond issue. Except as noted, bonds
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in the model might be considered to have a 20-year term, with
sinking fund at a 5 per cent rate, while interest is as set by the
market at the time of sale and expressed here as rm. Thus, in each
year's accounts,
(4) D = (.05 + r ) B (.05 + r ) (rs V)
The present value formulation implies that the value of money is
nonlinear but that the present values themselves can be represented by
a linear accounting equation. The discussion below examines the manner
in which some of the terms of the equation are interrelated and even
intercorrelated in certain fundamental ways, but no attempt is made
to introduce non-linear factors. One might argue in opposition to
such a procedure; the effect of increasing population, for instance,
may be non-linear along the lines sketched out by Baumol's analysis
of unbalanced growth.7
In short, the basic problem is that each of the terms of the
equation may be considered to be subject to determination by authority
outside the control of the local government. For example, the
character and amounts of intergovernmental transfers are established
at the State capitol and in Washington, and, if such assistance is
negligible, then G x G c, and C will also be small. Moreover, the
debt limit factor, rs, and the market interest rate, rm, are beyond
local control, and even valuation,V, and the property tax rate may be
established by a superior level of government, which may also restrict
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the range of opportunities for obtaining the other tax and non-tax
revenues in the Q category. To the extent that current expenditures,
X, are mandatory in terms of object of expenditure, if not also in
the level of service to be provided, and imply the need for some
range of capital outlay, Cm4 the local government's fiscal choices
may indeed be narrow.
In the hands of a weak or unmotivated municipality, the fiscal
equation will be nothing more than an accounting device, with the
various rates and categories manipulated annually for fiscal balance.
Almost any municipality, given a reasonably stable economic base,
can exist within the set of exogenous restraints embedded in its
particular set of fiscal factors, so long as it is willing to
maintain current expenditures, X, at a low level and to minimize its
exposure to the difficulties of capital outlays and resultant in-
debtedness. The strains come when standards are raised and when
waves of social, economic, and demographic change engulf the
community. Then the inherent intercorrelations in the data input
into the equation and the interdependence of the accounting categories
are highlighted in the annual reports of the city managers and in the
literature of urban economics.
The equation must therefore be evaluated in terms of such
changes. The growth of population and employment in a locality, for
instance, will presumably cause property valuation, V, to increase,
thus generating larger tax revenues and debt potential without change
of rates. If population increases (say, as lower skilled persons
migrate to the center city) but employment within the municipality
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decreases (say, as industries move to the suburbs), the stability of
V is in question, while the possible yield from other sources, Q,
depends upon the incidence of such levies on residents and non-
residents. 8 As noted, the municipality's ability to finance capital
outlays may be importantly determined by intergovernmental grants,
while intergovernmental assistance may also be required to support
the additional services deemed necessary. Meanwhile, an increase in
the scope and level of goods and services provided, as represented
by C and X in the model, may stimulate economic development in the
locality, but it does not follow thereby that property values, V,
will rise, for the means of increasing C and X may have required
increases in tax rate, rt, and other taxes, Q, and contributed to
the flight of higher income families to other jurisdictions with a
more felicitous mix of goods and services.
Thus the dispersion of authority over the activities represented
in the accounts, the ultimate interdependence of one factor with the
others, and the particular shape of the basic political and economic
forces in the community must all be recognized by the individual city
budgetmaker. The degree to which a given type and amount of munici-
pal expenditure or impost will generate positive or negative change
in the unique environment under investigation by a local finance
officer may be exceedingly difficult to trace and measure except
in such qualitative terms. The purpose of the model, however, is to
throw light on the relationships that might be found for any
individual municipal corporation for which data are supplied.
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The model is not designed to analyze the multi-governmental environ-
ment of the metropolis, where a set of differentiated, competitive
governmental entities become the object of concern (as in the writings
of Wood, Rothenberg, and many others). The model, however, is
related to the work of researchers who have attempted to correlate
socio-economic characteristics of the residents with the expenditure
patterns of their cities and towns (as in the writings of Brazer,
Sacks, Schmandt, and others), for we must make the assumption here
that the city managers using the equation already know the pattern
of suburban differentiation in their metropolises and the social,
political, and economic forces that combine to determine the mix
and level of expenditures. The question is to determine, as best
they can, the trade-offs between taxes, borrowings and grants-in-
aid in a comprehensive budget.
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C. Graphic analysis of fiscal factors in local equilibrium equation
Before we insert quantitative data into the equation introduced
in the preceding section, it is useful to provide a more sensitive
qualitative basis for the discussion. We may do this by tracing
analytically the revenue and debt effects generated by a decision
to increase the amount of construction outlays in the accounts of a
single municipal corporation. The effects are linked in the manner
represented in Figure 15 below, where the direction of the flow of
effects is from the vertical of C (construction outlays) to the
to the left for revenue effects and to the right or clockwise, for
the debt effects. The diagram suggests that, although every factor
affects every other factor in the realm of municipal finance, a
persistent pattern can be described by which the effects are made
manifest.
In Figure 15 there can be found four tripartite relationships,
denominated by the same terms defined in the preceding section. The
dotted lines through the midpoints of the sides of the triangle
indicate the equilibrium points established for the individual
municipal corporation that the model represents, with a positive or
negative change to be reflected in the direction indicat.ed.
We begin with the requirement that C increase from the equili-
brium point, considering first the effects on debt.
In the most unfavorable situation, as shown by the xxx-line,
no further intergovernmental grants, Gc, are available to help
finance the increase in capital outlays, C, and the burden thus
falls on B, borrowings. If B increases, there is a tendency for
Chart of Dynamics of Fiscal
Equilibrium for a Municipal
General Government
Effect of Increased
Capital Outlays on:
REVENUES
DEBT
FIGURE 15
**o#*** effect/An f&aordle(t c .ka
195
the municipality's bond rating to fall, thus increasing the debt
servicing burden, D, for a given level of B. Now, with regard to
the revenue effects of this situation, also shown by the xxx-line,
the increase in C and D, given a property base, V, that has not
increased proportionately with the expanded needs of the municipality,
will require a relative increase in property taxes, P. The effect
of higher property taxes, moreover, may be a fall in the Q portion of
other revenues as some economic activity and higher income persons
flee the city. It follows that,if property taxes must rise to
service a larger amount of borrowing, and if the combination of
Gx and Q is stable or falling, current expenditures, X, will be
severely constricted, if not actually decreased in scope and effective-
ness.
In more favorable circumstances, the scenario allows the
posited increase in capital outlays, C, to be matched by some in-
crease in inter-governmental grants, G c requiring only a small amount
of new bonds and generating only negligible effects on debt service
burden and rating. The increase in C, moreover, may be optimistically
held to stimulate growth in property valuation, so that the increase
in property tax rates in relative terms is unnecessary. In such a
case, P remains in equilibrium with the combination of Q and G ,
with the further possibility that economic stimulation will support
a desirable increase in the level of current expenditures, X.
The shaded area on the diagram suggests the range of effects,
and some useful intuitions can be gained by choosing some other
category than C as the initial source of change, observiug the
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range of positive and negative changes that follow from subsequent
assumptions required to obtain a new equilibrium position.
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D. Empirical data in the local equilibrium equation
In this section, we insert representative data into the basic
equilibrium equation in preparation for an exploration into the
parameters of valuation, debt, intergovernmental assistance and the
other factors brought together by means of the diagram in the
preceding section.
The data employed for the discussion are taken from the annual
municipal financial reports collected and analyzed by Manvel of the
Bureau of the Census. Figure 16 shows how the estimated 1964-65
data for all cities change on a per capita basis by size of population.
The example case is based on data for the 300,000-499,000 size
group, and we shall assume in the first instance that constant
dollars are represented and that the same amounts are received and
spent each year in the 20-year period. As calculated in Table 5,
the present value of local accounts for 20-years discounted at
5 per cent are: current expenditures of $1,300, debt service of
$275, Capital outlays of $375, financed by property taxes amounting
to $625, other taxes and charges of $725, intergovernmental revenues
of $375, and borrowings of $225. Differential trends in the data
are not reflected in these totals, since the 1964-65 data were
merely repeated for each of the future years.
These estimated data are in acceptable ranges. An average
valuation of $2,500, for instance, at 2 per cent effective tax rate,
produces the $50 per capita figure that was derived from the
published figures, while the scale of the effective tax rate itself
is well corroborated by Census surveys as to the relation of true
FIGURE 16
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FISCAL EQUILIBRIUM FACTORS, TABLE 5
TYPICAL CITY, PER CAPITA BASIS
Present value Per capita
Factor of 20-year amounts,
stream, dis- annual basis
counted at 5%
REVENUES
Property Taxes
P = rtV (=2% on $2500) $ 625 $ 50
Other Revenue
Q 725 58
Intergovernmental Revenue
G G + Gc 375 30
Borrowings
D rsV (=9% on V=$2500) 225 18
$1950
OUTLAYS
Expenditures
X 1300 104
Debt Service
(.05 + rm) (rsv), equivalent
to interest of 4% on debt of
$225 plus sinking fund payment
of 5% on $225. 275 22
Capital Outlays
C = Cg + Cm, where annual
borrowings are 18/30 or
about 60% of capital outlays. 375 30
$1950
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value to tax receipts. The $2,500 per capita valuation, in turn,
given debt of $225, suggests a 9 per cent ratio of debt to valuation,
also in the range of State constitutional and statutory maxima.
Moreover, the $225 debt figure itself is in line with the estimate of
per capita debt derived by allocating to the class of cities above
its proportionate share of reported debt and converting to a per
capita basis. 12 Since approximately one half of capital outlays by
State-local units have been financed by bond issues in recent years,
according to the Joint Economic Committee study, the calculated
60 per cent ratio of borrowings to outlays also appears reasonable
for the example case. 1 3
The most egregious variation between the proto-city suggested
by the data and an actual municipality in the size class would
probably be found, as suggested by Manvel's report, in the category
covering educational services and facilities, for only 10 of the
43 cities in the 200,000-499,000 size group operate their own
("dependent") school systems; education is handled by independent
school districts in the other areas. Thus only one-quarter of the
revenue and expenditure items devoted to education are reflected
in the group data employed in the example above; were the school
district budgets included, the sums given would rise proportionately
in every category.
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E. Parameters in a theory of borrowing
We are now in a position to begin exploring the relationship
between the gross categories employed in the model. This procedure
is the reverse of the usual approach, whereby each category or object
of expenditure is examined individually but where the total budget
that the sum of the parts represents is rarely considered as a whole.
More specifically, we shall use the equilibrium model to under-
stand the means by which significant expansions in the expenditure
and capital outlay categories can be financed, given the rules of the
municipal game and the observed limitations in the expansion of
revenues from property tax and other sources.
In. the following discussion, the dollar figures are considered
to be in real or constant dollars, so that the effect of changes
in the relative amounts of factor inputs can be observed without
reference to changes in the price level and thus in terms of resource
allocation alone.
Long-term borrowing to finance current expenditures
In the first application of the model, we seek a definitive
explanation of why current expenditures cannot be financed by borrowings,
except for very short periods when there is a reasonable expectation
of support from intergovernmental sources or local tax sources. We
begin by assuming that no further revenue can be expected from local
taxes on existing real property or from further non-property taxes
and charges. The reasoning behind such a constraint is reflected
in real world situations where taxpayers no longer are willing to
raise taxes to pay for desirable new public services but will vote in
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favor of such referenda as the proposed Watson amendments that was
narrowly defeated in the California election of 1968.14 We assume,
in addition, that the example city has exhausted its capacity to
levy non-property taxes and to set charges for services without
precipitating deleteriously higher rates of suburbanization of
employment and residences. The burden of financing is thereby
placed on intergovernmental revenues and long-term borrowing. In
later explorations, we shall observe the effect of assuming a rise
in valuation and economic activity so that increases in property
taxes and other revenues can be generated.
On the expenditure side of the equation, we assume that our
representative community has adopted fixed policies whereby current
expenditures, X, will increase at the compound rate of 5 per cent
a year and capital outlays will increase at the compound rate of
10 per cent a year. In fact, such increases are not beyond the
experience of communities in recent years, especially in cases when
the physical plant of the city has been neglected and the provision
of welfare services has lagged.
Evaluating the present value stream of the assumed rates of
change in the equation, as was done in Table 5, provides the following
set of values for the equilibrium equation:
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Property taxes P $ 625
Other revenue Q 725
Intergovernmental rev. G + g 375 + g
Borrowings B + b 225 + b
$1,950 + g + b
Current Expenditures X 2,080
Debt service 275 + d
Capital outlays 1,015
$3,370 + d
where g, b, and d represent the incremental amounts required to
balance the fiscal accounts of the community.
Thus, the present value of expected outlays over the ensuing
20-year period has risen to $3,370 per capita, plus the amount required
to service the additional debt (if any) incurred over and above
existing indebtedness.
Having assumed that property taxes based on existing valuation
and other revenues remain invariate, P and Q remain at $625 and
$725 respectively, while the burden of financing the larger amount
of current and capital outlays is put on additional intergovernmental
subsidies (g) and on additional borrowings (b). In summary, the
deficit to be financed in this assumed situation is equal to
[$3,370 + d] less [$1,950 + g + b]. Thus, to obtain fiscal equilibrium,
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as must be done,
$1,950 + g + b = $3,370 + d
(5) g + b - d = $1,420
At one extreme, all the additional funds might come from inter-
governmental sources; thus g would equal $1,420 and d and b would be
zero. *Total intergovernmental funding would amount to $1,420 plus
the existing $375 or $1,795, a total amount that is 4.8 times as great
as in the basic example.
Where the equation is easily balanced by the provision of inter-
governmental funds or tax revenues, the model "blows up" at the other
extreme, the case where no further intergovernmental assistance (or
tax or other revenues) are forthcoming. The performance of the model
under these extreme conditions is analyzed below.
With incremental g equal zero, the equilibrium equation in
present value terms becomes:
(6) b = $1,420 + d
In the example, we have allowed X and C expenditures to increase
steadily, with P and Q revenues constant, creating a substantial
deficit to be covered by additional revenues. Borrowings, although
they are a source of funds, are not considered as a source of
"revenues" since they must be repaid at interest.
We apply the discount rate to both the annual interest
payment and the annual repayment of principle (and do not earn
interest on a sinking fund). Therefore "d" as the present value of
interest and repayment of principal will always be greater than
the principal sum of bonds alone. It follows that it becomes
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impossible for "b" to equal "d" plus a constant sum such as $1,420
as in equation (6) above.
The algebra of the model shows how borrowings to cover current
and capital outlays require further borrowings to pay for interest
and refunding ad infinitum, so long as no other sources of revenue
are available. The "blow up" of the model occurs because of the
assumption that the city fathers could allow expenditures on current
and capital account to escalate each year without the support of a
proportionate increase in property and other tax and non-tax sources.
The model in this case has merely dramatized the effect of drift
in municipal affairs when expenditures are forced for political
reasons to increase year after year in situations where the increases
in tax and non-tax revenues are limited, in which case intergovern-
mental subsidies become essential.
Borrowings are shown to be feasible only when sufficient
current revenue is available to cover interest, while additional
revenues are required for sinking fund purposes unless it is
possible for the municipality to rely upon refunding maturing debt
issues whenever funds are required. The possibility of refunding is
quite clearly, however, a function of the municipality's success
in keeping its ordinary sources of revenue in good repair and in
maintaining an attractive and efficient physical environment which
stands as proxy for mortgaged property in the mind of the bondholder.
In the next example, we relax the constraints concerning
increases in revenue from ordinary tax and other sources and
consider the degree to which increases in property valuation,
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together with additional intergovernmental fundings provide a firmer
basis for larger borrowings and for estimating the amount of current
and capital outlays financeable. In this second case, however,
intergovernmental subsidies will be the dependent variable, to be
estimated as an amount required to balance the budgets, after a given
amount of debt has been incurred and debt service reserves established.
If such intergovernmental supports are not to be anticipated, the
municipality will be forced to curtail its proposed outlays pro-
portionately.
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F. Implications of a growing tax base
In this next example, we relax some of the constraints and look
only to intergovernmental subsidy as the balancing factor, a procedure
that enables us to gain some further perspectives concerning the way
in which growth of the tax base is a critical variable, furnishing
a new basis for determining the size of capital outlays and borrowing
programs. The procedure by which resort is made to higher levels of
government may, indeed, accord with practices in the real world, for
the model suggests that borrowings tied to property valuations may
tend to lag behind the need for capital funds that are presumed to
increase exponentially as in the example.
The results of the two sets of assumptions at work in this
example are partially illustrated in Figure 17. In both cases,
X and C have been allowed to increase at the same rates (5 and 10 per
cent respectively) as before. In addition, in both sets, other
revenues, Q, were allowed to increase at a more modest 3 per cent
compound annual rate over the 20-year period.
The major difference between the two cases illustrated in
Figure 17 is in the growth assumed for true valuation, V. Set 1
represents the consequences of a one per cent compound growth rate
in valuation; set 2 is based on a two per cent rate.
The procedure followed'involved a re-estimate of property tax
revenues at a rate of two per cent of V, a re-estimate of borrowing
capacity a 9 per cent of the annual increase in V, and calculation of
debt service on the cumulative amount of bonds outstanding at the
same rates as before: 20-year sinking fund payments and 4 per cent
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interest. Then governmental subsidies, G, were calculated as the
equilibrating mechanism. (Data in Table 6.)
Under the assumed conditions, as Figure 17 shows clearly, the
increase in taxable valuation dramatically decreases the gap between
borrowing power and the amount of intergovernmental funds required to
support a given level of current expenditures and capital outlays
(which are also graphed on the figure).
The unanswered question for American municipal government is
the extent to which such intergovernmental transfers are to be avail-
able on a continuing and expanding basis in the future. For compari-
son the 10 and 12 per cent compound growth curves for G have also
been plotted in Figure 17.
Also for comparison can be found the graph of one-half of
total project capital outlays (the graph of the total projected
capital outlays lies fairly along the 10 percent G curve). As noted
previously, one half of C is the proportion of State-local capital
outlays financed by the sale of long-term bonds in recent years.
The one per cent rate of growth in valuation is sufficient to
finance one-half of the 10-percent rate of growth for capital outlays
assumed for the example for two-thirds of the period, while at the
two per cent rate in growth of valuation, bond capacity is in excess
of a demand to finance half but insufficient to finance all of the
projected capital outlays.
The condition evident here is that factor mobility, with both
P and Q able to increase in size, has generated a number of benign
effects. The municipality's reliance on G is reduced but hardly
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TABLE C)
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eliminated; borrowing capacity exceeds half of the projected need
in the early years, but falls increasingly short as the outlay
curve rises exponentially; and, because the bonds outstanding are
added sequentially, debt service builds up more slowly in present
value terms than in the first example where all the bonds were sold
at the beginning of the period.
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G. Implications of changing factor inputs on interest rates
Interest rates remained invariate in the examples we have
considered thus far. In this section we reconsider the impact of
changes in the amounts and purposes of borrowing by a municipality,
and we attempt to provide an explanation of the forces changing the
interest rate demanded by the market on securities sold by the
municipality. The extent to which the volume of bonds issued is
responsive to changes in market rates is considered elsewhere,1 5
but, with respect to the model employed here, the reader can observe
that interest costs by themselves, not including repayment of debt,
are relatively small compared to the amounts given for other
current expenditures,
Financing of capital outlays through debt financing has been
of greater interest to the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations than to the writers on public finance theory and on
metropolitan affairs generally. Labovitz and Ecker-Racz have stated
that one of the major findings of the intergovernmentalist research-
ers concerns the inverse relationship between the interest rate on
borrowings and the tax effort index for the particular jurisdiction,
another way of saying that the use of tax revenues for capital
outlays decreases the need to borrow and increases the community's
bond credit rating.16
Whitelaw ignored long-term borrowing in his extraordinary
time-series data, although the prevailing level of municipal bond
interest rates appears as one of the independent variables.
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The relationship between relative interest rates and two ratios
internal to a given municipality's fiscal situation is shown in
Figure 18. The term relative interest rate may be taken in the
sense that a municipal credit rating is associated with interest
rates that are higher or lower than the prevailing average market
rate for municipal bonds of a given type. The two ratios are
(1) borrowings in relation to total valuation (B/V) for the given
municipality and (2) total borrowings in relation to total capital
outlays (B/C). To the extent that the interest rate, r, for bonds
with the same maturity implies a level of debt service, d, the two
may be considered interchangeable in the argument below.
The shape of the B/V curve is shown in Figure 18 to be somewhat
similar to a production cost curve. For smaller cities where the
volume of bonds is never large and which are sold in what are known
as regional markets rather than the general market for municipal
securities, the interest rate is somewhat higher than for larger
and/or better-known issuers. 17 By the same reasoning, interest
rates for medium-sized cities just beginning to enter the market
with small-sized offerings tend to be penalized as unknowns by
slightly higher interest rates.
As the amounts of bonds outstanding become higher percentages
of valuation, however, the interest rate imposed on new bond
issues tends to be increased, either as a premium supposedly related
to a higher risk of default or as a result of some other rationaliz-
ation for a lower bond rating.
The shape of the B/C curve is shown to be somewhat similar to a
FIGURE 18
Analytic Diagram of
Relationships between
Interest Rates, Bonds
Issued, and Property
Valuation
0-00,
x sop*,
'I
I I
j 'I
U I
I I
1 I I
I U
I'
I U
L ~ KZ 3
2> ~
9
V ~
215
demand curve. As the proportion of capital outlays to be financed by
bonds falls, in other words, as the demand for bonds diminishes for a
given level of capital outlay, the urgency underlying the municipality's
approach to the market also diminishes, with a consequent decrease in
the interest rate demanded of or acceptable to the municipality.
At the point of equilibrium for the given municipality, its
unique B/V and B/C curves are assumed to intersect to generate an
interest rate, r, and a quantity of bonds, k. A general policy to
increase the percentage of capital outlays financed by bonds would
tend to shift the B/C curve upward, and a general policy to allow
bonds outstanding to represent a higher percentage of the tax base
valuation would tend to shift the B/V curve upwards as well. The
opposite policies would have the opposite effects.
As the equilibrium is disturbed by such changes in policy, four
new equilibrium points can be generated, as shown in Table 7.
Interest rate increases are found at the intersection of higher
(B/V)' and higher (B/C)', with the amounts of bonds involved also
increased, and at the intersection of a higher (B/V)' but a lower
(B/C)", in which case borrowings decrease. The inference in the
latter case is that the valuation base is lagging; hence even the
lower bond sales implied by (B/C)" are dominated by the deteriorating
credit ratio (B/V)'.
Interest rate decreases are associated with a lower (B/V)" and
a higher (B/C)', again with the inference that a change in (B/V)" is
more significant than the change in financing policy (B/C)". It then
follows that the intersection of the same lower (B/V)" c'ondition with
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lower (B/C)" policies would be associated with lower interest rates
and smaller amounts of borrowing.
TABLE 7
MATRIX OF RELATION BETWEEN INTEREST RATES, BONDS ISSUED,
AND VALUATION
HIGHER = (B/V)'
HIGHER =
(B/C)'
LOWER =
(B/C)"
effect
up
down
r 's up
LOWER = (B/V)"
r_ down
up
down
down
rIs down
By means of Figure 19, it is now possible to consider how
different patterns of borrowing affect interest rates demanded by the
market. The patterns represent different mixes of bond types as well
as different amounts of bonds sold and outstanding.
In Figure 19, the general shape of the interest rate curves is
the same as for the B/V curves in the preceding Figure 18, and the
effect
k's up
k's down
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bonds in the B/V ratio can be said to be equivalent to those issued
by the municipality as its general obligations (GO's), secured by the
full faith and credit of the municipality's taxing authority.
The bond market, however, is confronted with a variety of
different types of bonds associated with a particular locality. Some
are GO's or other bonds issued by the municipality itself. Some are
GO's issued by coterminous governmental units such as school districts.
Others are GO or limited guarantee or revenue bonds issued by coter-
minous or regional governmental units. The concept of a community's
overlapping debt is usually expressed in per capita terms, attributing
to each citizen the sum of his proportionate burden from each of
these separately-constituted issuers.
The interest rate demanded by the market for the general
obligation bonds of a given community is a function of the market's
perception of how overlapping debt (from Issuers i, ii, and iii)
affects the ability of an individual taxpayer to provide funds for
debt service on the various issues. No quantitative research has
been done on this subject to date, so far as this writer is aware,
but the subject can be approached qualitatively in terms used by
bond underwriters to explain the ratings and rates given different
types of issues in the same locality.
The reasoning of the market is shown in Figure 19, where GO is
the interest rate curve for the municipality's general obligations,
and I' is the interest rate curve for some bond issue included in
the overlapping debt category. This I' curve is characterized by
lower-interest rates than the municipality's own GO curve because
FIGURE 19
Observed Effect on Relative Yields on a
Municipality's Indebtedness with New
Issues of Overlapping Debt
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of a higher bond rating which might be merited for any of a number
of credit factors. Similarly, I" and I t" are curves for other
issues, less favorably rated, by other borrowers in the locality.
The municipality's interest rate appears to be set on a first-
come first-served basis. If related Issuers i, ii, and iii sold
bonds first, the rating given to the general obligation sold there-
after by the municipality might vary widely from the rating that the
municipality's same GO's might have been given if they had been sold
before any of the competing but complementary issuers had entered
the market. It must also be noted that the mix of activities
supported by general obligations in one municipality may be very
different from the mix financed by another municipality, even when
both are located in the same State.18
In Figure 19, however, the municipality's general obligation
bonds have come into the market first, with the rate curve falling
slightly as the volume of total or overlapping debt in the locality
increases from the origin to point "a".
When Issuer i with his I' rating sells bonds along the I' curve
and increases overlapping debt from "a" to "b," the municipality's
outstanding bonds are shown to fall slightly in rating and hence in
price as the yield on them in the market increases. Thus when
the municipality comes into the market with new bonds, moving the
quantity outstanding from "b" to "c," it must sell them at the
slightly higher yield basis demanded.
The next contributor to overlapping debt is assumed to be
Issuer ii whose credit rating is lower than either the municipality
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or Issuer i. Issuer ii is able to sell its bonds on the I" curve,
but the response to the size of overlapping debt as the quantity
outstanding now moves from "c" to "d" is assumed to be unfavorable.
In the example, however, Issuer i comes into the market again
and is still able to sell bonds at its prime rate, as the quantity
outstanding moves upward once more from "d" to "e." When the
municipality again enters the market with new bonds sufficient to
move the quantity of overlapping debt from "e" to "f," it finds the
unfavorable response of the rating agencies has forced its market
rate above the I" line, while the value of its outstanding securities
has been depreciated in the hands of holders as a result of the
change in market rating.
The concepts developed in this study suggest that the amount
of bonds issuable by a given municipality is not easily established
in either theory or practice. The discussion of Figure 19 indicates
that the amount of bonds sellable by a municipality is a function,
not only of how it manages its own affairs but of the competition
vis-a-vis the market by issuers in its locality that make its own
bonds more or less acceptable in the market.
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NOTES TO APPENDIX I
1. For discussions, see the Whitelaw and Kee dissertations.
2. Although his model includes budgetary constraints.
3. See Margolis.
4. Shattuck also shows how other policies, such as insistance on
on level debt service, affect the amounts that can be borrowed.
5. Studenski, Public Borrowing.
6. See International City Managers Association, also Chatters
and Hillhouse in bibliography.
7. See Baumol in bibliography.
8. For a good study of this relationship, see Fiscal Planning for
an Urban Community under U. S. Dept. of H.U.D. in bibliography.
9. See Note 1 above.
10. In Municipal Year Book 1967.
11. See "median effective tax rates" for 122 cities in U. S. Census
of Governments - 1967, Vol. 2, "Taxable Property Values," p. 15.
12. Data in Manvel's essay in Municipal Year Book 1967.
13. See U. S. Joint Economic Committee, Vol. 2, Financing, report
by A. H. Diamond and Chapter 2.
14. See Note 5, for Chapter 1.
15. See Appendix K; also Joint Economic Committee, Ch. 18
(McGouldrick).
Footnotes continued on following page.
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NOTES TO APPENDIX I
(continued)
16. See Note 5, for Chapter 1.
17. See Joint Economic Committee study, Vol. 2, Ch.
problems of small municipalities.
16 on credit
18. No studies are known to the author concerning the effect on
one issuer of bonds issued by an agency whose jurisdiction
overlaps the first. The argument for Figure 19
is an attempt to visualize the process.
APPENDIX J
THE DEFAULT RECORD
The chief analysts of the municipal bond rating agencies have
frequently remarked in recent years that the simplest part of their
job is estimating the probability of default for a given bond.1
Reference- is made to the resources currently available for stabilizing
the general economy, to generally higher standards of municipal
administration than prevailed during the 19th Century, and to
greater knowledge for both issuers and investors concerning the
likelihood of the necessary future economic growth in a locality to
generate adequate tax revenues for satisfactory debt service.2
The default record of a century of municipal bond finance, as
compiled by Hillhouse during the 1930's encompasses: (a) the first
recorded default, Mobile, Alabama in 1839, (b) minor troubles before
the Civil War, (c) a fifth of all municipal bonds affected during
the post-Civil War period to the early 1880's (with Carpetbagger
frauds a special form) (d) a rash of problems in the 1893 financial
crisis, (e) a few real estate busts and a long succession of Far
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West irrigation district defaults in the 1900-1930 period, and
(f) the special problems of the 1930's, beginning with Florida real
3
estate.
Two facts about the time distribution of defaults over
this hundred-year period from 1830 to 1930 stand out:
the first is that defaults were almost continuous, in
good times and bad; the second, that only in major de-
pression periods did the volume swell to anything like
dangerous proportions.
The record by Census regions, in descending order of fiscal probity,
finds the East at the top, followed by the North Central and midwestern
states, the West with its irrigation district problems, and the South,
the region with the most damaged reputation of all. (As both Hillhouse
and Studenski point out, it is unfair to generalize about the South's
performance in the Civil War and reconstruction period, although
Chamberlain disagrees.5
A persistent and frustrating attempt was made throughout the
1930's to define the term "default" and to estimate both the number
of State and local governmental units affected and the amounts in-
volved. Hillhouse's text refers to scores of such estimates, the
most authoritative ones emanating from the files of The Bond Buyer,
with its editor establishing the amounts actually in default at the
peak in the range of $150-300 million or 1-2 percent of the total
6
municipal debt. In about hialf the states, no serious defaults
occurred, but almost half of Florida's taxing districts were in
default, while nine states had more than fifty defaulting municipali-
ties, over and above defaulting special districts. The roll of the
States with cities over 10,000 in default was given as follows:7
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TABLE 8
State
Ohio
Mi ch i gan
New Jersey
No. Carolina
Florida
Texas
Tennessee
Kentucky
Louisiana
Arkansas
No. of Cities
10,000 or more
population in
default
24
21
18
10
9
5
2
2
Total no. of cities
with 10,000 or more
population
61
41
54
23
15
36
8
13
9
9
The record of default during the Depression was felt to be rela-
tively mild, certainly in comparison to foreign, railroad, industrial,
and public utility bonds. Considerable confusion was caused by the
early attempts to create State administrative machinery to handle
municipal bankruptcies and to affirm the inconstitutionality of the
Federal Municipal Debt Adjustment Act of 1934. By the time accept-
able legislation was passed, most of the larger cities from New York
down had passed through their crises, reduced their expenditures, and
been restored in the graces of their creditors. By the.end of the
1930's only hopelessly uneconomic special districts and real estate
speculations were in default.,
Attention to the matter of defaults in the post-war period had
focused on two different types of situations.9 The first is the
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possibility of municipal bankruptcy for a limited number of very
large cities overwhelmed by problems of race, poverty, and
suburban exodus and undersupported by intergovernmental subsidies for
the welfare responsibilities given them; the solution to their
problem is beyond the power of the local finance administrator. The
second focus of concern is in regard to revenue bond issues, a form
of indebtedness that has come to play a leading role in the post-war
period.
APPENDIX J NOTES:
1. See chapter on Ratings in Rabinowitz.
2. This is also the feeling expressed in the Economic Reports of the
President.
3. Hillhouse, Municipal Bonds, especially Ch. IV.
4. Hillhouse, op. cit., p. 38.
5. See Chapter 2 (C) above.
6. Hillhouse, op. cit., p. 13 ff.
7. Hillhouse, op. cit., p. 27.
8. See discussion of Act in Neff.
9. Well-reported in the Joint Economic Committee study.
APPENDIX K
EXTENT OF BORROWING FOR
LOCAL PUBLIC CONSTRUCTION
Earlier chapters have analyzed the historical process by which
State and local governments were deprived of the privilege of
constructing revenue-producing facilities for the conduct of commerce
and industry and restricted, at a later date, in their attempts to
help finance the private enterprises that were developed to fill the
gap.
By the turn of the century, however, municipalities, later
joined by the States, were again in the construction business,
largely in connection with non-revenue producing activities such
as public schools, automobile roads, waste disposal facilities,
fire and police stations, and city halls. When recourse was
made to the bond markets, these governments offered only their
general obligations, backed by their full faith and credit based
on the power to levy taxes on property.
Some revenue bonds were issued for public utilities, but it
was not until the coming of major tunnels, bridges, and toll-
highways and the demand for very large power and water supply
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systems in the West that revenue bonds represented a significant
share of new bond issues offered.
We have also observed the historical process by which the
federal government was rendered unable to participate directly in
the construction of internal improvements during the one-hundred-
year period between Jackson and the Depression of the 1930's. That
latter crisis confirmed the role of the federal government as part-
financier of local facilities, a role that had begun to reappear on
a minor scale after World War I.
The record for the pre-World War II years is seen in Figure 20.
The chart shows the temporary dip in construction that followed the
1929 crash, the saucer-shaped graph of funds supplied by State and
local governments themselves, and the more erratic series of
fundings of State-local projects by the federal government. State
and local governments were able to sell some bonds throughout the
depression years to finance the portion of construction not funded
by the federal government.
Of more immediate concern is the record of the post-World
War II years and the expectations for the middle-range future. The
pattern of analysis follows the work of the Joint Economic
Committee's 1966 study of trends in governmental expenditure in
relation to resources, construction, and local indebtedness.1
Annual capital outlays for structures and equipment are defined to
include State and local new construction plus purchases of existing
structures plus net purchases of equipment less compensation for
construction in process. The Committee expected:
Sources of Funds for Governmental Construction,
By Year, 1928-1941
FIGURE 20
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(a) total State and local expenditures, which
were 7.7% of GNP in 1947 and 9.6% in 1962, to represent
10.6% of GNP in 1975; and
(b) annual capital outlays for structures and
equipment as a percentage of total expenditures for all
purposes by State and local governments to stay at the
29% level for 1975, having risen from 16% in 1947 to
29% in 1962.
These projections of capital outlays are based upon the survey
of capital requirements shown in Table 4 of Chapter 6 above, with
State and local governments called upon to provide two-thirds (or
$327.8 billion) of the $499.1 billion total. For the post-war
period (1946-1966), the Joint Economic Committee concluded that long-
term borrowing financed about half of the $220 billion capital
outlays by State and local governments, the remainder being financed
by current revenues and intergovernmental funds.
Although historical data on bond sales before the early 1950's
is sparse, the Committee adjusted data from The Bond Buyer and the
Investment Bankers Association for time lags, underreporting, and
amounts unrelated to capital. outlays and published a series
representing "long-term debt issued for capital outlays."
Figure 21 shows the total capital outlay and debt series for the
period between 1946 and 1975 from the Committee report.
Bond sales and amounts provided by the Federal Government
have both been rising faster in recent years than have the capital
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outlays of State and local governments. In general, total expendi-
tures and capital outlays by State and local governments have risen
at the same rate, except notably in the 1958 recession when expendi-
tures continued to rise but capital outlays were cut. Federal
contributions to State and local outlays, however, were increasing
rapidly during the recession but were cut back in 1961, after which
time they have continued to increase faster than outlays.
As for bonds, new issues related to outlays fell off between
1958 and 1960, and increased more rapidly than outlays thereafter
until 1963, in which year they dipped before resuming a rate more
in line with the growth in outlays; more or less the same relation-
ship holds for the total new issue market.
These relationships are revealed by Figure 22 on which, for
the 1956-65 period, State and local capital outlays have been
compared to (a) total expenditures by State and local governments,
(b) total Federal intergovernmental expenditures related Lo capital
outlays, (c) total new bonds issued, and total bonds related to
capital outlays, all of the data in 1958 constant dollars. Since
the graph is on "log-log" paper, the graphs would be straight lines
at a 45 degree angle if these various series were changing at the
same rate; a line moving more sharply than 45 degrees from lower
left to upper right is increasing faster than the capital outlay
series; a line moving from upper left to lower right indicates a
decrease relative to an increase in capital outlays.
Projections of bond sales, capital expenditures, and federal
programs, in summary, are based upon a variety of assumptions and
FIGURE 22
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upon data that are suggestive but not often accurate. Nevertheless,
the Joint Economic Committee study and other research materials are
valuable and acceptable to the extent that the system continues
relatively unchanged in terms of tax exemption, economic progress,
rate of urbanization, pattern of municipal finance and price
structure in the market, to name a few of the assumed conditions.
There can be little doubt that the "needs" study reflects a solid
demand for capital facilities. There can be more doubt as to the
willingness and ability of local governments to undertake the
projects forecase and even greater doubt as to the methods by which
the federal government will attempt to lighten the burden.
Economists interested in both the "perversity hypothesis"
discussed in Chapter 2 (D-4) and in the market for State-local bonds
have attempted to explain the relationship between interest rates
and the volume of bonds offered by State-local governments to
finance public construction. There is some evidence that high
interest rates induce some local borrowers to defer construction,
but little evidence to suggest that projects are permanently
abandoned because of the interest rate factor. 2
NOTES TO APPENDIX K:
1. State and Local Public Facility Needs and Financing, see Vol. 1.
2. See JEC Financing, Vol. 2, Ch. 18 (contribution by Paul F.
McGoul dri ck).
APPENDIX L
SIX ALTERNATIVES FEDERAL TAX EFFECT
INTERSTATE
EQUALIZATION EFFECT OVERALL TAX BUDEN EFFECT
I I T
COMPENSATORY FISCAL APPROACH--cut Federal
income tax or reduce the national debt or
both depending on economic conditions.
Federal income taxpayers
could expect further
reductions in tax
liability.
No significant effect.
The overall Federal-State-local tax
system would be less progressive
because the Nation would be required
to place increasing reliance on
proportional and regressive State anc
local taxes to finance rising
needs.
TAX CREDIT OPTION APPROACH--provide Persons in the low and The overall effect sl4Fhtly more
Federal income taxpayers a more generous middle tax brackets progressive because (a) low an
write-off of their State and local taxes carrying above average No significant effect. middle income tax bracket taxpayers
with an option plan permitting them either State and local tax receive larger write-offs, and
to itemize their State and local tax loads would receive the (b) State and local governments would
payments (as they can do now) or receive a most benefit. Persons be encouraged to place more reliance
tax credit for State and local tax payments in the high tax brackets on income taxes in order to maximize
in excess of _% of their net taxable income, now enjoy a liberal tax credit possibilities.
write-off privilege
through itemization.
TAX SHARING APPROACH--distribute to the High income States with No marked change in the tax inciderncc:
States a designated percentage of the None high tax payments would picture unless Federal dollars
Federal tax revenue on the basis of receive the largest actually replace State and local
collection, shares, revenue sources. n that case, treeru
is a slight progressive effect.
UNCONDITIONAL GRANT APPROACH-i-through a
permanent Trust Fund, distribute among the No marked change in the t"x incidenc,:
States for general government purposes, on None Moderately equalizing, picture unless Federal dollars
a per capita basis, an amount equal to 1% actually replace State and local
or 2 of the Federal income tax base revenue sources. in that case, tlrc
(proposal of President's Task Force on is a slight progressive effect.
intergovernmental Fiscal Cooperation).
CONDITIONAL GRANT APPROACH--expand A mild to considerable No marked change in the tax incidenc 
present type of conditional grant-in-aid effect depending on picture unless need for State and
programs to finance specific functions. None function aided and the local matching funds requires
factors cranked into increases in regressive type taxes.
equalization fomula.
DIRECTT EDERAL EXPENDITURE APPROACH--step Mild to considerable No marked change in the tax incidence
up direct Federal expenditure for such effect depending on type picture. Distribution of benefits
programs as river and harbor construction None of beneficiary and locus for construction type Drojccto li1,,elZ
projects; or launch new programs to deal of expenditure. to be less favorable to low income
with domestic problems of an interstate groups than expenditures a social
character, such as air pollution and mass purposes.
transportation.
Taese -uhortc=Ingo could be remedied nd a significant degree of inter-area equaliation could be effected by a systes of negativ tax c
EFFECTIVENESS OF PLAN
FROM A STATE AND LOCAL STANDPOINT
FEDEAL DTVOLVET
IN STATE & LOCAL
EXPENDITURE
DECISIONS INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS EFFECT
Least efficient because direct
benefits accrue to individual Federal Federal role somewhat diminished by
income taxpayers--indirect benefit to None the relinquishment of effective con-
the extent that a compensatory fiscal trol of part of its fiscal resources
policy promotes greater economic and State and local government roles
activity and expands the State and commensurately enhanced. *
local tax base. Can affect willing-
ness to raise State and local taxes
either way.
I More efficient than outright tax cut Federal role somewhat diminished-
only to extent that tax credits State and local governments
overcome resistance to higher State None somewhat enhanced because a more
and local tax rates. Much less liberal write-off of State and
efficient than sharing or grant local taxes could help to overcome
approaches because direct aid is to resistance to higher State and
taxpayers rather than to governments, local taxes.
An efficient aid mechanism because Federal role s hminished; States'
States are left free to allocate the - None role enhanced because these govern-
funds among competing needs. Local ments determine how funds would be
governments'lbenefit dependent on how spent.
they share in the funds.
An efficient aid mechanism because Federal role diminished; States'
States are left free to allocate the None role enhanced because these govern-
funds among competing needs. Local ments determine how funds would be
governments' benefit dependent on how spent.
they share in the funds.
A fairly efficient aid mechanism.
Both State and local governments are Federal role definitely enhanced in
directly benefited but because of Considerable relation to State and local
their specific expenditure focus, goernments.
conditional grants tend to distort
allocation of funds among programs.
An indirect aid to the extent that
direct Federal activity relieves Federal role definitely enhanced in
State and local governments of the Little or none relation to State and local
responsibility for inancing the governments.
program. Far less effective than
tax sharing or grant approaches.
The most efficient plan if the objective is
to reduce (1) Federal income tax burden, Probably the first choice of most political
(2) Federal role in relation to State and conservatives and the most objectionable course
local governments and (3) the progressiveness of action from a liberal point of view.
of the total Federal-State-local tax system.
From a State and local aid standpoint,
quite inefficient.
The most efficient approach if the objective
is to cut the Federal income tax while in- Probable appeal for many political conservatives
creasing the progressiveness of the tax system and moderates (a) as compromise position between
and maximizing indirect benefits of Federal straight Federal tax cut and plans calling for
tax reduction to State and local governments: greater Federal aid to State and local govern-
However, it provides no benefit for persons ments and (b) as a tax reform measure placing all
at lowest income level with no Federal tax and Federal income tax-payers in a better position to
renters could write-off State and local sales write-off "excessive" State and local tax payments.
and income taxes but not the property tax. Despite its progressivity feature, this approach
it has no significant equalization effect. would probably be opposed by most liberals as inef-
ficient when contrasted to direct forms of Federal
aid to State and local governments.
The most efficient aid plan if the objective This approach would probably be opposed by most
ito shift a part of the rising costs of liberals because it tends to aggravate the
State and local services to a nationwide in- fiscal disparity as between wealthy and poor
come tax without reducing the States' estab- States. Some difficulty may be encountered in
lished responsibility for allocating public proving that State and local fiscal needs warrant
funDs among competing needs. The tax sharing general purpose Federal support. Probably the thir
approach ignores the equalization issue. choice of most conservatives.
The most efficient aid plan if the objective Because of its middle-of-the road position, it
is to shift a part of the rising costs of could pick up support from the left and the right
State and local services to a nationwide as a compromise measure despite the novel character
income tax without reducing the States' es- of this aid plan. Some difficulty may be
tablished responsibility for allocating public encountered in proving that State and local fiscal
funds among competing needs. The uncondi- needs warrant general purpose Federal support.
tional grant approach provides for a
moderate degree of interstate equalization.
Due to its Federal control and equalization possi-
The most efficient aid plan if the objective bilities this approach receives considerable
is to help State and local governments to political support from most liberals. Because of
finance specific programs. While this its time-tested character, it also enjoys a certain
approach has equalization possibilities, it measure of general political acceptance not
tends to distort allocation of funds among accorded to tax credit and unconditional grant
programs. proposals. Political conservatives can be expected
to resist this approach since it would increase
Federal involvement in State and local affairs and
might preclude a Federal income tax cut.
The most efficient approach if the objective Strong political appeal for liberals particularly
is to bring direct Federal action to bear if direct Federal expenditures fall in the social
on the solution of a national domestic welfare category. Conservatives can be expected
problem. From a State and local aid stand- to oppose since it would increase Federal control
point, quite inefficient. on the domestic front and might preclude a
Federal income tax cut.
POLITICAL EVALUATIONTECHNICAL EVALUATION
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 1: TOWARD NEW POLICIES
1. The reader will note several references in the text concerning
the neglect of this subject in the literature of fiscal federalism.
This present work attempts to shed light on the fundamental his-
torical and theoretical aspects of municipal policy with respect
to capital expenditures; the author's earlier study, Municipal
Bond Finance and Administration, in contrast, accepts without
question the appropriateness of the legally-approved bonds being
issued by local governments and is wholly concerned with the
process by which such bond issues are marketed and with the uncer-
tain future of the market. See also Chapter 6 (C).
2. An excellent analysis of the emergence of the direct federal-city
relationship is found in Martin, Cities and the Federal System.
3. See APPENDIX D.
4. John Gardner, in his Godkin Lectures at Harvard, Spring, 1969.
5. These are only a few examples of the economic and political climate
during the months this dissertation was being written. The Watson
Amendment, rejected in a state-wide referendum, would have
(a) reduced property taxes and ultimately prohibited the use of
property taxes "for education, welfare, and other services un-
related to property" (see Wall Street Journal, 11/1/68, p. 8);
the Youngstown school system closed a month early for lack of funds
(Wall Street Journal, 12/18/68, p. 1); New York City threatened
to cut back its welfare budget; and headlines like this, "Three
more tax-exempts fail to draw any bidders," (Wall Street Journal,
12/20/68) 'were seen frequently.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 2: DEVELOPMENTAL STAGE
1. This chapter is an evaluation of
documented in greater detail in
the historical progression
APPENDIX B.
2. The Report on Relief of the States (and its antecedents) is also
discussed in Balles, Financial History of the United States from
1789-1860. See entry in bibliography under U. S. Congress.
3. Adams, Public Debts, p. 341.
4. Hillhouse, Municipal Bonds, p. 145.
5. See Studenski, Public Borrowing, p. 13.
6. Lancaster, State Supervision of Municipal Indebtedness, p. 23.
7. See APPENDIX C.
8. Mumford, The City in History, p. 476.
9. See notes on Censuses in APPENDIX D.
10. See Shaw, G. B., ed., The Fabian Essays in Socialism, p. 49, etc.
11. An embittered
a Great City
view of this process is found in Klein,
(New York).
12. See Municipal Finance Officers Association, "Factors
Municipal Utility Rates," Special Bulletin 1965A.
Bankrupting
in Determining
13. See quotes in APPENDIX B (K).
14. The subject of restrictions is covered in works included in the
bibliography by Lancaster, Secrist, U. S. Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations (hereafter cited as US/ACIR), and
U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee (hereafter cited as US/JEC),
"State and Local Public Facility Needs and Financing."'
15. See Durand; also Ely, Taxation in American States and Cities;
Seligman, Essays in Taxation.
16. The subject of the property tax is widely discussed, but we
limit references here to several important studies from US/ACIR:
"Fiscal Balance in the American Federal System," hereafter cited
as "Fiscal Balance.. ." and "The Role of the States in Strengthening
the Property Tax." See also Netzer.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 2: DEVELOPMENTAL STAGE (continued)
17. "The relationship between state-local tax revenue and personal
income is a rough measure of tax effort,'' from US/ACIR's ''Fiscal
Balance...'', p. 77. See also the original US/ACIR treatise,
''Measures of State and Local Fiscal Capacity and Tax Efforts.''
18. Chamberlain, The Principles of Bond Investment.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 3: MAJOR POLICY ISSUES IN THE 20TH CENTURY
1. The Court's decision in Commissioner vs. Shamberg's Estate,
323 U.S. 792, was in connection with the financing of the Port
of New York Authority; a more complete discussion with biblio-
graphy is found in Rabinowitz, Municipal Bond Finance and
Administration, Chapter 8.
2. For an excellent discussion of Dillon's Rule, see Martin,
Cities and the American Federal System, p. 28 ff.
3. See APPENDIX D.
4. Bryce quoted in Vigman, Crisis of the Cities, Ch. 2.
5.. Ely, The Coming City.
6. Council of State Governments, State-local Relations, Ch. VI.
7. For data in this section, see U.S. Bureau of Census, Historical
Statistics of the U.S. (1960 ed.), Section Y, and current
Economic Reports of the President. See also APPENDIX D.
8. See also APPENDIX E.
9. See US/ACIR, "The Problem of Special Districts in American
Government," among many other studies on the subject.
10. See Note 1, above.
11. See US/JEC, Vol. 2, Ch. 7 (Curley), and U.S. Dept. of Commerce,
''Highway Bond Financing."'
12. Our attempt to shed light on the way in which the rating of a
municipality changes is found in APPENDIX I, especially
Section I therein.
13. See APPENDIX J.
14. See US/ACIF studies on tax overlapping.
15. This is the author's interpretation of what "fiscal balance" means.
16. The following comments on the distribution of the income tax,
other non-property taxes, and the property tax have been
abstracted from US/ACIR's "Fiscal Balance..." p. 105 ff.
17. See Robinson, The Postwar Market for State-local Securities, p. 3;
also Rabinowitz, op. cit., Ch. 10.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 3: MAJOR POLICY ISSUES IN THE 20TH CENTURY (continued)
18. The Atlas case involves the allocation of tax exempt interest by
insurance companies between reserves and operating income and is
discussed in Rabinowitz, op. cit., Chap. 10. The principles
seem to be found in the tax reform bills being submitted to the
Congress by the Nixon administration at this writing for applica-
tion to high-income individuals.
19. The original demonstration of this effect was made by Robinson,
op. cit., and concurred in by Ott and Meltzer, Federal Tax
Treatment of State and Local Securities.
20. US/ACIR, "Fiscal Balance...," p. 248 and Table, p. 166.
21. Ibid., p. 260.
22. Keynes, General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, p. lol
23. Hanson, A. H. and Perloff, State and Local Finance in the
National Economy.
24. Musgrave, Public Finance, Ch. ti. See also, the recommendations
in Studenski, Public Borrowing.
25. Rafuse, R. W., Jr., "Cyclic Behavior of State-local Finance," in
Musgrave, Essays in Fiscal Federalism.
26. Report of the National Commission on Urban Problems, "Building
the City"; see our APPENDIX F.
27. See Hatry, H. and Cotton in the bibliography; see also Rabinowitz,
op. cit., Ch. 12, and further comment in our Chapter 9 (A) below.
28. Musgrave, Public Finance, op. cit., p. SCL..2-
29. See text in APPENDIX F.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 4: LOCAL GOVERNMENT VS. THE GENERAL WELFARE
1. See especially Adams, Public Debts, and Ely, Taxation in American
States and Cities.
2. For further discussion of this point see the introductory section
of APPENDIX I.
3. See Chapter 1 (A) and APPENDIX G.
4. The author is indebted to George Spiegel, Esq., Washington, D.C.,
for information concerning his work as counsel for municipally-
owned utilities in proceedings before federal regulatory agencies.
5. Perhaps the best study of the Port of New York Authority is Bird's,
but we can assume that the reader has a fair understanding of the
operation of PONYA and of the general arguments for and against
that type of authority.
6. Based on the author's experience as a consultant and upon recent
conversations with Bernard Taper, MIT-Harvard Joint Center for
Urban Studies, concerning his forthcoming study of the state of the
arts in the Boston area.
7. Note should be made of the use of discounting in the model
presented in APPENDIX I.
8. Based on examination of the payments by the Cambridge Housing Authority.
See also Hartman's article on public housing and the many referen-
ces in the literature of intergovernmental fiscal relations to the
payment of monies in lieu of taxes to municipalities by federal
agencies.
9. As stated in press copy of the Pomeroy Lecture by Charles Haar,
convention, American Institute of Planners, Cincinnati, Spring,
1969.
10. This is consistent with the view taken by the U.S. Treasury
Department, as discussed in Rabinowitz, Municipal Bond Finance and
Administration, Ch. 10.
11. See the discussion of the use of federal programs for the purchase
of State-local securities at submarket rates in Chapter 9 (C) below.
12. See US/ACIR, "Fiscal Balance...," p. 161.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 5: THE CITY'S ACTUAL SHARE OF FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY
1. As represented by many of the items in our bibliography. It
comes as a surprise, therefore, that workable data was so scarce
until the late 1950's, especially in connection with debt securi-
ties, and that so few time-series analyses of individual muni-
cipalities have been published.
2. For an excellent summary of the ACIR's various studies, see
Frieden, Metropolitan America: Challenge to Federalism, and the
later case studies in volume 2 of US/ACIR "Fiscal Balance...."
3. Walker, Municipal Expenditures. See also discussion of this
problem in Rabinowitz, Municipal Bond Finance and Administration,
Chapters 7, 11 and 12.
4. These are designated as "Type C" functions in the system described
in Chapter 8 (B) below.
5. Whitelaw, W. E., An Econometric Analysis of a Municipal Budgetary
Process Based on Time-Series Data.
6. The nature of the rating system is discussed in Rabinowitz,
op. cit., Chapter 7. In addition, the author, with the assistance
of Edwin Kuh, professor of economics at MIT, had the experience of
running multiple regressions with ratings for all cities and towns
in the U.S. over 25,000 population in 1960 as the dependent vari-
ables and with time-series data on the socio-economic and fiscal
characteristics of those governments as the independent variables.
We had only moderate success in beginning to understand the
relationship between the independent variables and the ratings
assigned. One can only guess, therefore, at the real reasons for
the change in rating by Moody's.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 6: ACTUAL AND EXPECTED USES OF TAX-EXEMIPT SECURITIES
1. Clark, The Purposes of The Indebtedness of American Cities, 1880-
1912. Recall that debt outstanding for cities stood at $202
million at the end of the developmental stage analysed in
Chapter 2 above.
2. See Chapter 1 (A) and APPENDIX G.
3. Most of the data discussed here is taken from the IBA's contribu-
tion to US/JEC, "Financing...." Current data is published by the
IBA in its bulletin, and arrangements can be made for them to
provide special tabulations using their detailed information on
individual issues.
4. The primary source of data on defaults is The Bond Buyer, 67 Pearl
Street, New York City, a financial publication of great longevity
and prestige in the municipal bond field. The data they collected
is discussed in Hillhouse, Municipal Bonds, and in Neff, Trends in
Municipal Finance Since 1900.
5. Data from the Economic Reports of the President.
6. Our calculation of the relationship between the data found in the
Economic Reports of the President and that published by the IBA.
7. For further discussion of this point, see Chapter 8 (A and B).
8. See APPENDIX K.
9. For full documentation of this possibility, see Rabinowitz,
Municipal Bond Finance and Administration.
10. The analysis by Ott and Meltzer, in Federal Tax Treatment of State
and Local Securities has been generally accepted by the contending
governmental agencies as an adequate prediction of the effect of
the elimination of the tax exemption feature. See also, Rabinowitz,
op. cit., Chapter 10.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 7: INFLUENCE OF POLITICS ON THE FORM OF DEBT
1. See, for example, Studenski, P. and Mort, Centralized vs.
Decentralized Government in Relation to Democracy.
2. US/ACIR, "Fiscal Balance...." For the proposal of the National
Commission on Urban Problems, see APPENDIX F.
3. This is our interpretation of the potential for the work of
Ehrenkrantz (see bibliography) and of the building authorities
considered further in Chapter 8 (C) below.
4. The suggestions for State intervention in the process by which
municipal governments approach the capital markets on an
independent and individual basis have been discussed repeatedly
in the municipal bond field, and a number of States have, since
the 1930's, instituted controls of one sort or another over
local bond sales, but no State has yet taken over the bond
issuing function in its entirety.
5. Important sources for intuitions in this regard are listed in the
bibliography under Resources for the Future and National Bureau of
Economic Research.
6. For details on these units of governments, see Mariner, This Is
Your Massachusetts Government.
7. Professor Lloyd Rodwin has suggested that the American doctrine
is supported by the experience of the English after World War II.
8. Tabulations of relevant State laws and discussions of their
significance can be found in Secrist, Lancaster, US/ACIR's
studies of State constitutional and statutory restrictions, and
US/JEC, Vol. 2.
9. Fine descriptions of the conditions found by the muckrakers are
in Neff, Trends in Municipal Finance Since 1900, and Hillhouse,
Municipal Bonds.
10. These are gems of conventional wisdom that the author has not been
able to prove or disprove, but they are consistent with the dis-
cussion in APPENDIX I (section H) and with the discnssions of the
contemporary applications of "productivity" in Chapter 4 (B) above.
11. See discussion of New York City transit obligations in Moody's
Manual of Municipals (under category New York City).
12. See, for instance, reference to the Los Angeles situation in Haar's
Pomeroy Lecture, Conference of the American Institute of Planners,
Cincinnati, Spring, 1969.
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NOTES. TO CHAPTER 8: A NORMATIVE VIEW OF MUNICIPAL DEBT POLICY
1. A summary of the argument to this point is in Chapter 1 (A).
2. A model for this approach is in US/ACIR's concept of a "repre-
sentative" tax system by which to judge tax effort. See
definition in Chapter Note 2:17 above, and see US/ACIR's
"Measures of State and Local Fiscal Capacity and Tax Efforts."
3. A pioneering effort to consider the complementary roles of
public and community organizations is in "Fiscal Planning for
an Urban Community," under heading US/Department of Housing and
Urban Development in bibliography.
4. See discussion in Frieden, Metropolitan America: Challenge to
Federalism, with its citations to related US/ACIR studies.
5. See US/JEC, Vol. 2, "Patterns of Lease Rental Financing."
6. See Moody's Manual of Municipals, under entry for New York City
(transit).
7. This point is developed at length in a demonstration study in
Detroit, "Renewal and Revenue," which shows that urban redevelop-
ment, based on heavy land-cost write-downs, will generate suffi-
cient tax revenues only if middle- to high-income housing
replaces slum housing. See reference under US/HUD in bibliography.
8. See enabling act for New York State Urban Development Corporation.
9. See bibliography under U. S. Congress, House of Representatives,
Committee on Banking and Currency.
10. See bibliography under Harvard School of Design and American
Institute of Planners.
11. See Mace, Wheaton, and Isard in bibliography,
12. See description in Moody's Manual on municipals under appropriate
headings.
13. E.g., Housing Act of 1968, Title IV.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 9: SYNTHESIS AND GUIDELINES
1. See, for instance, Rothenberg.
2. Moore, F. T., "Operations Research on Urban Problems," (Rand), p.7.
3. For an extended discussion of the economics of property taxes on
public utilities, see Harriss, C. L., "Constitutional Restrictions
....," Section VI-13 ff.
4. New York Times, May , 1969.
5. The Vice President's Handbook for Local Officials (1967)describes:
HUD's Public Facility Loan program (p. 174), which can be used also
to provide medical facilities (p. 237) and facilities for disad-
vantaged groups (p. 247); the Department of Agriculture's program
of loans to rural community groups (p. 215); and the Department of
Commerce's Economic Development Administration's program of grants
and loans for Public Works and Development Facilities (p. 203).
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